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Abstract 
In most states, the decennial redistricting is done through a legislative process. This means 
that lawmakers decide on how electoral districts are formed. This also means that the 
lawmakers get to choose or reject their electors, which is not compatible with several 
definitions of democracy. In some states reforms are implemented either through ballot 
initiatives or court actions. Scholars have demonstrated that removing the control of this 
redistricting process from the lawmakers will increase electoral competition. There are, 
however, those who argue — before the U. S. Supreme Court — that such instances of 
direct democracy is against the intents of the Founding Fathers and thereby 
unconstitutional.  
This thesis explores the origins and development of partisan redistricting, the 
undemocratic aspects of it, and whether such an increase in electoral competition is 
traceable in the 2012 election to the U. S. House of Representatives. It shows that there is a 
very small difference between reelection rates in legislature-drawn districts and in districts 
drawn by commissions. An argument is made, that revising the redistricting process is a 
matter of political culture more than of constitutional law, and that the strongest arguments 
for a revision of state redistricting procedures are normative — not numerical. The analysis 
of election results in states with different redistricting procedures indicates that there is not 
any statistically significant difference in incumbent reelection rates, but that the dataset is 
too small to lend serious weight to any side of the argument. 
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Preface 
“You can find it all online.” How right, and how very wrong! 
Yes, much could be found online — one fragment here and another there — but rarely 
exactly what I was looking for. This has been a meticulous search for and retrieval of a 
myriad of information-fragments, combined with reading the works of historians and 
political scientists dating back to 1787 and forward to amicus briefs presented to the U. S. 
Supreme Court early March 2015.  
 
This thesis has become timelier than I intended or expected it to be one year ago. While 
this thesis is being finalized, the U. S. Supreme Court justices read fresh analyses by 
scholars whose early work triggered this thesis. In the weeks between this thesis’ 
submission and its grading, the court may halt, reverse or support the popular redistricting-
reform movements I have attempted to describe. Whatever the U. S. Supreme Court 
justices decide, hopefully, the thesis is so broadly scoped that it remains relevant, but still 
so specific that is worth reading. 
 
Some acknowledgements are due. 
 
To Elisabeth, whom I hope to spend more time with than I have during the last five years; 
to my supervisor, David C. Mauk, my other teachers and fellow NORAM-students; to all 
nameless idealists who have filled and maintain the online databases of The Brennan 
Center and Ballotpedia; to the anonymous law students who keep a watchful eye on the  
U. S. Supreme Court and maintain the SCOTUS-blog; to the redistricting professionals of 
the Iowa Legal Services Agency, who between redistricting cycles found the time to 
answer queries from a Norwegian student: 
 
Thank you.
 VIII 
 
  
 IX 
 
Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Thesis question ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.2 Rooted in the American studies ........................................................................ 2 
1.1.3 Method .............................................................................................................. 3 
1.1.4 Significance, a definition .................................................................................. 3 
1.1.5 The division line in the academic field ............................................................. 4 
1.1.6 A slim chance ................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 What is apportioning and redistricting? ................................................................... 7 
1.3 How do states organize their congressional redistricting? ....................................... 9 
1.3.1 Redistricting by Legislative Process .............................................................. 10 
1.3.2 Commissions .................................................................................................. 11 
1.3.3 Other — or simply Iowa ................................................................................. 12 
1.4 Overview ................................................................................................................ 12 
2 What is the problem with partisan redistricting? .......................................................... 14 
2.1 Overview ................................................................................................................ 14 
2.1.1 Representation ................................................................................................ 17 
2.1.2 Accountability ................................................................................................ 22 
2.1.3 Electoral competition ...................................................................................... 23 
2.1.4 Polarization ..................................................................................................... 25 
2.2 Partisan Redistricting: The Gerrymanderer’s Toolbox .......................................... 27 
2.2.1 The shapes of Sandra Day O’Connor ............................................................. 27 
2.2.2 Packing ........................................................................................................... 29 
2.2.3 Cracking ......................................................................................................... 30 
2.2.4 Kidnapping ..................................................................................................... 31 
3 Historiography of partisan redistricting ........................................................................ 32 
3.1 Early occurrences ................................................................................................... 32 
3.2 The Original Gerrymander of 1812 ....................................................................... 33 
3.3 Baker v. Carr (1962) and related cases .................................................................. 35 
3.4 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Affirmative Gerrymandering........................ 37 
3.5 New shapes: Bushmanders, the Bullwinkle and Lower Intestines ........................ 41 
 X 
 
3.6 Redistricting reforms ............................................................................................. 42 
3.6.1 California: “What Kind of Democracy is That?” .......................................... 43 
3.6.2 Arizona: The Electors vs. the Electorate. ....................................................... 44 
3.6.3 Iowa – Often Idolized, Never Imitated .......................................................... 50 
3.7 Hubris and Demolition: Shelby County v. Holder ................................................ 53 
4 Do election results depend on the redistricting method? ............................................. 56 
4.1 Apportionment, Redistricting and Election Results, State by State ...................... 56 
4.1.1 Conventions used in this chapter ................................................................... 57 
4.2 States redistricting by independent commission ................................................... 59 
4.2.1 Arizona ........................................................................................................... 59 
4.2.2 California ....................................................................................................... 59 
4.2.3 Hawaii ............................................................................................................ 60 
4.2.4 Idaho .............................................................................................................. 60 
4.2.5 New Jersey ..................................................................................................... 61 
4.2.6 Washington .................................................................................................... 61 
4.3 States without one-party control, redistricting by legislature ............................... 61 
4.3.1 Colorado ......................................................................................................... 61 
4.3.2 Indiana............................................................................................................ 62 
4.3.3 Iowa................................................................................................................ 62 
4.3.4 Kentucky ........................................................................................................ 63 
4.3.5 Louisiana ........................................................................................................ 63 
4.3.6 Minnesota ....................................................................................................... 63 
4.3.7 Mississippi ..................................................................................................... 64 
4.3.8 Missouri ......................................................................................................... 65 
4.3.9 Nevada ........................................................................................................... 65 
4.3.10 New Hampshire ............................................................................................. 66 
4.3.11 New Mexico ................................................................................................... 66 
4.3.12 New York ....................................................................................................... 66 
4.3.13 Oregon............................................................................................................ 67 
4.3.14 Virginia .......................................................................................................... 67 
4.4 States with one-party control, redistricting by legislature ..................................... 69 
4.4.1 Alabama ......................................................................................................... 69 
4.4.2 Arkansas ......................................................................................................... 69 
 XI 
 
4.4.3 Connecticut ..................................................................................................... 70 
4.4.4 Florida ............................................................................................................. 70 
4.4.5 Georgia ........................................................................................................... 72 
4.4.6 Illinois ............................................................................................................. 73 
4.4.7 Kansas ............................................................................................................. 73 
4.4.8 Maine .............................................................................................................. 74 
4.4.9 Maryland ......................................................................................................... 74 
4.4.10 Massachusetts ................................................................................................. 75 
4.4.11 Michigan ......................................................................................................... 75 
4.4.12 Nebraska ......................................................................................................... 76 
4.4.13 North Carolina ................................................................................................ 76 
4.4.14 Ohio ................................................................................................................ 77 
4.4.15 Oklahoma ....................................................................................................... 77 
4.4.16 Pennsylvania ................................................................................................... 78 
4.4.17 Rhode Island ................................................................................................... 78 
4.4.18 South Carolina ................................................................................................ 78 
4.4.19 Tennessee ....................................................................................................... 79 
4.4.20 Texas ............................................................................................................... 79 
4.4.21 Utah ................................................................................................................ 80 
4.4.22 West Virginia .................................................................................................. 80 
4.4.23 Wisconsin ....................................................................................................... 81 
4.5 States with only one congressional district ............................................................ 82 
4.5.1 Alaska ............................................................................................................. 82 
4.5.2 Delaware ......................................................................................................... 82 
4.5.3 Montana .......................................................................................................... 82 
4.5.4 North Dakota .................................................................................................. 82 
4.5.5 South Dakota .................................................................................................. 82 
4.5.6 Vermont .......................................................................................................... 82 
4.5.7 Wyoming ........................................................................................................ 82 
4.6 Analyzing the numbers .......................................................................................... 83 
4.6.1 A testable hypothesis ...................................................................................... 84 
4.6.2 The significance .............................................................................................. 86 
5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 87 
 XII 
 
Works cited .......................................................................................................................... 90 
Appendix .............................................................................................................................. 98 
State overview ...................................................................................................................... 99 
State details ........................................................................................................................ 102 
Electoral district details ...................................................................................................... 105 
Reelection rates .................................................................................................................. 124 
States redistricting by commission .................................................................................... 125 
States redistricting by legislature ....................................................................................... 126 
States redistricting by legislature with one-party control of the process ........................... 127 
States redistricting by legislature without one-party control of the process ...................... 128 
 
 
 
 
Illustrations 
Figure 1 - Texas congressional districts 18, 29 and 30 ruled illegal in Bush v.Vera (1996). 
Scales vary. .......................................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 2 - Texas congressional districts 3, 6 and 25 were left unchallenged in Bush v. Vera 
(1996) Scales vary. ............................................................................................................... 28 
Figure 3 – An example of packing. Circles = Majority of Democrats. Squares = Majority of 
Republicans. ......................................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 4 - An example of cracking. Circles = Majority of Democrats. Squares = Majority of 
Republicans. ......................................................................................................................... 30 
Figure 5 - An example of kidnapping. i = incumbent. ......................................................... 31 
Figure 6 - Illustration on page two in The Boston Gazette March 26, 1812 ........................ 33 
Figure 7 - The Columbian Centinel, April 7, 1813. ............................................................. 34 
Figure 8 - North Carolina 12th District, 1993. ..................................................................... 38 
Figure 9 - Illinois 4th District .............................................................................................. 40 
Figure 10 - New York 12th District, "The Bullwinkle" ....................................................... 41 
Figure 11 - Florida's Fifth District. Source: The Washington Post. .................................... 71 
Figure 12 - Illinois Fourth District, "the Earmuff." ............................................................. 73 
Figure 13 - Maryland's Third District. Source: The Washington Post. ............................... 74 
Figure 14 - North Carolina's Twelfth District 2012, "The Lower Intestines." Source: The 
Washingon Post ................................................................................................................... 76 
Figure 15 - Pennsylvania's Seventh District. Source: The Washington Post. ...................... 78 
Figure 16 - Texas' 35th District, "The Upside-Down Elephant." Source: The Washington 
Post. ...................................................................................................................................... 79 
 
 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Thesis question 
1.1.1 Overview  
Does method matter? In congressional redistricting, it does. Every ten years, 
following the decennial census, most of the borders around congressional districts in the 
United States are redrawn. It is the privilege of the legislators for the individual states to 
decide in what manner and where the borders around their respective congressional 
districts are redrawn.
1
 This privilege is most often used in the most blatantly partisan ways 
to secure that those in power remain in power. The habit has been criticized by leading 
scholars as unconstitutional, unfair and harmful for the political process, but it has also 
been vehemently defended by other scholars, and although redistricting plans very often 
end up in the courts, the bigger picture shows that the U. S. Supreme Court has not found 
legal grounds to interfere unless a racial bias have been obvious or districts within a state 
are indefensibly unequal in population.
2
 Redistricting is seen as an activity primarily within 
the political realm, and conflicts within that realm are to be settled primarily with political 
means, not through judicial processes. 
Those seeking reform seem to be gaining greater acceptance, as several states have 
been moved to reform their redistricting processes, either by popular initiative or by court 
action, releasing the legislature’s grip and delegating the work to more or less independent, 
neutral, non-partisan or bi-partisan groups. This thesis investigates the arguments for and 
against such moves and attempts to deduce from the 2012 congressional election results 
whether the states’ method of redistricting can be detected in election results through the 
differences in the rate of reelection of incumbents. 
                                                 
1 Section 4, clause 1 of the U. S. Constitution says “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress 
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” In an 
amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court March 2015, Stanford Law Professor Nathan Persily incepts the idea 
that this may not actually cover redistricting as such. This will be described in detail in chapter 3.6.2. 
2 The most influential cases, Baker v. Carr (1962) and Shaw v. Reno (1993) will be explored in more detail in 
chapter 3. 
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1.1.2 Rooted in the American studies 
This thesis builds upon – or suffers — from its origin, the American studies. It has 
emerged from reading Professor William E. Hudson’s American Democracy in Peril.3 
Among the eight challenges to America’s future he lists “Elections without the people’s 
voice” as one. Admittedly, Hudson does not dwell much on the redistricting process as a 
major problem; he rather points to the system of single-member plurality elections as the 
original problem, which inherently leads to gerrymandering. He does, however, point 
(lending support from the French theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau) to a lack of 
accountability through competitive elections — which gerrymandering contributes to — as 
a major obstacle to a representative democracy.
4
 Even in the most voter-relaxed of his four 
democracy models, the pluralist democracy, competitive elections is an absolute 
prerequisite.    
Interdisciplinarity is a central aspect of this thesis, and any suffering will originate 
from what Philip Deloria in his address to the American Studies Association called the 
initial framing of their academic field; it was what they refused to exclude rather than what 
they chose to include.
5
 In this thesis, congressional redistricting will be examined as a 
historical phenomenon, as a normative question and as a matter of statistics. A risk of 
overreaching is admittedly present, but even a quick glance at redistricting, gerrymandering 
all the polarization, all the court cases, all the public activity it leads to and the voluminous 
academic literature will tell an observer that this subject is too multi-faceted to be 
examined from one angle alone. 
A mild warning against deep-diving into numbers is detectable in another 
cornerstone of the American studies syllabus. Towards the end of University of Maryland 
Professor Gene Wise’s “Paradigm dramas of the American Studies”, he tells the story of 
how academic greats like Henry Nash Smith and Leo Marx scoffed at quantative questions 
and how the “counting fad (…) waned.”6 Nevertheless, because elections, come Election 
Day, is all about numbers, which do provide a useful check of theories, a deep dive into the 
numbers is a major part of this thesis.  
                                                 
3 William E. Hudson. American Democracy in Peril: Eight Challenges to America's Future.  Los Angeles: 
CQ Press, 2013. 
4 Hudson. 43. 
5 P.J. Deloria.  "Broadway and Main: Crossroads, Ghost Roads, and Paths to an American Studies Future." [In 
English]. American Quarterly 61, no. 1 (Mar 2009): 1-25. 
6 Gene Wise. ""Paradigm Dramas" in American Studies: A Cultural and Institutional History of the 
Movement." American Quarterly 21, no. 3 (1979): 293-337.334. 
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1.1.3 Method 
The thesis examines the balance of power in each state by checking who controls 
the state house of representatives, the state senate and the governorship.
7
 If partisan 
redistricting affects competition in politics, the rate of incumbents being reelected should 
— when adjusted for other factors — be higher in states where the incumbents’ party 
controls the legislature and the elected politicians themselves take care of the redistricting. 
States with an independent body handling the redistricting should —again, adjusted for 
other factors — have a lower rate of reelection.  
The immediate problem at hand is how to adjust for those other factors, such as all 
the advantages at hand for incumbents: The backing of a national party, name recognition, 
an experienced staff, a full time job on the political arena and several statistics showing a 
more than ninety percent chance of reelection — which may keep financial supporters from 
betting on the opposition. The complexity of quantifying such an adjustment is way beyond 
a master’s thesis and quite possibly beyond more extensive research, since the unknown 
factors are many and the applicability of the end result may be of little practical use. This 
has not hindered several scholars in establishing a cause-effect relationship between 
redistricting method and the level of electoral competition. Professors Jamie L. Carson, 
Michael H. Crespin and Michael McDonald have all published research showing this, and 
their works are referenced in greater detail throughout this thesis.  
While being aware of those other factors, we will build a matrix of who controls the 
house, the senate, the governorship, the redistricting and if there is an incumbent running 
for reelection. With those data at hand, we will see whether to what degree we can predict 
the outcome and we will check this prediction against the election results. 
1.1.4 Significance, a definition 
A definition on “significance” is due. In statistical terms, “significant” signals that 
ninety-five percent of the data is within the expected range, a confidence level of 0.05. 
Here, we can almost dismiss that before even looking at reelection rates. We have so few 
relevant data points that one single fluke election result will tip the scales. Nevertheless, we 
will do the math. Outside chapter 4.6, in which we check the numbers, “significant” is used 
                                                 
7 The official name of the lower house of the forty-nine states with bicameral legislatures varies. In this thesis 
“state assembly” and “house of representatives” are used interchangeably. 
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according to the Oxford Dictionaries’ definition: “sufficiently great or important to be 
worthy of attention.” 
1.1.5 The division line in the academic field 
 In 2002, in a much-cited Harvard Law Review article — which is examined more 
closely in chapter 2 — Professor Samuel Issacharoff of Columbia Law School applied a 
consumer/market-approach to the process of redistricting as a way of moving past “the 
morass” created by Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno (1993).8 He argued that the American 
tradition of gerrymandering stifles competition in a way that would trigger anti-trust 
measures if performed by Coca Cola Company and PepsiCo. Issacharoff argued that even 
bipartisan compromises are subject to scrutiny for the same reason; they are market actors 
dividing turf for their own good, effectively disenfranchising voters. He proposed that in 
order to restore competition and end racial gerrymandering political insiders should lose 
the right to control the redistricting process. 
The article was met by an array of opponents, most notably Nathaniel Persily, then 
Assistant Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania. In his “In defense of Foxes 
Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting 
Gerrymanders” in Harvard Law Review he lauded Issacharoff’s initiative and “good 
normative arguments,” but disagreed with both his premises and proposed solutions.9 
According to Persily, there is plenty of turnover in the House, districts are indeed 
competitive, a low level of competition is not necessarily an evil and there are other factors 
more important than gerrymandering causing this high rate of reelection. This discussion is 
still ongoing among scholars, but the main division lines in the debate remain the same as 
between Issacharoff and Persily, who did, however, agree on one subject: States which 
outsource the redistricting process to a more or less independent body have lower litigation 
expenses related to redistricting than those who do not. Fourteen years later, however, now 
Stanford Professor Persily warmly defended removing redistricting from legislators in an 
amicus brief before the U. S. Supreme Court. That will be explored in detailed in chapter 
3.6.2, which concerns the redistricting reforms in Arizona. Recent events in Arizona may 
demonstrate that now, even commission-states may risk high litigation expenses.  
                                                 
8 Samuel Issacharoff. "Gerrymandering and Political Cartels." Harvard Law Review 116, no. 2 (2002): 593-
648. 
9 Nathaniel Persily. "In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to 
Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders." Harvard Law Review 116, no. 2 (2002): 649-83. 
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Seven states need no redistricting in congressional elections, as they have only one 
representative in the House, but the 43 others have chosen widely different methods for 
handling the redistricting process. These may be divided into groups according to several 
criteria, which will be explained more in detail in chapter 1.3. The most common method is 
legislative redistricting, in which a redistricting plan is proposed, voted upon, signed by the 
state governor and enacted in the same manner as any other state law. Other states delegate 
it to a more or less independent, neutral, partisan or bipartisan commission. The lines 
between these groups are not always razor-sharp, their alleged neutrality may be 
questioned, and we will keep that in mind when analyzing the results in chapter  4.1.  
The most recent national decennial census was held in 2010, and the biggest losers 
were Ohio and New York, which each lost two seats, while Texas was the biggest winner, 
gaining four seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.
10
 Six states gained and ten lost, but 
due to internal population shifts, every state had to go through the redistricting process well 
before the 2012 elections.  
This thesis offers an examination of the results of the 2012 congressional election to 
see if the states’ choice of redistricting method is reflected in the results. The question to be 
answered in this thesis is “Can House election results to a significant degree be predicted 
by the states’ choice of redistricting method?” This will be attempted by looking at the rate 
of incumbent reelection for every state and for every category of redistricting method.  
1.1.6 A slim chance 
At the outset one must acknowledge that the chances of finding a definitive answer 
in the election results are slim. In a series of articles on the subject of redistricting and 
electoral competition in the Harvard Law Review in 2006, Assistant Professor of 
Government and Politics at George Mason University, Michael P. McDonald, who is 
clearly on Issacharoff’s side of the discourse, admits that “with so few competitive districts 
now and few neutral redistricting institutions, it is difficult to measure the contemporary 
effect of redistricting institutions on competitive districts and of competitive districts on 
elections.”11 Since this thesis concerns itself with a later census than the ones McDonald 
analyzed, after which big states like California and Arizona have reformed their 
                                                 
10 Kristin D. Burnett. "Congressional Apportionment: 2010 Census Briefs." United States Census Bureau, 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf. 
11 Michael P. McDonald. "Drawing the Line on District Competition." PS: Political Science and Politics 39, 
no. 1 (2006): 91-94. 
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redistricting processes, the odds for finding such an effect should be somewhat better, but 
the reelection rate is still high and the number of competitive districts small. According to 
the Brennan Center for Justice, seventy-nine incumbents left the U.S. House of 
Representatives following the 2012 election. Of these, only twenty-six lost on Election 
Day.
12
 The others chose not to run for reelection or lost to a challenger from their own 
party in the primaries. One could argue that losing to a challenger in the primary should be 
counted as a lost reelection, but in this thesis it is not, since in several states, only a fraction 
of the voters may take part in this decision. If all states had open, unified primaries, the 
argument for counting primary-losers would be stronger, but in fact states have closed, 
semi-closed, open, semi-open, blanket, nonpartisan blanket and unified primaries. 
Including primary-losers would add substantially to the complexity of this thesis, but not 
illuminate the subject to any noticeable degree, so in this thesis they are not counted.  
  
                                                 
12 Sundeep Iyer. "Redistricting and Congressional Control Following the 2012 Election." Brennan Center for 
Justice, http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/redistricting-and-congressional-control-following-2012-
election. 
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1.2 What is apportioning and redistricting? 
“In total, legislative redistricting is one of the most conflictual forms of 
regular politics in the United States short of violence.”13 
In order to understand redistricting, one needs to understand apportioning, which is 
the process of dividing the seats in the House of Representatives among the states. It is 
rooted in the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 2, which already in its original 
form stated that representatives “shall be apportioned among the several States (…) 
according to their respective Numbers” and mandated that the most recent federal 
decennial census would be the basis for apportionment. 
In 1789 the first House of Representatives consisted of sixty-five members, and 
with every state constitutionally guaranteed at least one House representative, each House 
member representing a population of approximately 30,000. As the nation expanded, the 
number of representatives grew to 435 in 1910, when the House itself placed a limit on its 
membership, which resulted in an average district population of 210,328.
14
 The number has 
been kept at 435 since then, except for a brief period in 1959-1962, when Alaska and 
Hawaii were admitted as states and awarded one representative each. The average 
congressional district population, following the 2010 Census apportionment, was 710,767. 
The most populous state, California, currently has fifty-three representatives. There are 
seven states with only one representative: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming. Among these seven we find the districts with both 
the highest and lowest populations. Montana’s single district counted 994,416. Rhode 
Island’s two districts averaged 527,624. According to the 2010 Census, the resident 
population of the United States was 308,745,538. 
The U. S. Census Bureau carries out the apportionment, according to “the method 
of equal proportions,” a formula used since 1940.15 First, every state is awarded one house 
seat each. The remaining 385 seats are awarded according to this formula: 𝑃𝑉(𝑛) =
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
√n∗(n−1)
. To find the priority value, PV, of a state’s second or 53rd seat, 
n is substituted with 2 or 53, respectively. All these priority values are sorted, and the 
                                                 
13 Andrew Gelman and Gary King. "Enhancing Democracy through Legislative Redistricting." The American 
Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 541-59. Quoted in Nathaniel Persily’s brief in support of the 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commision to the U. S. Supreme Court, March 2015. 
14 Kristin D. Burnett. "Congressional Apportionment: 2010 Census Briefs." United States Census Bureau, 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf. 
15 "Computing Apportionment." United States Census Bureau, 
https://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/computing.html. 
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remaining seats in the U. S. House of Representatives are awarded to those 385 with the 
highest priority values. Using the formula, a 54
th
 seat for California has a priority value of 
37,341,989
√54∗(53)
=  698,012. A second seat for Wyoming has a priority value of 
568,300
√2 ∗(1)
=
 401,849, which means that California — which after the 2010 apportionment was 
awarded 53 seats — is closer to gaining its 54th seat than Wyoming is to gaining a second 
seat. The most populated of the single-seat states — Montana — would have a priority 
value of 
994,416
√2∗(1)
=  703,158 for its second seat, which would rank above California’s 54th. 
The result of the apportionment is to be delivered to the President no later than nine 
months after the census date, which since 1930 has been April 1. Within one week of the 
next congressional session, the President is to inform the Clerk of the United States House 
of Representatives, who then must notify the state governors within 15 days. For the 2010 
census, that was January 25, 2011. How the redistricting is handled from then on, is not 
specified by federal law and thereby up to the individual states, which each does it in its 
distinctive way, but largely within a common pattern. Washington, which is one of the five 
states to carry out redistricting through the means of an independent or bipartisan 
commission, may serve as an example, since the timelines of states with other methods are 
largely the same. 
In Washington state, the four caucuses — the Republican and Democratic 
groupings from the state House and Senate — each appoint a member to the redistricting 
commission in January. 
16
 None of the four appointees can be politically active, hold 
political office, serve as lobbyists, run for public office for the next two years or have done 
so the last two years. Those four appointees then appoint a fifth non-voting member. At 
least three of the four voting members must agree on a redistricting proposal in the form of 
a detailed map, which is to be submitted to the state legislature by January 1 the following 
year. No later than the state assembly’s 30th day in session – which in 2012 was February 
10 – the legislature must pass the redistricting proposal. Any boundary changes require a 
2/3 majority in both houses of the state legislature. If the required majorities are not met by 
the commission or the legislature, the Washington State Supreme Court determines the 
redistricting. After Legislative Day, the maps are put to use in the state primaries.
17
  
                                                 
16 Patrick McDonald. Email from Assistant to the State Secretary of Washington, July 14, 2014.  
17 Patrick McDonald. "General Information on the Congressional and Legislative Redistricting Process and 
Timeline." Washington: Washington Secretary of State, 2010. 
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It must be noted that redistricting is in no way an activity limited to congressional 
elections. There are electoral districts to be drawn for all levels of political administration, 
not at least for the state house of representatives, but also for city councils, school boards, 
city comptrollers and a wide range of elections according to each individual state’s laws 
and regulations. This thesis, however, will only examine elections for the U. S. House of 
Representatives. 
1.3 How do states organize their congressional 
redistricting? 
Seven states—Alaska, Delaware, Montana, Maryland, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Vermont and Wyoming—have no need for congressional redistricting, as they have only 
one congressional district, due to their small populations. Classification of these processes 
is not a straightforward task. Different scholars and publications apply different categories. 
In a comparative study of processes, Professor Michael P. McDonald divides states into 
these four categories with regard to congressional redistricting: “Legislative process,” 
“Legislative process/commission,” “Commission” and “Other.” 18 The electoral database 
website Ballotpedia operates with “Commission-based,” “Legislative-based,” and “Hybrid” 
for example. Professors Jamie L. Carson, Michael H. Crespin and Ryan D. Williamson use 
“Legislative,” “Court” and “Commission” as their categories when evaluating the 2012 
elections — which may be seen as a pragmatic approach, as a considerable number of 
redistricting cases move from legislature to courts. It does, however, mask the negative 
effects of legislative processes, as most court-decided cases start out as legislative cases. 
19
 
This thesis will use neither. Professor McDonald’s categories are closest to being 
preferred, but while reviewing the different states methods, it became evident that 
“commission” is a malleable term with such wide-ranging implications. Some commissions 
are simply advisory, and their advice is easily disregarded, as it happened in Virginia in 
2011-2012.
20
 Other commissions are only for practical, administrative purposes, as 
conducting public hearings, as in Iowa. Some commissions are intended to be independent 
legal bodies, free from bindings to the state legislature, as in Arizona, but that does not 
                                                 
18 L. Handley  and B. Grofman (2008). Redistricting in comparative perspective. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 56. 
19 J. Carson et al. (2014). "Reevaluating the Effects of Redistricting on Electoral Competition, 1972-2012." 
State Politics & Policy Quarterly 14(2): 165-177. 168. 
20 This is described in chapter 4.3.14 
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keep the state legislature from dragging the committee before the U. S. Supreme Court. The 
“Court” category used by Carson et al is a pragmatic approach, but most court-decided 
redistrictings are originally legislative processes — albeit failed processes, but still 
legislative processes. When the Texas legislature chooses to hand the process over to the 
courts, it is a politically motivated move made by the majority in the Texas state legislature 
in order to achieve a — for them — more desirable result.21  Counting these states as a 
separate category of “others” or “judicial” would mask the effects that this thesis attempts 
to unmask. Some advisory commissions are of the same nature; just false scaffolding 
masking a partisan, legislative process. Their existence gives some credence to the process, 
but their advice is neither wanted nor heeded, as in Virginia 2012.
22
  
We thereby are left with only two clearly defined groups. First, we have states 
redistricting through the legislature. Second, we have states redistricting through some sort 
of commission. If those commissions are not clearly independent, the process of the state in 
question will be classified as legislative. 
1.3.1 Redistricting by Legislative Process 
During the 2001 redistricting process, thirty-eight states handled redistricting as a 
legislative procedure, leaving it entirely up to active state politicians to control the 
remapping of the political landscape. In 2011 the National Conference of State Legislatures 
counted twenty-nine states drawing legislative districts only through state legislative 
authority without the help of commissions.
23
 In these states a revised map of electoral 
districts is presented in the same way as any other legislative bill. It must first pass through 
the state legislature’s lower chamber, second through the upper chambers and third be 
approved by the state governor. If one party controls all those three branches or has a 
majority large enough to override a governor’s veto, the map may — and most often will 
— be drawn in the most partisan way legally possible. As the chair of the Texas state 
Republican Party, Susan Waddington, phrased it to the Fort Worth Star Telegram during 
the 2001 redistricting process: “We weren’t overly sensitive to protecting anyone in 
particular, and particularly not Democrats. We make no bones about that. We’re the 
                                                 
21 More details in 4.4.20 
22 More details in chapter 4.3.14. 
23 Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin and Wyoming. 
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Republican Party.” 24 If a political party controls only one or two branches, either a deal is 
struck or the case goes to court, usually the state Supreme Court, and a bipartisan solution 
is more likely. 
The Republicans tight grip on the pencil that draws the electoral maps is founded on 
a broad experience of being on the suffering side of partisan redistricting. Bill Brock, who 
was chairman of the Republican National Committee from 1977 to 1981, made winning 
control of state legislatures one of his main objectives. This, he said, he did out of fear that 
Democrats in control of state legislatures would lead to the GOP “being gerrymandered out 
of existence.” 25 
Legislative processes are most often led by subcommittees in the state legislature. 
Quite frequently state legislatures fail to come up with a plan, and the redistricting is done 
by federal judges or experts appointed by judicial panels or by the Governor. Some 
legislatures may even choose to fail deliberately, in order to circumvent the pre-clearance 
demands posed by Section Five of The Voting Rights Act of 1965. A belief that a panel of 
judges may be more lenient than the Department of Justice may motivate such a move, as 
suspected in Texas in 2011, as described in Chapter 4.4.20.  
1.3.2 Commissions 
Twenty states used a commission for some function during the redistricting process 
following the 2010 census. 
26
 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington gave 
commissions the primary responsibility for drawing the maps. Maine and Vermont used 
only advisory commissions. Connecticut, Illinois, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Texas kept 
commissions as backups, should the legislature fail to agree on the new maps. For several 
of these states, however, the commissions were used only for drawing electoral districts for 
the state legislature. The legislatures of Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, Ohio and 
Pennsylvania remained in control of the congressional redistricting, and the one-district-
states of Alaska and Montana have no need for congressional redistricting. 
                                                 
24 Quoted in Lisa Handley and Bernard Grofman. Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 57. 
25 Michael McDonald. "Redistricting, Dealignment, and the Political Homogenization of Congressional 
Districts." Dissertation abstracts international 60, no. 5 (1999): 1747. 15. 
26 "Redistricting Commissions: Redistricting Plans." National Conference of State Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.aspx.  
 12 
 
It must – again – be emphasized that a “commission” is not an entity with fixed 
attributes. Its composition and its mandates vary widely. Some are just partisan tools for a 
political party. Others are bipartisan or bipartisan with a supposedly neutral tiebreaker. 
Some commissions aspire to be neutral. Some have only an advisory function, and others 
are free and mandated to present the legislature with a map to vote on. The criteria, on 
which those committees are supposed to base their drawing, also vary widely. In one state, 
Illinois, increasing competition is one criterion of several which the commission must take 
into account when drawing its maps. In states where the governor comes from the party 
controlling the legislature a commission may be instructed – on or off the record – to 
protect the incumbents. It is alto worth noting that being bipartisan is not the same as being 
neutral. According to Issacharoff’s early Harvard Law Review initiative, bipartisan 
commissions tend to protect incumbents from two parties. Neutrality is protecting none. 
1.3.3 Other — or simply Iowa 
In Iowa, the legislators leave redistricting to professionals, but still — formally — 
the Iowa State legislature has the final word. There is some disagreement on whether Iowa 
is a commission-state, a legislature-state or something unique. This will be described in 
detail in chapter 3.6.3.  
1.4 Overview 
In chapter two we look more closely at what challenges partisan redistricting poses 
to a democracy, according to conflicting theories, in terms of representation, accountability 
and competition. We also examine the technical aspects of gerrymandering and look into 
packing, cracking and kidnapping as tools for gaining political power.  
There is some debate on the exact meaning of “gerrymandering,” but in this thesis 
the terms “partisan (re)districting” and “gerrymandering” can be used interchangeably, 
both meaning “shaping election districts to dilute the effect of the opponents’ votes and to 
increase the effect of the supporters’ votes.” An overview of alternate meanings is found in 
chapter 2.2 - The Gerrymanderer’s Toolbox. A detailed look into the events leading to the 
christening of this political tool is found in chapter 3.2 - The Original Gerrymander of 
1812. 
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The historiography section in chapter 3 aims to show that politicians gerrymandered 
long before Massachusetts’ Governor Elbridge Gerry’s name became attached to it. The 
chapter draws a line from the American Revolution, via the 1960s U. S. Supreme Court 
rulings, to current landmark court cases. 
Chapter 4 is an analysis of the incumbents’ reelection rate in the 2012 election for 
the U. S. House of Representatives. By gathering information on each individual state’s 
redistricting method, on which party controls it’s one or two chambers of legislature, on 
which party-affiliation its governor has and on whether any incumbent U. S. House 
representative has run and won or lost, we check to see if there is a pattern or correlation 
between these factors before reaching a conclusion in chapter 5. 
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2 What is the problem with partisan 
redistricting? 
2.1 Overview 
The main theme in debates on redistricting is “fairness.” A debate on what is fair or 
unfair is bound to be a normative debate, although some attempts have been made to 
quantify levels of competition. Even then, if the two sides of the debate agree on how to 
compute the levels of competition, they do not necessarily agree on whether redistricting is 
the main cause — or even a significant factor— affecting the competitive levels of 
elections. The immediate and undisputed effect of partisan redistricting is that, given 
control of the redistricting process, politicians or political organizations may secure 
themselves representation — and thereby power — not proportional to their popular 
support. Fair elections are cornerstones of democracy, but political systems in general — 
and the American is no exception — are usually results of history, balance of power, 
circumstance and caught or lost opportunities. As a result, “fairness” is not a defining trait 
or attribute of congressional elections. Nevertheless, voters need to maintain some belief 
that elections are held in a fair manner. Otherwise, there would be no incentive to vote. Nor 
would there be any morally founded incentive to respect the institutions based on those 
elections. 
There is no unified definition of “fairness” in electoral context, but it is reasonable 
to include “one person, one vote” and representation in Congress proportional to the 
number of votes cast as safely within most people’s criteria for fairness in elections. In her 
doctoral dissertation, political scientist Jenna Ashley Robinson argues that “elimination of 
malapportionment is not enough to ensure fairness.”27 There are other, equally important 
factors, like fighting racial bias and historical wrongdoings. She attributes the recent 
electoral reforms, in which the power of redistricting is removed from legislators, to a fight 
for procedural fairness. 
28
 
Building a normative argument for partisan redistricting — seen as an isolated 
phenomenon — may prove hard. Political columnist Walter Shapiro is plainspoken on that 
subject: “It is impossible to make a high-minded moral case for the virtues of 
                                                 
27 Jenna Ashley Robinson. "Partisan Bias and Competition." Doctoral Thesis, Chapel Hill, 2012. 4. 
28 Robinson. 6. 
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gerrymandering.” 29 In politics, however, most actions are not seen as isolated. “Chicago-
style politics” is used as an expression for a power-play where “right or wrong” is 
secondary to “in or out of political office,” and this kind of politics is in no way limited to 
Chicago. The following events in Illinois in 2001 illustrate both what can be achieved 
through redistricting and how normative arguments may lose out to political ambition. 
In July 2001 an outfoxed young state senator from Chicago, Barack Hussein 
Obama, complained to his local newspaper, the Hyde Park Herald: “The system of 
redistricting in the U. S. tends to allow representatives to choose people, instead of people 
choosing representatives.” Obama had challenged the incumbent Bobby Rush, a seasoned 
political veteran, for the Illinois First District’s seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
He had caught Rush’ attention when he won almost thirty percent of the votes in the 2000 
Illinois Democratic Party primaries. When the congressional voting district maps were 
redrawn in 2001, both Obama and another challenger found their home addresses outside 
the redrawn Illinois First District. This rendered their chances of winning an election slim, 
since carpetbaggers — opportunistic outsiders — tend to wear out their welcome, and if 
they win, they must move to reside within their electoral district. A spokesperson for Rush 
assured the Hyde Park Herald that the incumbent did not even know where Obama lived. 
Separated from his old district by only two blocks and now competing with a much more 
well-known name — Jesse Jackson Jr. — Obama withdrew from the congressional race 
before the maps were approved.
 
So did the other challenger. 
30
 
In 2001, the Illinois Democrats had won the decennial lottery which decides who 
gains control of the electoral map drawing. 
31
 The state legislature district maps were drawn 
at a later date than the congressional maps. John Corrigan, the Democratic consultant in 
charge of redistricting has since told the story of how Obama in September of 2001 made 
sure that his home district, his electoral base for the state senate, was expanded northwards 
to encapsulate whiter, more affluent and influential neighborhoods – and also with more 
Republican voters. In this way Obama secured himself a broader and financially stronger 
home base, fit for his soon-to-follow run for the U. S. Senate and for his later and larger 
ambitions. 
32
 When interviewed by his local newspaper about the Republicans’ objections 
to the Democrats’ blatant gerrymandering, Obama in September provided a view matured 
                                                 
29 Walter Shapiro. "Why Gerrymandering Doesn't Explain Congressional Extremism - And Masks the Real 
Problems." Brennan Center for Justice, http://www.brennancenter.org/print/10718. 
30 Todd Spivak. "Rush Opponents Are Drawn out of First District." Hyde Park Herald, July 4 2001. 
31 Illinois uses a commission if the legislature fails to agree on redistricting — and it has failed since 1970. 
The nine member bipartisan commission elects its tiebreaking 9th member by lottery.  
32 Ryan Lizza. "Making It. How Chicago Shaped Obama." The New Yorker, July 21 2008. 
 16 
 
since he himself was outmaneuvered in July: “For Republicans to squawk too much is 
inappropriate.” 33  
Obama’s July argument — that politicians choose their voters — echoes the most 
common argument used against partisan redistricting: It goes against the idea of democratic 
representation. Another frequently used argument is that partisan redistricting takes away 
accountability. If legislators adjust districts to avoid real confrontation, voters are bereft of 
the right to hold their elected officials accountable. The third argument — which is often 
used among those campaigning for election reforms — is that drawing safe districts 
eliminates electoral competition, which again might result in politicians less responsive to 
their voters’ wishes and need. A fourth argument against partisan redistricting is the 
increased polarization — a more combative and less pragmatic approach to politics. This 
chapter examines further all those four — much overlapping — arguments: Representation, 
accountability, competition and polarization.  
It must be noted, however, that the overall effect of partisan redistricting – on a 
larger scale and over time – is disputed. This was reflected in Obama’s September 2001 
argument: If everybody does it, injustices and inequalities will even out over time. Even 
some of those arguing the dangers of partisan redistricting agree that other factors — 
incumbents’ financial supremacy and changes in the nation’s political geography — may 
contribute more to the increasing polarization and to the decreasing electoral competition 
than gerrymandering does. At least one paradox is apparent: If partisan redistricting stifles 
political competition – which scholars have successfully argued – moving the redistricting 
processes out of the smoke-filled backrooms and out in the open should cause a drop in the 
election victory margins. No such drop is noticeable. The Washington Post notes that in 
1962 members of the U. S. House of Representatives won on average 65 percent of the 
votes in their electorate. This number maxed out at 71 percent in 2002 and slid back to 65 
in 2012. 
34
 
  
                                                 
33 Todd Spivak. "Democrats Would Be King under New State Remap." Hyde Park Herald, September 26 
2001. 
34 Philip Bump. "Gerrymandering Matters Less Than You Might Think." Washington Post, August 18 2014. 
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2.1.1 Representation 
Partisan redistricting affects both how and whether citizens are represented in 
Congress. This is above dispute, as it is by definition the purpose of gerrymandering. The 
concept of representation, however, is in itself disputed. This chapter will show that, while 
the most common argument is that gerrymandering skewers representation, some argue that 
partisan redistricting actually improves representation.  
In his widely debated article How Democratic is America, Professor Howard Zinn 
of Boston University argued in 1985 that representation “by its very nature is 
undemocratic.” 35 This was immediately (in the very same volume of Points of View) 
blown off as “Rosseauistic nonsense” by philosophy professor Sidney Hook of New York 
University. However, Zinn presented a — within a debate on redistricting and 
gerrymandering — seemingly valid argument when he with support from James Madison 
and Federalist No. 10 defended his position by arguing that “the representative tends to 
become a member of a special elite; he has privileges which weaken his sense of concern at 
others' grievances.” This was written decades before Arizona’s state legislators sued to 
overturn the outcome of a public ballot, but as a characterization of recent events in 
Arizona, it is on target. 
36
 
In Federalist no. 2, John Jay counted “a people descended from the same ancestors, 
speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles 
of government” among the blessings of the young republic. While Jay’s 1787 writings in 
support of ratifying the United States Constitution may have bluntly disregarded the 
diversity of the nation’s origins, as political analysis his comment was still was precise. 
Besides some influence from French thinkers, the American political system is largely 
based on the English representative system, which predates both representative government 
and the concept of the sovereignty, according to Yale Professor Edmund S. Morgan. 
37
  
In his 1983 book Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England 
and America, Morgan draws a line from 13
th
 century England through the American 
Revolution. He argues that there was no concept of “We, the People” or of citizens’ rights. 
There was, however, a sovereign king acting as God’s lieutenant, with an administrative 
need to communicate with his subjects to ensure that his taxes and laws were accepted, 
                                                 
35 Howard Zinn, ed. How Democratic Is America. edited by R. E. DiClerico and A. S. Hammond, Points of 
View. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1989. 
36 The Arizona case is described in detail in chapter 3.6.2. 
37 Edmund S Morgan. Inventing the People : The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America. 
Kindle edition, 2013 reprint ed. New York: Norton, 1988. Location 538/6567. 
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collected and obeyed. The king summoned representatives from boroughs and commons to 
satisfy his needs — not the needs of his subjects. Those representatives were required to 
have the full power of attorney from their boroughs, so that a declaration of consent from 
them to the king’s orders would not need any reassurance from the local subjects. 
Representation was in other words not a right claimed by the king’s subjects, but by the 
king or by noblemen serving their own interest by surrounding the king with controllable 
representatives from the noblemen’s own districts. Morgan brands it as “an obligation 
imposed from above.” 38 
In a country emerged from a revolution sparked by the slogan “No Taxation 
Without Representation,” it may seem self-evident that the concept of representation is 
crucial. The most basic building block of a representative democracy is the notion that 
every eligible voter is actually represented by someone that the voter voted for, that his or 
her voice is echoed in some way in a house of representatives. Morgan’s preferred term for 
this notion of representation — and for other perceived notions of power balance — is 
“fiction.” 39 He also calls the king’s infallibility and sovereignty a fiction, in time to be 
replaced by another fiction— the belief in people’s rights. Some of these fictions, he notes, 
are so vital to upholding a belief-system that they are branded “self-evident” — like the 
assumption of the need for the consent of the governed, and the belief that all men are 
created equal. It must be emphasized that Morgan’s calling a phenomenon fictional does 
not imply that it has no real implications or is without consequence, only that it is based on 
perceptions of reality, which are prone to change over time.  
In England, as God’s lieutenants, the thirteenth and seventeenth century kings were 
above criticism and beyond reproach. Even if the thirteenth century Magna Carta was 
aimed to protect free men from the random actions of a sovereign king, the king ruled with 
the blessings of the Pope in Rome as a god’s lieutenant. As a result, any opposing view had 
to be framed in non-confrontational universal terms. Both in the House of Lords and the 
House of Commons obligations and rights were claimed as universal — not as of personal 
interest to a particular baron or borough — even if this very well could have been the case. 
Out of this grew the fiction of rights and representation, argues Morgan, who finds it 
remarkable that “they were able to turn the subjection of subjects and the exaltation of the 
king into a means of limiting his authority.” 40 
                                                 
38 Morgan. 603/6567. 
39 David Hume. Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. 1758. 
40 Morgan. 232. 
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The English system of representation, matured over several centuries, was exported 
to the first colonies. In the 1630s, for example, King Charles awarded Lord Baltimore the 
right to issue laws for the British colony of Maryland, but only with the consent of the free 
men residing there. Morgan draws a picture of a colony in which a confusion of 
representation, delegation and revocation of delegated powers was common among the free 
men of Maryland. What is remarkable, stresses Morgan, was that representatives in all the 
early colonies were representatives for geographical districts, just as they were in England. 
They were apportioned and elected based on geography, not on political faction or 
industrial need. Founded by trading companies, Massachusetts and Virginia deviated from 
this principle briefly, but popular reaction put an end to that. A century later, before the 
American Revolution, the principles of representative democracy were widely recognized. 
What Morgan now brands a fiction, was by 1776 a truth held to be self-evident. 
The Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume, whose writings inspired many 
of the Founding Fathers, also highlighted the fictional aspect — not of representation, but 
of government — when he in 1758 wrote that “Force is always on the side of the governed, 
the governors have nothing to support them but opinion.” 41 While the king’s right to power 
was reckoned as old fiction, representative government was the vanguard of political 
science. In Federalist no. 10, Jay’s constitutional co-promoter and -writer, James Madison, 
made the case for a representative government. He emphasized the cooling effects of a 
representative system within a large republic, envisioning that it would limit the effects of 
hot-tempered majorities within smaller political entities and add stability in a large 
territory. 
42
 
 The very notion that one man in Congress represents another — or even a whole 
county — may be branded a fiction, but should that fiction lose credibility among the 
electorate, the very foundation of representative democracy is threatened. This was 
reflected in the doctoral dissertation of Elmer Cummings Griffith in 1907. He focused on 
representation as the foremost sufferer of gerrymandering:  
                                                 
41 Hume. 1758. 
42 Hudson.5. 
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The gerrymander is a political device of far-reaching effect. It sets aside 
the will of the popular majority. It is a species of fraud, deception, and 
trickery which menaces the perpetuity of the Republic of the United 
States more threateningly than does, perhaps, the unjustice [sic] of unjust 
taxation, for it deals more fundamentally with representative 
government.
43
  
Despite the moral indignation from Griffith and others, gerrymanderers were safe from any 
repercussions from others than the electorate — which was manipulated by the 
gerrymandering. The law remained silent on gerrymandering for centuries. 
The first U. S. Supreme Court ruling to interfer with partisan redistricting, Baker v. 
Carr (1962) ensured that being underrepresented actually could be litigated, and Reynolds 
v. Sims (1964) and Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) both upheld the principle of one person, 
one vote. The problem with partisan redistricting is that while two votes may carry the 
same numerical weight, one may carry this weight in a place where it is of no use. 
In a political system of single-member districts there lies an inherent risk that the 
number of “wasted” votes is bound to be high. Professor of Political Science, William E. 
Hudson makes an argument for a goodbye to the single-member pluralities of USA, since 
within such a system, only those who voted for the winner will actually gain any political 
representation. 
44
 With an average winning vote percentage of sixty-five to the U. S. House 
of Representatives, as much as thirty-five percent of the voters will be without 
representation.  
In Nathan Persily’s 2001 rebuttal to Samuel Issacharoff in Harvard Law Review, he 
argues that the U. S. Supreme Court in Gaffney v. Cummings (1973) — which concludes 
that a redistricting plan can still be constitutional despite minor differences in population 
size between electoral districts — underlines that partisan redistricting used to ensure a 
representation roughly proportional to the electorate does not constitute an obviously 
“invidious discrimination.” 45 Issacharoff had in Harvard Law Review argued that the U. S. 
Supreme Court had gotten it “exactly backwards” and should worry more — not less — 
when political parties cooperate. 
Increasing competition has been the main focus of several election reforms during 
the last decade, but Associate Professor Thomas L. Brunell at the University of Texas at 
Dallas respectfully disagrees with the emphasis on increasing the number of competitive 
                                                 
43 Elmer Cummings Griffith. The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander. Chicago: Scott, Foresman & 
Co., 1907. 7. 
44 Hudson. 180. 
45 Gaffney v. Cummings (1973) 
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districts: “The goal of redistricting is not to maximize the number of seats that switch from 
one party to the other every two years; rather the goal of redistricting is for the House to 
pass legislation in such a way that policy preferences among the electorate are reflected in 
policy outputs. Drawing districts on the basis of ideology satisfies this goal, while drawing 
competitive districts does not.” 46 
Brunell chooses representation over competition. In his 2006 article in PS: Political 
Science and Politics he notes that the data shows that voters whose preferred candidate 
goes to Congress are systematically happier with both their representative and the political 
system as such, than those who did not vote for the winner. Brunell admits that this finding 
“is not especially groundbreaking,” but his conclusion is — although clearly utilitarian — 
not often voiced among political scientists, as far as the research for this thesis has 
uncovered. He argues that like-minded voters should be packed in as homogenous districts 
as possible, thereby increasing the number of happy voters. Brunell also argues that the 
combined outcome of many competitive electoral battles in single-member districts may be 
a “delegation to the House that is truly unreflective of the underlying partisan divisions in 
a state”— which in purely mathematical terms makes sense, should one party win all the 
close battles. Brunell does not accept as truth the “common wisdom among most voters and 
certainly among the media” that representation will be enhanced by increased competition 
and declares — pointing to the Issacharoff/Persily debate of 2001 — that there is 
“absolutely no evidence” of this. 47 In 2012, Brunell and Harold Clarke in Political 
Research Quarterly repeat, support and expand on Brunell’s original criticism, observing 
that recent survey-data show that the consensus on competition as undisputedly good is 
“largely an elite-level phenomenon.” 48 One could argue that any informed debate on 
political theory is largely an elite-level phenomenon.  
  
                                                 
46 Thomas L. Brunell. "Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts Eliminates 
Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes toward Congress." PS: Political Science 
and Politics 39, no. 1 (2006): 77-85. 
47 Brunell. 77-85. 
48 Thomas Brunell and Harold D. Clarke. "Who Wants Electoral Competition and Who Wants to Win?". 
Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2012): 124-37. 
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2.1.2 Accountability 
Partisan redistricting is at odds with the concept of accountability. For many voters 
in a representative democracy, the vote cast on Election Day is their only way to effectively 
evaluate and pass judgment on the performance of their elected representative. If their 
Congressman or Congresswoman has simply redistricted away their disgruntled 
constituents, and swapped them for more amiable voters, a vital part of the American 
system of checks and balances is rendered powerless. Professor G. Bingham Powell of 
University of Rochester states it most clearly:  
Few contrasts between dictatorship and democracy are sharper than this 
one: in a democracy the citizens can vote the leaders out of office. The 
citizens' ability to throw the rascals out seems fundamental to modern 
representative democracy because it is the ultimate guarantee of a 
connection between citizens and policymakers. It enables the citizens to 
hold the policymakers accountable for their performance. Such 
accountability is a keystone of majoritarian democratic theory.
49
 
Among those quoting Powell is Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University, Rebecca 
L. Brown in her 1998 Columbia Law Review article. There she posits that accountability is 
a pillar of the Constitution, “similar to separation of powers, checks and balances, or 
federalism.” 50 There is a need to protect the people from an encroaching judiciary, she 
argues, and the people’s instrument for this is their elected politicians, who must be held to 
account by voters in order to stand up to the judiciary. There is clear support for this in the 
Federalist Papers, she argues. 
In Federalist No. 68 Alexander Hamilton warns that “the Executive should be 
independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves,” so that he not 
forgets whom he serves. It must be noted that, when Brown centuries later concludes that 
“accountability is a structural notion of blame whose final cause is liberty,” the 
reminiscence of the writing style found in The Federalist Papers is uncanny. 
51
 
While Brown and Publius focus on accountability as a cogwheel in the inner 
workings of the system of checks and balances, political theorist Benjamin Barber 
emphasizes accountability as vital for a large-scale republic to survive under federalism. 
Democratic representation is the device needed to combine the opposing demands of 
                                                 
49 G. Bingham Powell. Elections as Instruments of Democracy : Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. 47. 
50 Rebecca L. Brown. "Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution." Columbia Law Review 98, no. 3 
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efficient central administration and participatory self-government, and the concept of 
accountability is used to bridge this “widening abyss,” according to Barber. 52 If we apply 
Professor Morgan’s perspective on this, the result is this: Without the fiction of 
accountability there would be no representative democracy, no matter whether the 
representation is fictional or real.  
In his initial Harvard Law Review article, Issacharoff argues that there are 
“incentive structures operating to ensure the accountability of elected representatives to 
shifts in the preference of the electorate” and that these are skewed when politicians are 
allowed to redraw their own electoral districts. 
53
 His emphasis on and definition of 
democratic accountability is borrowed from Rebecca Brown’s recently mentioned 
Columbia Law Review-article. The people have delegated the power that once was regarded 
as belonging to the king, then and now as belonging to the people, to its representatives, 
and every Election Day they reclaim it, is Brown’s perspective — which Issacharoff builds 
upon. Incumbents, who redraw maps to avoid their voters’ judgment, undermine this pillar 
of American democracy. 
In his rebuttal, Nathan Persily acknowledges Issacharoff’s normative arguments, but 
not Issacharoff’s application of them, and he argues that even entrenched incumbents are 
indeed held accountable, not at least during the primaries. Those incumbents are also the 
ones best known to — and of most use to — their voters, according to Persily. Measuring 
competition and accountability through reelection rate “ignores the fact that vulnerable 
incumbents often resign when they face tough challenges,” notes Persily. 54 
2.1.3 Electoral competition 
In discussions on what democracy is or should be, those emphasizing the 
competitive elements of democracy tend to borrow some of their arguments from the 
Austrian political scientist and economist Joseph Schumpeter and Professor of Political 
Science at Yale, Robert Dahl. Schumpeter has provided a working definition of 
representative democracy, as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
                                                 
52 Benjamin Barber. A Passion for Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. Reprinted in 
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 24 
 
struggle for the people’s vote.” 55 In his deliberations on polyarchy Robert Dahl echoes 
Schumpeter, calling democracy “a system of control by competition” in which politicians 
in power are strongly encouraged to modify their conduct in order to maintain their power 
by winning elections. 
56
 
Among those frequently quoting Schumpeter and Dahl is Professor Michael 
McDonald, who has devoted much of his academic work to the subject of competition in 
politics, and while he in much of his research has focused on trying to quantify levels of 
competition under altering circumstances, he also stresses other, normative arguments and 
is very much in line with another Schumpeterian — William E. Hudson — and with 
Hudson’s call for an active, public deliberation. 57 McDonald argues that competition 
“fosters other indicators of a healthy democracy,” such as increased, free coverage of the 
elections by the media, higher campaign expenditures used to inform voters, and a 
generally increased voter participation. 
58
 
Only 15 of 435 seats changed party hands in the four elections to the U. S. House of 
Representatives from 1998-2004. Of those 15, only five were incumbents losing to 
challengers. Another six had been placed in the same district as other incumbents by 
redistricting. According to Professor Gary C Jacobson of University of California, San 
Diego, this prompted a revived scholarly concern about the declining competition. 
59
 One 
of the more remarkable academic debates growing from this, is reflected in PS: Political 
Science and Politics in 2006, where Professor of Political Science at Emory University, 
Alan Abramowitz and his two Ph.D. candidates Brad Alexander and Matthew Gunning 
argue against Issacharoff’s coupling of partisan redistricting to lessened competition.60 
Under the title “Don’t Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections” they argue that 
the financial advantage of incumbents is the main cause for the lack of competition, 
coupled with a “natural” polarization of the electorate — which is discussed further in 
chapter 2.1.4.  
Professor McDonald refutes their claims, arguing that their numbers are wrong, and 
that several different methods of measuring competition show a connection between 
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partisan redistricting and levels of competition. The three Emory scholars do, however, 
choose to take the numbers presented by McDonald as support of their findings, not as 
opposition. They admit that, yes, there is a lower competition, and, yes, there is a 
correlation between partisan redistricting and lower levels of competitions, but no, this 
correlation is not big enough to be deemed important when compared to the effects of 
campaign finances and polarization. They do admit that there is no doubt that redistricting 
may cause some significant short term effect, and McDonald laments that the effect of 
redistricting has become increasingly difficult to measure, given the low number of 
competitive districts and neutral redistricting institutions. All in all the opposing scholars 
are not significantly apart from each other’s conclusion; they simply emphasize different 
aspects of the same political environment on their way to their respective conclusions. 
2.1.4 Polarization 
Whether polarization is a result of a lack of competition or a factor leading to lack 
of competition is no certain case; it can be both. Both ways, it is seen as an increasing 
problem, and the issue was raised by — among others — President Obama, talking to 
reporters in August 2013:  
And all of you know it. I mean, I'm not telling you anything you don’t 
know -- because it’s very explicit. You report on it. A big chunk of the 
Republican Party right now are in gerrymandered districts where there’s no 
competition, and those folks are much more worried about a tea party 
challenger than they are about a general election where they’ve got to 
compete against a Democrat or go after independent votes. And in that 
environment, it’s a lot harder for them to compromise. 61 
In his original Harvard Law Review article, Issacharoff warned that a lack of 
competition removes the incentive for opposing voter groups to find common ground. He 
points out that the party-internal primaries favor candidates with views and politics more to 
the extreme right or left wings. This is, however, counterweighted in the general election 
— but only if there is a real competition in which politicians stances must be modified to 
attract voters from the opposition. Without this incentive, extremists are more likely to win 
and the gap between political camps widen. 
62
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It is interesting to observe that Issacharoff’s primary opponent, Nathan Persily, in 
his amicus curiae brief to the U. S. Supreme Court in 2015 uses the polarization Issacharoff 
warned against as an argument in support of redistricting commissions. Persily warns that 
redistricting is a polarizing task causing lasting enmity:  
“Recognizing the conflict of interest of state legislatures and the 
poisonous polarization that redistricting inflicts upon the legislature as an 
institution, many states have identified redistricting as an area where the 
normal process of legislation should be altered.” 63  
This perspective is supported in 2006 in PS: Political Science and Politics by 
Professor Alan Abramowitz and his Ph.D.-candidates mentioned in chapter 2.1.3. They do 
not look at gerrymandering as the dominant cause for neither polarization nor lessened 
competition. The three Emory scholars argue that modern demography increases 
polarization; Americans increasingly choose to live in communities with residents of 
similar political affiliation. They emphasize numbers show most of the change in district 
partisanship to have happened between redistricting cycles. If partisan redistricting were 
the dominant cause of increased polarization, we would not see this. The polarization is 
also visible in another statistic, according to Abramowitz and his Ph.D.-candidates: More 
than before, people tend to vote for the same party in both House elections and presidential 
elections.
 64
 
In June 2014, Pew Research Center reported that polarization has never been more 
dominant in American politics than now.
65
 Voters are less likely to compromise or to 
change party preference, and they surround themselves more with people who share their 
political views. They also have increasingly unfavorable opinions about the opposing party. 
House representatives who come out as moderates, run an increasing risk of losing in the 
primaries, since the level of competition in the general election is of less importance. 
Professor Hudson — who is a proponent of parliamentarianism in USA — 
attributes much of the polarization to the system of single-member pluralities (SMP). As 
long as Congress is not elected by proportional representation, members of Congress can 
“safely ignore the preferences, interests, and concerns of the minority party,” argues 
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Hudson, who notes that this does not provide legislators with much motivation to 
compromise and negotiate across party lines. 
66
 
2.2 Partisan Redistricting: The Gerrymanderer’s 
Toolbox 
The exact meaning of the word “gerrymander” has varied. In 1907 Elmer 
Cummings Griffith lamented that the word was “one of the most abused words in the 
English language” as it had “been made a synonym for political inequality of every sort.” 67 
He defined it as “the formation of election districts (…) with boundaries arranged for 
partisan advantages.” Ninety-four years later cartographer Mark Monmonier in his book 
Bushmanders and Bullwinkles acknowledged at least two definitions. For political 
scientists it is “deliberately increasing the number of districts in which a particular party or 
group is in majority”. For the media and the general public, however, “the term suggests 
sinister shapes that signify unfair if not illegal manipulation.” 68  
This chapter will explore some of the main tools and techniques used in such 
manipulation. The examples are all based on figures in Monmonier’s Bushmanders and 
Bullwinkles, the Brennan Center’s handout Know Your Lines and David Doherty and Josh 
Ryans article in PS, Political Science and Politics, “Redistricting in the Classroom: A 
Model for Inductive Learning.” 
2.2.1 The shapes of Sandra Day O’Connor 
 
Figure 1 - Texas congressional districts 18, 29 and 30 ruled illegal in Bush v.Vera (1996). Scales vary. 
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When states issue guidelines for redistricting, “compactness” is a frequently applied, but 
varyingly defined criterion.
69
 In simple terms, a perfect circle would be the ideal shape of a 
congressional district if compactness were its only desired attribute. For several adjoining 
districts, the perfect shape would be a square or another regular, convex polygon. There are 
several formulas for calculating compactness in comparative studies, which will not be 
explored in detail here, since the pivotal attribute for a district is not just its shape as such, 
but rather its shape within a given context. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
has spoken out on shapes in two landmark cases. In Shaw v. Reno (1993) she described the 
highway-hugging outline of North Carolina’s 12th Congressional District (see Figure 8, 
page 38) as so “bizarre” that it was “unexplainable on grounds other than race” — and 
thereby subject to strict scrutiny. 
70
. In Bush v. Vera (1996) she branded the Texas’ 30th 
Congressional District as so “extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed 
only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional 
districting principles.” In the same case, several other districts were just as bizarrely shaped 
as the 30
th
, but they could be explained through others contexts than racial discrimination 
and thereby avoided interference by the U. S. Supreme Court. O’Connor made it clear in 
the plurality ruling that "bizarre shape and noncompactness cause constitutional harm 
insofar as they convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly 
racial.” In other words, it is not the shape itself that is unconstitutional, but when it appears 
as a symptom of unconstitutional acts, it may be subject to strict scrutiny. 
 
Figure 2 - Texas congressional districts 3, 6 and 25 were left unchallenged in Bush v. Vera (1996) Scales vary. 
 If we stick with Monmonier’s definition of gerrymandering, however, even a 
perfectly circular district may be a result of gerrymandering if its shape is molded by 
partisanship and serves a partisan purpose. A wish to preserve existing county lines and 
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areas of common interests also appear in several redistricting guidelines. There are plenty 
of almost square counties and districts in the Midwestern United States, but most counties 
are shaped by natural borders, mountains and rivers. There are also communities of interest 
that defy compactness, like stretched coastal areas, mountain-ranges and riversides. 
Technically, a compact district may at times serve partisan purposes better than a sinisterly 
shaped district. 
2.2.2 Packing 
“Packing” is gathering a group which would normally be divided among two or 
more districts, into one electoral district. This can be done in accordance with The Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 to create a minority majority to secure that a considerable minority is 
secured representation, as it was done in Illinois 4
th
 District. In order to create a Hispanic 
majority they packed a district with Hispanics — whom if districts had been drawn 
compact — would have been spread over several districts. 
Packing can also be used to waste votes by creating a large majority in one district 
and consequently removing those voters from districts where they otherwise could have 
secured a narrow victory. In , we see a map presumably drawn by Democrats. A large 
Figure 3 – An example of packing. Circles = Majority of Democrats. Squares = Majority of Republicans. 
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number of Republicans are packed in the left district, thereby wasting a marginal majority 
and giving the Democrats a narrow victory in two of three districts, despite being a 
minority statewide. 
2.2.3 Cracking 
Cracking is dividing a majority between two or more districts in which they no 
longer are a majority. This is a much used tactic. Although not concerning a congressional 
election, a redistricting of single-member districts for the election of county officers in 
Hinds County, Mississippi, is a visually striking example of cracking. The proposed maps 
split the city of Jackson and its quite concentrated black population into five separate 
districts in which blacks were no more than 28 percent of any.
71
 
In  we see a map presumably drawn by Republicans (squares). A substantial 
Democrat minority is cracked into three equal parts, all too small to win a single district. 
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Figure 4 - An example of cracking. Circles = Majority of Democrats. Squares = Majority of Republicans. 
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2.2.4 Kidnapping 
Incumbents tend to be reelected for many reasons, among them name recognition 
and a long relationship with their voters. These two advantages can be overcome by 
“kidnapping” them, which is to redraw the maps so that incumbents previously safely in the 
middle of their district suddenly find themselves in the outskirts of a new district and apart 
from their electoral base. A partisan mapmaker may also draw the incumbent in a district 
with a strong challenger from the opposing party, maybe even with another incumbent or 
even worse — with an incumbent from their own party. In Figure 5 two Republican 
incumbents are placed within the same district, increasing the chances for a split — and 
losing — Republican electorate.  
The same tactic can be applied against a bothersome competitor from one’s own 
party, as it was done to wannabe U. S. House Representative Barack Obama in 2001. 
 
Figure 5 - An example of kidnapping. i = incumbent. 
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3 Historiography of partisan 
redistricting 
3.1 Early occurrences 
Partisan districting occurred long before the U. S. Congress emerged on the political 
stage. In 1907 Elmer Cummings Griffith traced the earliest occurrences of gerrymandering 
in America back to 1709, when election districts for the Pennsylvania State Assembly were 
shaped to reduce the influence of the city of Philadelphia and favor the neighboring rural 
districts. 
72
 The English concept of “rotten boroughs” or “pocket boroughs” — districts 
with a dwindling and controllable population, but still with representation in the House of 
Commons — was well known to the first Pennsylvanians. 
Griffith describes gerrymandering - while not yet named - as widespread during the 
decades before the First Continental Congress in 1774. Districting a colony for an election 
was “a very common practice” when the party in control of the legislature feared the 
outcome of an election by general ticket, writes Griffith. He notes that several of the first 
states even enacted laws to limit such practices soon after gaining independence.
73
 Yet, he 
points out that the potential of partisan redistricting was “little understood and 
consequently not feared” by the time of the American Revolution. 74 He argues that 
Virginia Representative James Madison overcame attempts at gerrymandering before 
election to the first U. S. Congress in 1788. 
75
 In 1812, however, then incumbent President 
James Madison was probably a beneficiary of the gerrymander that gave name to the term. 
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3.2 The Original Gerrymander of 1812 
These events concern an election for the Massachusetts State Senate, not for the U. 
S. House of Representatives, and as such, they are outside the scope of this thesis. They 
did, however, not only 
add to the political 
vocabulary, but also 
provide a very good 
example of both how 
much and of how little 
can be achieved 
through unscrupulous 
districting. If the 
general population — 
as claimed by Griffith 
— “little understood” 
the effects of partisan 
districting in the late 
colonial period, they 
did after 1812. The 
“Gerry-mander” was 
that remarkable in 
terms of name-
recognition and 
effectivity. 
Massachusetts 
had been a Federalist stronghold, but the Jeffersonian Democrats gained control of all 
branches of the Massachusetts state government in 1811. To secure this position the 
Democrats redrew the electoral maps before the 1812 election, dividing Massachusetts 
(which at the time also included Maine) into eighteen districts represented by 40 state 
senators. The redistricting was also aimed to ensure more Democrats in the U. S. Electoral 
Figure 6 - Illustration on page two in The Boston Gazette March 26, 1812 
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College, writes Griffith, but 
Republicans averted this.
76
 In 
February of 1812, Governor 
Elbridge Gerry signed the new 
districts into law.  
The Boston Weekly 
Messenger printed a map of the 
districts, which caused a reader to 
suggest that the outer district only 
needed wings to resemble a 
monster. An engraver — most 
likely Elkanah Tisdale — gave 
form to the idea. 
77
 An editor 
thought it resembled a salamander, 
another renamed it after the 
governor, and the newborn creature 
was published on page two in the 
Boston Gazette on March 26, 1812 
under the heading “The Gerry-
mander. A new species of Monster.”  
The drawing — and the 
name — caught the general public’s attention, but the numbers are just as eye-catching: On 
May 20 the Columbian Centinel reported that in a very close race 101,930 votes were cast 
for senators. Of these, the Federalists received 51,766. Democrats received 50,164. Yet, of 
the 40 senators, Federalists won only eleven. The Democrats won twenty-nine. In 1907 
Elmer Cummings Griffith concluded that it was “one of the most successful instances of 
the gerrymander on record.” 78 
While Governor Elbridge Gerry’s signing of the electoral maps into law in February 
1812 secured the senate majority and may have contributed to President James Madison’s 
reelection, it did not help Gerry secure a gubernatorial reelection. He did, however, become 
                                                 
76 Griffith. 76. 
77 Monmonier. 2. 
78 Griffith. 73. 
Figure 7 - The Columbian Centinel, April 7, 1813. 
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Madison’s vice-president.79 The next election to the Massachusetts State Senate reaffirmed 
the Federalist majority in Massachusetts and reversed the outcome of the 1812 state senate 
election. Twenty-nine Federalists and only eleven Democrats were elected to the state 
senate, which goes to support an argument often maintained by proponents of legislative 
redistricting: Over time, injustices even out.  
April 7, 1813 The Columbian Centinel printed an illustrated “obituary” for the “far-
famed, and ill-begotten Monster the GERRY-MANDER”. It was “Hatched 1812. Died 
1813.” While it was true for the specific creature twisted around the counties of Essex and 
Worchester, pronouncing the death of the newly named — but centuries old — species—
was premature. It was alive and breeding 1946 and 1962 when it caught the attention of the 
U. S. Supreme Court. In the 1980s there even emerged a mutation — the computer-assisted 
Bushmander — which is described in chapter 3.5.  
3.3 Baker v. Carr (1962) and related cases 
We conclude that the complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal 
protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which 
appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision. The right asserted is 
within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
80
 
These were Justice Brennan’s concluding remarks in Baker v. Carr (1962). It is a landmark 
court case for partisan redistricting, but Baker v. Carr did not decide on over specific 
electoral districts and borders. The court did, however, find that a complaint from eleven 
disenfranchised voters could be a matter for the courts to decide. The plaintiffs argued that 
their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated, since the 
state of Tennessee had not reapportioned once since 1901 despite massive population 
changes, leaving them effectively without a vote and without means to right this wrong 
through the political realm. The Tennessee Constitution stated that they had an equal right, 
but the Tennessee legislature had no self-interest in righting these obvious wrongs, and the 
Tennessee courts would not interfere in matters so clearly within the political domain. In 
general, political struggles were to be settled within the political domain with political 
methods. Courts were reluctant to usurp powers from politicians. 
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Until 1962 the U. S. Supreme Court rejected several such attempts to bring 
injustices from redistricting before the courts. This jurisprudence was reaffirmed in 1946, 
when the court would not interfere on behalf of three Illinois voters from districts with 
populations larger than in other districts. 
81
 Their case, a claim that the redistricting was 
unconstitutional, was rejected as a matter to be dealt with on the political arena — not in 
the courts. As part of the narrow majority, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter warned 
against courts “entering the political thicket” in Colegrove v. Green (1946). He stressed 
that the wrongs in the case were “wrongs suffered by Illinois as a polity” and not a private 
matter. Sixteen years later, the very same Frankfurter repeated that warning in his minority 
dissent in Baker v. Carr. After almost a year of deliberations, the Supreme Court found that 
it had jurisdiction in such matters and referred the case back to the Tennessee courts for 
them to decide. 
Columbia Law Review found it hard in 1963 to draw conclusions from Baker v. 
Carr but posited that “its confusion will suggests that judicial self-restraint will continue to 
reveal itself in congressional districting cases” — which has been proved to be true. 82 An 
immediate effect from Baker v. Carr was that a string of other redistricting cases were 
heard, not just by the U. S. Supreme Court, but also by lower courts. The U. S. Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren in Reynolds v. Sims (1964) held that districts for 
state legislature should have equal populations. In Alabama, where the plaintiffs in 
Reynolds v. Sims came from, some districts were 14 times the size of others. In New 
Hampshire, the least populated district had three people. Another had 3,244. The rule of 
“one person, one vote” in congressional elections was affirmed in Wesberry v. Sanders 
(1964) with little room for interpretation:  
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We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 
2, that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several 
States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a 
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. (…) We do 
not believe that the Framers of the Constitution intended to permit the 
same vote-diluting discrimination to be accomplished through the device 
of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a 
vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run 
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast 
aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected 'by the People,' a 
principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional 
Convention. 
This triggered a wave of reapportionments and redistricting still recurring every ten 
years. The U. S. Supreme Court had set a standard that all came down quantity — to 
numbers — which promotes competition. On August 6, 1965, President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson complicated matters by signing into law the Voting Rights Act, which shifted the 
standard towards quality — to ensure representation for groups disenfranchised by Jim 
Crow-laws. 
3.4 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Affirmative 
Gerrymandering 
No voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States 
to vote on account of race or color. 
83
 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed to ensure racial minorities 
representation by enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, which states that citizens’ right to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged on the basis of race or color. Following the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 it was part of President Lyndon B. Johnsons “Great Society” — a 
program to end poverty and racial injustice.  
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act — the “non-dilution provision” — outlaws 
electoral districts drawn to secure the political dominance of a white majority by 
specifically forbidding any discriminatory “standard, practice or procedure.” Section 5 
requires that some states and districts — defined in Section 4 — with a history of racial 
discrimination need preclearance from the Department of Justice or the Federal District 
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Court for the District of Columbia of any changes to electoral laws, procedures and 
electoral districts.
84
  
One effect of this was that affirmative gerrymandering was expressively encouraged 
by the U. S. Congress if done to secure representation for a racial minority in so-called 
“majority-minority” districts. If redistricting was done with intent to dilute minority voting 
strength, it was illegal. Simultaneously, the jurisprudence established the year before by 
Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) set heavy demands on numerical equality. Political mapmakers 
were forced out on a tightrope, torn between demands the Fourteenth Amendments demand 
for numerical equality and The Voting Rights Acts call for affirmative action. This opened 
for a string of cases before the U. S. Supreme Court where high court’s understanding of 
the mapmakers’ intents was deemed as crucial.  
The most influential case was Shaw v. Reno (1993), which according to both 
Issacharoff and Persily led USA into a “legal morass.” 85 The North Carolina state 
legislature had, following the 1990 census and reapportionment, drawn an electoral district 
map made up of some remarkably odd shapes. A group of white voters claimed equal rights 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment when the state of North Carolina had drawn a 
black minority-majority 
12
th
 District — as 
prescribed by the Voting 
Rights Act. The case 
ascended to the US. 
Supreme Court as Shaw 
v. Reno.  
 The 12
th
 
District’s borders snaked 
along Interstate 85 most 
of the way, long, narrow 
and curvy. “I love the 
district because I can 
drive down I-85 with both 
car doors open and hit 
                                                 
84 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was rendered powerless in June 2013 when the Supreme Court 
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85 Issacharoff and Persily. Pages 636 and 652, respectively. 
Figure 8 - North Carolina 12th District, 1993. 
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every person in the district," said Mickey Michaux, a Democrat candidate, to The New York 
Times.
86
 A narrow majority in the Supreme Court held with the plaintiff. The court found 
that the intentions of the mapmakers might have been noble and in line with the Voting 
Rights Act, but that the “bizarre shape” of the district might suggest that the mapmakers 
had tried too hard and in the process given rise to an equal protection challenge. The case 
was referred back to the North Carolina District Court.  
The case — and a series of legally challenged redrawn districts — then moved back 
and forth between the North Carolina legislature, the North Carolina District courts and the 
U. S. Supreme Court until 1999, when the U. S. Supreme Court — this time unanimously 
— reversed a district court decision, and for all practical purposes paved way for a return to 
the “bizarre shape” previously contested. In his book, Bushmanders and Bullwinkles, 
cartographer Mark Monmonier utters sympathy for his North Carolinian colleagues being 
caught in a squeeze: “North Carolina might easily feel abused — an innocent victim caught 
between an aggressively proactive Justice Department and an adamantly yet numerically 
minimal Supreme Court majority. In this sense any state compelled to create and then 
dismantle a minority–majority district is also a victim of fate.” 87 
One aspect qualifying this as a “morass” is that the high court also made it clear that 
the mapmakers’ intent could cause judicial action, but their actions alone was not 
sufficient. Justice Clarence Thomas put this in writing: “our prior decisions have made 
clear that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so 
happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the state 
were conscious of that fact.” Even if a “high correlation between race and party preference” 
was evident, wrote Thomas, this would not be enough to prove that race was the motivating 
factor. 
88
 
On the heels of Shaw v. Reno came a string of cases where some bizarrely shaped 
districts survived judicial inspection, while others were discarded. Persily was outspoken in 
his critique in 2001: “The incoherence of the Shaw doctrine and its natural consequence, 
acting alongside the Voting Rights Act, of forcing partisan conflict to be expressed as racial 
conflict led to racially charged litigation that forced courts to wallow in the political thicket 
for the past ten years.” 89  
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87 Monmonier 49. 
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One district in particular, the Illinois Fourth, designed to ensure representation for a 
Hispanic minority, survived scrutiny, even if it was as bizarrely shaped as others, earning 
the nickname “The Earmuff District”. Monmonier attributes the district’s survival in court 
not just to adherence to the 
law, but to “savvy political 
cartographers (…) carefully 
documenting their rationale 
(…) [knowing] what would 
raise eyebrows.” 90 In other 
words, the mapmakers had 
learned to provide either a 
defensible rationale for the 
map or no traces of ill 
intent.  
Some practical 
consequences for the 
mapmakers can be found in 
the educational papers 
distributed by The National 
Conference for State Legislatures. There Minnesota Senate Counsel Peter S. Watson 
presents essential advice: “You may consider race in drawing districts. Avoid drawing a 
Racial Gerrymander. Beware of bizarre shapes. Beware of making race your dominant 
motive. Beware of Using Race as a Proxy for Political Affiliation.” 91 In the same forum, 
redistricting consultant Debra A. Levine acknowledges the challenges that all redistricting 
professionals face: “Plan on spending money for expert witnesses. Plan on spending money 
for lawyers with voting rights and litigation experience! Anticipate court challenges to your 
plans – You will be sued! (…) Be ready to defend everything you do.” 92 
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Figure 9 - Illinois 4th District 
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3.5 New shapes: Bushmanders, the Bullwinkle and 
Lower Intestines 
A whole new breed of gerrymanders appeared as computers became widespread on 
the political arena in the late 1980s. Combined with detailed polling data, mapping party 
affiliations down to city-block level, computers enabled the cartographers to craft electoral 
districts with a precision level previously impossible. The willingness of President George 
H.W. Bush’ Department 
of Justice to give 
preclearance to shapes of 
a bizarreness hitherto 
unknown, led 
cartographer Mark 
Monmonier to name such 
creatures 
“Bushmanders.“93 The 
president’s willingness 
may have been motivated 
by a will to adhere to the 
intentions of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, but 
one side-effect of packing 
a district with African-
American voters — who are most likely to vote for the Democrats — is that neighboring 
districts as a result will gain more white Republicans. In effect, this is gerrymandering, 
which Republicans at the time railed loudly against while the Republican-controlled 
Department of Justice was eager to give preclearance. 
94
 
The previously mentioned Illinois 4
th
 (The Earmuff) and North Carolina 12
th
 (The 
Lower Intestines, see Figure 8, page 38) are among the many computer-drawn bug-
splattered-on-windshield-shaped districts of the 90s. The most complex district, however, 
was New York City’s District 12 — popularly named “The Bullwinkle District” — was a 
polygon with 813 sides. Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act it required — and got — 
                                                 
93 Monmonier. 3. 
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Figure 10 - New York 12th District, "The Bullwinkle" 
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preclearance in 1992 by the Department of Justice under President George H.W. Bush. 
When signed into law by Governor Mario Cuomo in June 1992, its verbal description ran 
over 217 lines and 22 pages, reading “like the itinerary of a taxi driver trying desperately to 
run up the meter,” according to Monmonier.95 Five years later, a panel of three federal 
judges declared the district unconstitutional, being based dominantly on race and ethnicity, 
and the district was redrawn. 
96
 
Monmonier blames the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the U. S. Supreme Court’s 
focus on complex qualitative issues for the bizarre shapes and for the extensive litigation 
that followed. 
97
 He maintains that “Bushmanders would be difficult, if not impossible 
without computers.” Those computers may also contribute to the extinction of such 
creatures. Since the early 1990s the lowered cost of computing power, open access to 
government data and the appearance of free redistricting software, redistricting projects 
that in the late 1980s cost millions — literally — are now available for any moderately 
skilled programmer. 
98
 This enables almost any interest group or organization to understand 
and evaluate the redistricting process — or even propose redistricting plans of their own. 
3.6 Redistricting reforms 
There is a trend toward redistricting reforms, fuelled by grassroots movements, such 
as The Midwest Democracy Network, aiming to end the legislators’ grip on the process. 99 
Three states are the most remarkable examples of reforms: California, Arizona and Iowa. 
California and Arizona have both revised their respective state constitutions and formed 
external commissions to handle the redistricting process as a result of popular ballot 
initiatives. They both have faced challenges and resistance. In California their external 
redistricting agency is swelling beyond expectations, both in numbers and cost. In Arizona, 
the state legislature has gone to the U. S. Supreme Court to regain the redistricting rights 
which their voters revoked. Iowa is often hailed as an ideal by political scientists, but none 
of the states seeking election reforms have copied Iowa’s method. 
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3.6.1 California: “What Kind of Democracy is That?” 
California has moved from being a showcase of partisan redistricting to become 
“the largest laboratory of redistricting reform yet,” according to The Almanac of American 
Politics. Republicans controlled the map-drawing process in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Democrats were in control from the 1960s to the 1980s and perfected the craft of partisan 
mapmaking. In the 1984 U. S. House elections, the Democrats won only forty-eight percent 
of the statewide vote, but won sixty-two percent — twenty-eight of forty-five — of 
California’s seats in the U. S. House of Representatives. In 1994, after the next redistricting 
when they did not have the full control, fifty-two percent of the votes secured “only” fifty-
two percent — twenty-seven of fifty-two — seats. 100 
Several attempts to reform Californian redistricting had failed, and in the 2004 state 
congressional elections not one single of the 153 seats changed party hands. Republican 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger was outspoken: “What kind of democracy is that?” 
asked the “governator”, who warned the state legislature: "If we here in this chamber do 
not work together to reform the government, the people will rise up and reform it 
themselves. And, you know something, I will join them. And I will fight with them."
101
 He 
was proven right, and he stood by his promise. 
November 2008, a citizen’s initiative, Proposition 11 — also called “The Voter 
FIRST Act” — was enacted by a narrow 51 percent majority, despite being opposed by 
powerful incumbents of both parties. In the 2010 documentary movie Gerrymandering, 
Kathay Feng, who was the main author of the initiative, shared that falling victim to blatant 
racism was what drove her to fight for reform. One major Asian community of Los 
Angeles was divided into separate minorities in four districts, and her representative had 
uttered that he would rather not have any more Asians squeezed into his district. 
102
  
The new California redistricting process could hardly be more different than Iowa’s. 
Basically, Iowa lets two guys with a clear mandate draw a map, and then, after a round of 
public hearings, the legislature accepts it. California now showcases “a Byzantine 
application and lottery selection process,” according to The Almanac of American Politics. 
Proposition 11 transferred the right to redistrict from the legislature to a fourteen-member 
commission. Eight of the commission’s members are drawn by lottery from a pool of 
registered voters. Those eight then select the remaining six. Five of the fourteen must be 
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from California’s largest political party. Five must be from the second largest, and four 
must be from neither of those two parties. The commission may — and does — hire 
lawyers and consultants if needed.  The proposition found broad support from several 
organizations and from fractions of both parties, but prominent politicians opposed it. Then 
Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi (D), was against. So was the 
California Democratic Party. The opponents argued that the expenses were out of control, 
that the commission would not be held accountable to the voters and that the process was 
too complicated and no guarantee for the goals the supporters aimed.  
The commission was not supposed to draw congressional districts, only for 
elections to the state legislature, but in 2010, this time with sixty-one percent of the votes in 
a popular ballot, the commission was mandated to redraw California — and it did. Twenty-
seven incumbents were thrown into only thirteen districts. Fourteen districts had no 
incumbent. Among the seven incumbents who failed to be reelected was Democrat veteran 
Howard Berman, whose brother Michael in 2001 charged incumbents $20,000 a piece to 
draw them safe congressional districts.
103
 The California Democrats, who unwillingly had 
lost control of the redistricting, gained four seats. Sixty-one percent of the popular vote 
gave them seventy-two percent — thirty-eight of fifty-three — of the U. S. House seats, 
indicating that a change of method may indeed cause a change in election outcomes. 
There was some criticism raised against the Democrats, who ran what is called an 
“astroturf campaign” during the hearings preceding the drawing of district borders. They 
sent party professionals acting as local, worried citizens into those hearings. A report made 
by the political news site ProPublica passes a dismal verdict on what was meant to be a step 
in another direction: “What emerges is a portrait of skilled political professionals armed 
with modern mapping software and detailed voter information who managed to replicate 
the results of the smoked-filled rooms of old.” 104 
3.6.2 Arizona: The Electors vs. the Electorate. 
Arizona has become the frontier of the redistricting reforms, and a short timeline of 
the Independent Redistricting Commission in Arizona may be appropriate. It may serve to 
illustrate some of the challenges a commission may face and an overview of the legal 
boundaries they operate within. At the time of writing this (March 2015) the GOP majority 
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of the Arizona legislature is appealing — not to its voters, but to the U. S. Supreme Court 
— to regain the state assembly’s authority  to redistrict, which its voters revoked in a 2000 
ballot initiative. When the U. S. Supreme Court reaches a decision some time this year, the 
case may have far-reaching consequences for all states that have reformed their 
redistricting processes — most notably California. 
The series of events started in November 2000 when 784,282 citizens voted for and 
605,094 voted against Proposition 106, an amendment to the Arizona state constitution 
“relating to ending the practice of gerrymandering and improving voter and candidate 
participation in elections by creating an independent commission of balanced appointments 
to oversee the mapping of fair and competitive congressional and legislative districts.”105 
This voter initiative took the redistricting job out of the legislature’s hands, both for state 
legislative districts and for United States congressional districts. According to the 
amendment, redistricting is left to a bipartisan commission with a chairperson “who shall 
not be registered with any party already represented on the independent redistricting 
commission.” 106 The lawmakers are not entirely left out of the process: Of the five 
commissioners, the legislature appoints four — but not the tiebreaking fifth commissioner. 
The fifth commissioner is appointed by the commissioners appointed by the legislators, 
who also get to comment on the map proposals.  
During the first redistricting following the 2000 census, Democrats unsuccessfully 
filed suit against the commission, claiming that it had not created more competitive 
districts, which was one of the expressed goals of Proposition 106.
107
 After the 2010 
census, it was the Republicans’ turn to litigate. The commission did indeed create 
competitive districts, but the chairwoman of the commission was accused of partisanship, 
neglect of duty and misconduct and summarily removed from her post by Arizona governor 
Jan Brewer (GOP) — a decision quickly backed by a majority of the GOP-controlled 
Arizona State Senate. The Arizona State Supreme Court, however, ruled the governor’s and 
the senate’s actions unconstitutional and reinstated the chairwoman. 108 The commission 
then submitted redistricting maps to the Department of Justice for pre-clearance, as 
required by the amended Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and for the first time 
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since pre-clearance was required, it was accepted at first try. 
109
 In the 2012 election 
Democrats won all the three competitive districts by narrow margins.  
The commission still faces several lawsuits, the most significant for congressional 
redistricting is a suit filed by the GOP majority in the state legislature, arguing that the 
commission lacks the constitutional authority to oversee the redistricting process, as the U. 
S. Constitution states that this shall “be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof” 
– and not a commission – regardless of the voters’ decision of November 2000. Their suit 
was dismissed in February 2014 by two federal judges in a panel of three at the United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona. The case is now appealed to the U. S. 
Supreme Court, which at the time of writing (March 2015) has reduced the case to two 
issues — whether the Arizona legislature has legal standing to bring such a suit before the 
courts and whether the Elections Clause of the U. S. Constitution and the U. S. Code permit 
Arizona’s use of a redistricting commission. 110 The pivotal argument is whether “the 
Legislature” – the lawmaking body – named in the U. S. Constitution can only be 
interpreted as “the state senate and state house of representatives” as it indeed was 
interpreted by the one dissenting federal judge, or if “Legislature” can be read as “a popular 
vote on a ballot initiative,” which was not an option at the time the U. S. Constitution was 
ratified. 
111
  
During the oral arguments in March 2015, several judges expressed doubt that 
“legislature” could be read as anything but “the legislative body” — not “the people” — of 
the state. Justice Antonin Scalia, who is a known proponent of a literal interpretation of the 
law, had searched in vain for any instance of the term being used as a synonym for 
anything other than “the state assembly.”  Justice Anthony M. Kennedy warned the lawyer 
for the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission: “History works very much against 
you,” Kennedy said, pointing to the fact that in order to reform the election of senators to 
the U. S. Senate in 1913, it took a constitutional amendment, not a state referendum.
 112
 
If this doubt causes the judges to support the Arizona legislators’ reclaiming of 
redistricting rights, it will also likely reverse California’s election reforms, an effect 
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Professor Persily and others strongly warn against. Persily points to the fact that legislators 
— while in the majority — seldom support election reforms, and that direct democracy has 
proved useful to push such reforms through. He also warns against unforeseen 
consequences if the Arizona legislators should win in court: “The bounds of [the] 
Appellant’s argument cannot be easily contained.” 113 
It would be easy to dismiss the gripes of the Arizona legislators as nothing more 
than just that — gripes. There is, however a bigger and much more wide-reaching basic 
issue wrapped into this conflict. The political system in the United States of America is on 
the state and federal level not a direct democracy. It is mainly a representative democracy 
in which presumed responsible representatives gather to make decisions on behalf of the 
people. The Founding Fathers agreed on several provisions to prevent the nation from 
being ruled by the whimsical ideas of a majority.  Federalist letter author and fourth 
president of the United Stated, James Madison, made it clear that he placed no trust in 
direct democracy: “In all numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion 
never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, 
every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. “ 114 
In its brief in support of the commission, The Brennan Center for Justice at New 
York University argues that Madison not only opposed direct democracy; according to the 
chronicler of the 1787 Federal Convention, Madison also warned one legislative branch 
controlling the elections to another:  
“He observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was 
composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening 
body of electors (…) the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the 
necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little 
felt.”115 
In its brief The Brennan Center argues that, despite Madison’s mob-rule-warnings, 
for more than a century, citizen initiatives have regulated federal elections and Congress 
has approved those regulations. 
116
 In 1912, Ohio reformed its constitution, and three years 
later a public referendum rejected a set of congressional district maps. In Davis v. 
Hildebrant (1916), the court upheld the referendum as “a part of the state Constitution and 
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laws.” Since 1787 popular sovereignty has become “increasingly prominent” as states have 
amended their constitutions: South Dakota adopted direct democracy for some electoral 
procedures in 1898, Utah in 1900, Oregon in 1902 and 1904, Arkansas in 1916 and Ohio in 
1962 — just to mention a few. States have repeatedly made use of direct democracy to 
form electoral practices like establishing a primary system for all elections, for permitting 
the use of voting machines, for deciding on whether absentee ballots should be counted. 
The list goes on. During the oral arguments in the U. S. Supreme Court, Justice Elena 
Kagan observed that “there are zillions of these laws.”  117 Also, when new states were 
admitted to the Union, several had constitutions in which the people retained the tight to 
overturn the actions of their respective legislatures. Never did Congress protest against 
such state constitutions, not even against Arizona’s constitution which at the time Arizona 
was admitted into the Union in 1912, stated that the people “also reserve for use at their 
own option, the power to approve or reject at the polls any act, or item, section, or part of 
any act, of the legislature.” 118 
In its reply brief to the U. S. Supreme Court, the Arizona State Legislature quotes 
Madison’s warnings against direct democracy extensively and concludes that “the Framers 
were well acquainted with direct democracy, including its possible use by the states.” It 
goes on to argue that the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission is “an unelected 
and unaccountable commission.” 119 In contrast, the state legislature representatives are 
“elected, accountable and handpicked for the task by the Framers.” A warning is issued in 
the brief: If one was to accept the political theory of the reformers, nothing would prevent 
other states from leaving the task of redistricting “to an unaccountable, yet fiercely 
partisan, assemblage of political operatives.”   
The U. S. Supreme Court will have to weigh this against warnings from several 
reform supporters. The Brennan Center argues that a ruling in favor of the Arizona State 
Legislature would “undermine the ability of citizens of the states to combat the persistent 
problems of gerrymandering and to enact other electoral reforms. 
120
 The literal reading of 
“Legislature” would reverse decades of reform, The Brennan Center argues and provides a 
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1755 dictionary definition: “the power that makes laws.” That did not, however, move the 
Justice Scalia during the presentation of the oral arguments.  
Literal interpretation was taken as an argument for the reformers by Nathan Persily 
in his brief in support of the commission. He offers an entirely different take: If one is to 
read the Constitution as literally as the Arizona State Legislature does, the Elections Clause 
does not mention redistricting at all. It says “Places and Manner of holding elections.” 
Redistricting “does not affect how, where, or whether elections are held,” Persily argues. It 
affects only who can run, not the places and manner. The day of oral arguments did, 
however, not include any discussion of that idea. 
The Supreme Court is expected to rule on the case by the end of June 2015. 
121
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3.6.3 Iowa – Often Idolized, Never Imitated 
 Iowa is a bastard — in part legislative, in part commission and in part external 
agency. When it comes to redistricting, Iowa defies strict classification. Iowa’s electoral 
maps are drawn by an independent external agency, overseen by a bipartisan commission, 
mandated by the legislature.  
In 1968 the Iowa General Assembly adopted new legislative plans, but they were 
challenged in court and subsequently overturned by the Iowa Supreme Court. From then 
and during the 1970s the state high court drew the electoral maps. In 1980 the Iowa 
General Assembly established the process and procedures still used. Since then, no 
redistricting plan has been challenged in court. 
122
 The assembly decided that an external, 
non-partisan agency should do the actual redistricting without considering any political 
statistics, political demographics or consequences for incumbents. Compactness, numerical 
equality and not splitting counties among districts are the main criteria. 
123
 The external 
agency was The Legislative Services Bureau, since then renamed Legislative Services 
Agency, and between 
redistricting cycles the civil 
servants working there 
provide the Iowa state 
legislature with all kinds of 
administrative, legal and 
technical services. 
A temporary 
bipartisan redistricting 
commission is appointed 
every decade to oversee the 
agency and to conduct 
public hearings on the agency’s proposed electoral districts. The legislature has retained an 
option to amend the agency’s maps if those fail to pass legislation a third time, but this has 
never happened. According to the Iowa Legislative Services Agency’s legal counsel in 
charge of redistricting, Ed Cook, no politicians knock on their door when he and a 
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colleague draw the actual maps. 
124
 Their jobs are safe, even if powerful politicians should 
be threatened by the maps — as they routinely are. On that basis, classifying Iowa in this 
thesis as an external agency/state commission-state, can be defended, even if it technically 
and legally still is a legislation-state. The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of 
Law classifies Iowa as an “advisory commission”-state in its media guide, which may also 
technically be correct, since Iowa every decade appoint a temporary electoral commission. 
125
 However, that commission’s sole task is to lead public hearings on the proposed maps 
and to present the maps to the legislature. It plays no role in deciding how the borderlines 
are drawn. 
126
 In the 2008 book Redistricting in Comparative Perspective Professor 
Michael P. McDonald calls Iowa’s process “Commission + Legislative Process”. 127 
In State Politics & Policy the three professors Jamie Carson from University of 
Georgia, Michael Crespin from University of Texas and Ryan Williamson from University 
of Georgia brands Iowa’s process as changing from “Legislative” to “Commission” and 
back to “Legislative”. 128 “Legislative” may be an acceptable label, since the legislature 
indeed has the legal right to reject and append the external agency’s maps. A classification 
as a commission-state is less understandable, due to the commission’s very limited 
mandate, and one simply cannot change Iowa’s classification from decade to decade, as 
Carson, Crespin and Williamson does, since the process has been unchanged since 1980.
129
  
Since the agency’s first redistricting in 1980, however, the Iowa legislature has 
shown a restraint unknown to the Arizona legislators — even if the bipartisan commission 
in Arizona has a stronger legal protection than the Iowa Legislative Services Agency has 
— and the agency has presented maps where strong incumbents have found themselves 
suddenly in another district than their supporters. The state legislature has the option of 
overriding the agency’s maps in a third legislative round, but this political safety switch has 
not been flipped since the agency took over this work — not even once. This division of 
labor is not a part of the Iowa State Constitution, so the legislators may change the process 
at their leisure, without asking their voters. 
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Christopher Larimer, a political science professor at Northern Iowa University 
offered this explanation to US News & World Report: “It is almost like a game of chicken. 
The legislators can send it [the maps] back for another draft, but then they risk it coming 
back worse for their party.” 130 This actually happened in 2001, when Republicans rejected 
the agency’s first map. They based their rejection on a claim that the population disparities 
were too large — the district populations varied too much to the legislators’ liking. 
Whether this was the real basis for their rejection or simply a convenient excuse to overturn 
an inconvenient redistricting plan, is beyond examination in this paper. Nevertheless, the 
agency returned with a new set of maps with smaller population disparities as ordered — 
and two Republican incumbents placed within the same district. 
131
 This map was approved 
by a majority in the Iowa State Legislature. The maps following the 2000 and 2010 
censuses produced several districts contested by both parties, but at both times, the 
legislature ratified the maps without moving a single border. 
132
   
There are two aspects of Iowa which may explain this. First of all, Iowa is an 
exceptionally homogenous state with a largely white population, evenly sized districts and 
relatively high social equality. Most of all Iowa is purple — a quite even mix of Republican 
blue and Democrat red. Several commentators take pride in pointing out this fact. As a 
result, political battles are fierce and competitive, and any victory may be turned to a loss 
in two years. This may cause politicians to be inclined toward keeping the “redistricting-
stick” out of the political arsenal, since all politicians may quickly find themselves on the 
receiving end. 
In an interview with Morgenbladet, Political scientist Francis Fukuyama argues that 
civil servants need a certain degree of autonomy to run government offices properly. 
133
 He 
argues that, while Americans continuously argue the legitimacy of state government, 
Europeans are more ready to accept both the legitimacy of and the need for government. If 
we apply his perspectives to redistricting processes, Iowa comes off as more European than 
American, which may be one of the reasons why no other state has copied Iowa’s method. 
In this thesis, Iowa will be counted among the states redistricting through a 
legislative process. It is tempting to place Iowa among commission-states or even in a 
group of its own, since it clearly has found a better method than most other states. It is, 
                                                 
130 Lauren Fox. "Iowa Hosting Four Fierce Congressional Races Thanks to Redistricting." US News & World 
Report, July 5 2012. 
131 Placing two incumbents in the same electoral district is close to a worst-case-scenario. It is described in 
detail in chapter 2.2.4 
132 Barone et al. 31572/90879. 
133 Gudmund Hernes. "Og Nå: Verdensproblemer." Morgenbladet, Descember 12 2014. 
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however, also evident that Iowa has managed to maintain a legislative process without 
corrupting it. Its state constitution is not different from most other constitutions. Its political 
culture and tradition, however, is unique. 
3.7 Hubris and Demolition: Shelby County v. 
Holder 
Two aspects are noteworthy in Shelby County v. Holder (2013). First, there is a 
twisted line stretching back to Baker v. Carr (1962). In Baker v. Carr, the conservative 
minority dissented in the U. S. Supreme Court when the liberal majority held that electoral 
practices such as partisan redistricting — until then seen as exclusively within the political 
domain —could be justiciable. In Shelby v. Holder, it was the narrow conservative majority 
(5-4) that chose to upend The Voting Rights Act of 1965 — which was repeatedly and 
relatively recently renewed by Congress — while the liberal minority argued for judicial 
restraint. Second, it chose to emphasize states’ rights at the cost of civil rights. 
The U.S. Supreme Court justices in Shelby v. Holder emphasized that the core of 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 remains unchanged; the act still outlaws discriminatory 
electoral practices. The court did, however, effectively end the frequently used protection 
awarded by Section 5. The high court held that the formula in Section 4 — which defines 
which states and districts need preclearance from the Justice Department under Section 5 
— was based on bygone facts from 1965. It could no longer outweigh the Tenth 
Amendment, which reserves to the states all powers not specifically granted to the Federal 
Government, including the power to regulate elections. The Voting Rights Act “sharply 
departs from these principles,” noted the majority. The court invited Congress to come up 
with a new, up-to-date formula for Section 4, but critics found this unrealistic, given 
today’s polarized political environment. 134 Without Section 4, no states or districts are 
subject to the preclearance demands in Section 5. 
Congress had renewed the provisions of the Voting Right Act quite recently — in 
2006. In an unusually strongly worded dissent, justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg acknowledged 
that the 2006 renewal was within the political domain and that the court should leave it 
there — or in her own words: The decision was “well within Congress’s province to make 
and should elicit this court’s unstinting approbation.” Her characterization of the Supreme 
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Court majority leaves no room for misinterpretation: “(…) the Court’s opinion can hardly 
be described as an exemplar of restrained and moderate decision-making. Quite the 
opposite. Hubris is a fit word for today’s demolition of the VRA.” 
Some of the reactions were just as blunt as Bader Ginsburg’s: “another damaging 
and intellectually dishonest ruling” was the verdict from the New York Times editorial 
writers, who concluded that the court had “usurped Congress’ power.” 135 President Obama 
was “deeply disappointed” and politicians expressed doubt that Congress would be able to 
come up with a revised Section 4 strong enough to pass the U. S. Supreme Court. When 
Congress reenacted the Voting Right in 2006, they produced 15,000 pages of 
documentation, showing the sustained need for preclearance. 
136
 
The very same day that The U. S. Supreme Court published its decision, Texas 
announced its intent to implement a voter-ID law previously deemed discriminatory and 
blocked by the Justice Department. Other states soon followed Texas’ example. The Justice 
Department challenged Texas under a provision in Section 3 of The Voting Rights Act, 
which can be used on a case-by-case basis given a history of discrimination. Attorney 
General, Erik J. Holder Jr. promised that the Obama administration would “use every tool 
at their disposal” to fight discriminatory laws. 
 One year after the decision, in June 2014, The Brenner Center for Justice 
summarized the impact of Shelby v. Holder. Their main findings were that Section 5 no 
longer blocks or deters discriminatory voting changes, that challenging new discriminatory 
laws and practices had become more difficult, expensive, and time-consuming, and that the 
public now lacks critical information about new voting laws. 
137
  
The Brennan Center also issued a warning, that the effects may be “felt most 
acutely at the local level,” which is doubly troublesome, since most of the discrimination 
takes place on the local level where there are least resources to fight it. A similar warning 
also came from Richard L. Hasen, professor of law and political science at the University 
of California. He noted that if the reality indeed was as described by Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr, it was so because The Voting Rights Act worked and needed no revision. 
138
 
Hasen was also skeptical to the Attorney General’s “clunky” use of the remaining parts of 
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The Voting Rights Act. Both the professor and the Attorney General urged Congress to 
revive Section 4 with more general preclearance requirements. 
139
 
                                                 
139 Adam Liptak and Charlie Savage. "U. S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules." The New York 
Times, July 25 2013. 
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4 Do election results depend on the 
redistricting method? 
4.1 Apportionment, Redistricting and Election 
Results, State by State 
In this chapter we look into who was in power when the congressional district 
borders were drawn and decided, which method they used to decide those borders, and 
what the election outcome was.  
Following the 2010 census, the apportionment results were handed to the state 
governors by January 24, 2011, as described in detail in chapter 1.2. The detailed census 
data were distributed to the respective states through February and March. Then the states 
could start revising their congressional maps. Before the first state primaries and caucuses 
in August 2012 the congressional district maps must be made official.  
This implies that in order to establish any causal relationship between method and 
effect, we must look into the balance of power in each state in the late summer of 2012 
when the maps were finalized. We must also establish who controlled the governorship in 
2011 and 2012 and who had won the most recent state legislature elections and thereby 
controlled the state house and the state senate in 2012 when the maps were finalized. 
140
 
Most states elect state house representatives every two years, but some states elect every 
four years, so we must check election outcomes from 2010 – and in some cases from 2008. 
New Jersey and Virginia had state legislature elections in 2009. We must check each 
district to find if the incumbent of the 112th U. S. Congress in ran for reelection in 
November 2012 to the 113th U. S. Congress and whether they succeeded or failed. Then 
we will group the states according to their chosen methods and see if their reelection rates 
correlate to their chosen method. 
With two exceptions, the congressional district boundaries remained the same for 
the 109th to the 112th Congress. Georgia and Texas redrew their maps between the 109th 
and the 110th Congress. For this thesis, the shorter lifespan of Georgia’s and Texas’ map 
should not be significant.  
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Reference books and websites are full of useful statistics and facts on American 
politics, but — sadly — research for this thesis have not come up with any single source 
providing the information needed. Much is found and entered into the spreadsheets shown 
in the appendices titled State overview and Electoral district details. 
The names and numbers in this chapter and the appendices are mostly from the 
2012 and 2014 editions of The Almanac of American Politics, from the extensive databases 
of Ballotpedia and from numerous articles provided by The Brennan Center for Justice.
141
 
Most of these data are presented without any other attribution than this one. This is solely 
due to the fact that they are too numerous. The names and numbers from thee sources are 
found as tables in the appendices, and conclusions in this chapter are based on those tables.  
4.1.1 Conventions used in this chapter 
When 2012 is the given date, it means late spring and summer 2012 during the 112th 
Congress, when the next congressional district maps were finalized, before the election to 
the 113th Congress.  
When November 2012 is the given date, it is used about the outcome of the November 
election to the 113th Congress.  
(R) = Republican. (D) = Democrat. (I) = Independent. 
“Incumbency reelection rate” will in the following chapter refer to the number of 
incumbents winning, as a percentage of the number of incumbents running.  
“Majority reelection rate” is the same number, but only for the candidates representing the 
largest party in state legislature. Note that this is not always the party winning the most 
seats in U. S. Congress. 
“Minority reelection rate” is the same number for the smaller party, but not necessarily the 
smallest party in the state legislature, which in some states are independents.  
“Total reelection rate” is the total number of reelected incumbents, as a percentage of the 
total number of congressional districts in the respective states. Note that if a district has two 
incumbents – as some do after redistricting – the district is counted only as one won by an 
incumbent. 
All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer. 
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If districts are redrawn, we count incumbents from a previously otherwise numbered 
district as incumbents in their new districts, since they still retain the incumbent’s 
advantages of name recognition and financial resources. In some redrawn districts, most 
notably in California, a single district may have several incumbents running. 
If an incumbent drops out before Election Day or is beaten in a primary election, he or she 
will be counted as not running. 
If an incumbent after redistricting runs for election in another district, he or she will still be 
counted since an incumbent. 
Candidates who already served in Congress, due to special midterm elections, are all 
counted as incumbents, no matter how short their times in office were. 
142
 
  
                                                 
142 There is one single exception to this rule. Suzan DelBene of Virginia’s First District won a special election 
on Election Day, November 2012, to fill the vacant position of Jay Inslee, who ran for U. S. Senate. This 
means she served from November 2012 to January 2013. She did not, however, serve before Election Day, so 
her incumbency has no relevance to this thesis. 
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4.2 States redistricting by independent 
commission 
4.2.1 Arizona 
The 2011 reapportionment awarded Arizona a new, ninth district and triggered a 
serious redistricting. Establishing the incumbents’ reelection rate is not straightforward in 
this state and election. Four of eight incumbents ran in the 2012 election. Two of them ran 
in other districts, new, but overlapping with the old districts they won in 2010. Because 
they still had the incumbent’s advantage and faced no other incumbent in their respective 
districts, we will count their wins as both incumbents and as party keeps.  
The Republican Party controlled House, Senate and governorship, but the 
redistricting was controlled by an external, independent commission. Incumbents ran for 
reelection in four of nine districts, winning all races. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (5/5). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (3/3). The 
minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The total reelection rate was 
56% (5/9). The revised and contested redistricting process in Arizona is described in 
detailed in chapter 3.6.2. 
4.2.2 California 
California’s redistricting was the most radical of all following the 2010 census, both 
in terms of ends and of means. In the decade following the 2001 redistricting, only one 
single of the Golden State’s fifty-three seats the U. S. House of Representatives changed 
party hands. After the drastic 2011 redistricting, executed by a public commission – as 
described in detail in chapter 3.6.1 – California’s Congressional district borders were 
completely redrawn. As a result, fourteen districts had no incumbent running and thirteen 
newly formed districts shared twenty-seven incumbents. 
The California State Assembly and the State Senate were both controlled by the 
Democrats, and a Democrat governor was elected 2010. Incumbents ran for reelection in 
forty-four of fifty-three districts, winning thirty-nine of those races. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 89% (39/44). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
93% (27/29), losing two races to new Democrats. The minority party incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 80% (12/15). The total reelection rate was 74% (39/53). 
 60 
 
4.2.3 Hawaii 
Hawaii is a Democrat stronghold with two seats in the U. S. House of 
Representatives, the same as before the 2011 redistricting. Hawaii uses a nine-member 
bipartisan commission for redistricting. Two members each are appointed by the President 
of the Hawaii State Senate, the Speaker of the Hawaii House of Representatives, the 
Hawaii State Senate Minority Leader and the Hawaii House of Representatives Minority 
Leader. The commission Chair is appointed by Hawaii State Supreme Court. The 
commission is mandated to draw compact, contiguous districts and preserve socio-
economic communities where practicable. In 2011, the Hawaii State Supreme Court 
overturned the redistricting plans for State Legislature, but the congressional maps were 
accepted.
143
  
Incumbents ran for reelection in one of two districts, winning the one. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (1/1). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (1/1). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The 
total reelection rate was 50% (1/2). 
4.2.4 Idaho 
Redistricting in Idaho – where Republicans have 80% of the state House and Senate 
seats – is described by the Almanac of American Politics as ‘to simply shift the Boise 
dividing line between the First and Second districts a mile or two west every ten years.
144
 
Nevertheless, on September 15, 2011 the bipartisan redistricting commission failed to come 
up with a unified redistricting plan within its 90-day deadline. The Idaho State Secretary 
promptly appointed a new commission, which with four votes for and two against adopted 
a new plan on October 17. 
Incumbents ran for reelection and won in both districts. The incumbents’ reelection 
rate was 100% (2/2). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). 
The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The total reelection rate was 100% 
(2/2). 
                                                 
143 "Redistricting and Apportionment." State of Hawaii Office of Elections, 
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144 Barone et al. 25952/90879 
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4.2.5 New Jersey 
Since 1995 a commission has handled New Jersey’s redistricting. In 2011 they had 
lost one seat in the U. S. House of Representatives. Six Democrats and six were appointed 
by the State House, and those twelve elected a thirteenth member as chairperson and a 
presumably neutral tie-breaker. The independent chairperson sided with the Republicans, 
and the commission came up with a plan pitting two incumbents against each other in one 
district. The Democrat in question chose not to run for reelection. 
Incumbents ran for reelection and won in all twelve districts. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (12/12). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (6/6). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (6/6). The total 
reelection rate was 100% (12/12). 
4.2.6 Washington 
Since 1983, Washington has appointed a bipartisan commission to draw the 
electoral maps. In case of deadlock, the Washington State Supreme Court will take over, 
and the legislature has retained the option of overriding the commission, but that would 
require a majority of two thirds in both chambers of the legislature. Unlike the 
commissions in Iowa and California, the commission is allowed to actively protect 
incumbents – and it does.  
Incumbents ran for reelection in seven of ten states and won all. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (7/7). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (2/2). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (5/5). The total 
reelection rate was 70% (7/10). 
4.3 States without one-party control, redistricting 
by legislature 
4.3.1 Colorado 
The Colorado state legislature has twice failed to push a redistricting plan through 
house, state and governor. In 2001 Republicans lacked a single seat in the State Senate to 
push their plan through. In 2011 Democrats faced the same dilemma. They had the 
governor and a State Senate majority, but they lacked one single seat in the State House. 
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Both times, judges chose to apply Democrat-drawn maps in order to make one district more 
competitive. Nevertheless, in 2012, all seven incumbents won reelection, four of them 
Republicans.  
All reelection rates were 100%. 
4.3.2 Indiana 
If the Indiana State Legislature cannot agree on a redistricting plan, a five-member 
bipartisan commission is appointed. The Governor appoints the tiebreaking fifth member. 
The governorship secured redistricting-control for Democrats in 2001 despite Republican 
majority in the Indiana State Senate. In 2011 Republicans had secured control of House, 
Senate and governorship. They weakened the Democrat base of the Indiana Second District 
in which the incumbent Joe Donnelly chose to run — successfully — for U. S. Senate. 
Incumbents ran for reelection in six of nine districts and won all six. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (6/6). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% 
(2/2). The total reelection rate was 67% (6/9). 
4.3.3 Iowa 
In 2011, Iowa lost its fifth seat in the U. S. House of Representatives. The maps sent 
by The Iowa Legislative Agency for approval by the Iowa State House and Senate included 
one district with two Democrat incumbents pitted against each other and another with two 
Republican incumbents. The maps were accepted almost unanimously by all three levels of 
state legislature. Two of the four U. S. House representatives moved to new districts. One 
of those was Republican Tom Latham, who beat the 78 year-old eight-term incumbent 
Leonard Boswell (D) in the Third District. Boswell’s win had been narrower than Latham’s 
in 2010, and the 2011 redistricting worked in Boswell’s disfavor.  
Incumbents ran for reelection in four of four districts and won all. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (2/2). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 67% (2/3). The total 
reelection rate was 100% (4/4). 
Iowa’s redistricting process is described in detail in chapter 3.6.3. 
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4.3.4 Kentucky 
Democrats have more registered voters than Republicans in The Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, but Republicans control the Kentucky State Senate and have more seats in the 
U. S. House of Representatives. The Governor is a Democrats, and legislators agreed on 
fairly non-partisan maps in 2001 and 2011. 
Incumbents ran for reelection in five of six districts and won four. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 80% (4/5). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
50% (1/2). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (3/3). The total 
reelection rate was 80% (4/6) 
4.3.5 Louisiana 
All seven incumbents ran for reelection, even though The Pelican State kept only 
six seats in the U. S. House of Representatives after the 2011 reapportionment. Louisiana 
redistricting plans needed preclearance by the Department of Justice under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. A long battle between politicians promoting several different 
alternatives was fought before the plans were submitted in April 2011. In the spring of 
2011 Democrats had a slim majority in the State House, a solid majority in State Senate, 
but the Republicans had the Governor – and thereby veto power over redistricting plans.  
Incumbents ran for reelection in six of six districts and won all. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (6/6). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
50% (1/2). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (5/5). The total 
reelection rate was 100% (6/6). 
4.3.6 Minnesota 
Republicans were a majority in both State Senate and State House, but not large 
enough to override the May 19, 2011 veto from the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Governor 
Mark Dayton, who refused to sign any redistricting plan presented to him without 
bipartisan support. The case then went to the Minnesota State Supreme Court, which 
formed a five-judge panel – as it had done ten years before. The rules set down by the panel 
were largely the common ones: Compactness, contiguity and preserving community 
interests, but its carefully weighted words on incumbent protection is worth repeating here: 
“Congressional districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of protecting or defeating 
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incumbents. But the impact of redistricting on incumbent officeholders is a factor 
subordinate to all redistricting criteria that the panel may consider to determine whether 
proposed plans result in either undue incumbent protection or excessive incumbent 
conflicts.”145 The ruling guidelines mention neither stimulating nor stifling competition, so 
while incumbency protection is expressly the least important factor, increased competition 
is not a goal at all for Minnesotans. 
February 21, 2012, after hearings and reviewing submissions of map proposals from 
Republicans, Democrats and some other groups, the judicial panel published the finalized 
maps for elections to both U. S. House of Representatives and Minnesota State Legislature. 
The congressional district map was not drastically different from the initial Republican 
alternative, but it pitted the quite recent presidential candidate and very conservative U. S. 
House incumbent Tea Party Republican Michele Bachmann against the more popular 
Democrat Betty McCollum in District Four. Bachmann had by then already decided to run 
in District Six, which she won by an inch (51% vs 49%).  
Incumbents ran for reelection in all eight districts and won seven. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 88% (7/8). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
75% (3/4). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The total 
reelection rate was 88% (7/8). 
4.3.7 Mississippi 
In the Magnolia State redistricting is a legislative process — in principle. Several 
factors complicate the process. For one, Mississippi is one of the four states to hold state 
legislature elections in 2011, which leaves little time for redistricting, and its House 
representatives serve for four years, as do the state senators. Before the 2011 elections – 
and since Reconstruction – Democrats ruled the Mississippi House of Representatives with 
sixty-eight seats vs. the Republicans’ fifty-four. In 2011 Republicans won the House with a 
narrow sixty-three to sixty-nine majority. In the same election, Mississippi Republicans 
widened their narrow majority in the State Senate from twenty-seven vs. twenty-four to 
thirty-one vs. twenty-one. It was, however, the legislature elected in 2007 which decided to 
leave the redistricting process to a panel of federal judges, arguing that the legislature 
hardly was able to agree over maps in time to prepare for a proper election. The same 
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happened in 2001. Mississippi was subject to pre-clearance under the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, and the legislators doubted that they could draw maps that survived departmental 
scrutiny. When federal judges drew electoral maps, however, the DOJ had no mandate to 
overrule their decision. 
Incumbents ran for reelection and won in all four districts. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (3/3). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (1/1). The total 
reelection rate was 100% (4/4). 
4.3.8 Missouri 
In 2011, The Show Me State showed the world how color may trump party-
affiliation. Republicans controlled both chambers of the state legislature, but their partisan 
redistricting plan was “halfheartedly” vetoed by the Democrat Governor Jay Nixon, 
according to the Almanac of American Politics.
146
 A gubernatorial veto may be overridden 
by a two-thirds majority in Missouri, but the Republicans lacked four seats in the House of 
Representatives to do so. Come voting day, State House Representative Leonard “Jonas” 
Hughes IV (D) – with tears in his eyes – explained that pressure from the U. S. House 
Representative Emanuel Cleaver (D) made him break ranks and voted against his own 
party helping Republicans override the veto. Cleaver was leader of the Black Caucus in U. 
S. House of Representatives, and the Republican plan secured a black minority-minority 
district at the cost of weakening the Democrats chances to win a second seat. The 
Republican plan worked.
147
 
Incumbents ran for reelection in seven of eight districts and won all seven. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (7/7). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (5/5). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% 
(2/2). The total reelection rate was 88% (7/8). 
4.3.9 Nevada 
Having gained a new seat in the U. S. House of Representatives four decades in a 
row, the Nevada legislature in 2011 drew a congressional district map with one safe 
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Republican seat, one safe Democrat seat and two Democrat-leaning. Governor Brian 
Sandoval (R) vetoed the maps drawn by the legislature’s Democrat majority, and Judge 
James Todd Russell of the Nevada First Judicial District Court appointed a panel of three 
men who drew a map which contributed to a draw, two Democrats and two Republicans. 
Incumbents ran for reelection in two of four districts and won both. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 0. The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The 
total reelection rate was 50% (2/4). 
4.3.10 New Hampshire 
The New Hampshire Second District counted only 498 citizens more than the First, 
so the legislators in The Granite State could have gotten away with not adjusting 
congressional district borders at all. Still, the Republicans – who had both seats in U. S. 
House of Representatives and a bicameral majority – came up with new maps which 
moved 19,000 voters between the districts. Then they lost both seats. In the First District, 
the Republican incumbent lost by less than 13,000 votes. 
Incumbents ran for reelection in both districts and lost. The incumbents’ reelection 
rate was 0. The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The minority party 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The total reelection rate was 0. 
4.3.11 New Mexico 
Democrats controlled the legislature, which created a plan vetoed by the Republican 
governor. Then, State Supreme Court appointed a retired judge to decide on the 
redistricting. 
Incumbents ran for reelection and won in two of three districts. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (1/1). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (1/1). The total 
reelection rate was 67% (2/3). 
4.3.12 New York 
Law Professor Nathan Persily is quoted repeatedly in this thesis. In 2011 he had to 
put action behind his words – more than once. As in Connecticut, Persily ended up drawing 
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the final congressional districts in the Empire State. New York was subject to pre-clearance 
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and run by Democrat Governor Mario Cuomo, a 
Democrat-led State Assembly and a slim Republican State Senate majority. Cuomo had 
threatened to veto any gerrymandered maps, and as time ran for any chance of a unified 
plan coming from the legislature, a federal three-judge panel appointed a judge to run the 
redistricting – and she hired Professor Persily.   
Incumbents ran for reelection in twenty-four of twenty-seven districts and won 
twenty-two. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 92% (22/24). The majority (D) party’s 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 95% (17/18). The minority party incumbents’ reelection 
rate was 83% (5/6). The total reelection rate was 83% (22/24). 
4.3.13 Oregon 
Beating expectations, the divided legislature of Oregon – the only West Coast state 
without a redistricting commission – came up with a new set of maps with only small 
adjustments, maintaining the status quo. Incumbents ran for reelection and won all five 
districts.  
The incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (5/5). The majority (D) party’s 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate 
was 100% (1/1). The total reelection rate was 100% (5/5). 
4.3.14 Virginia 
An independent advisory commission to oversee the redistricting process was 
announced January, 2011 by Virginia’s Republican Governor Bob McDonnell. The 
commission’s advice was, however, neither needed nor heeded. An incumbent-friendly-
drawn map originated among Republicans in the Virginia House of Delegates, and that 
map found some Democrat support.
148
 That support was not enough to win legislation in 
the legislature in 2011. However, Virginia (and New Jersey) held state legislature elections 
in 2011, and come January, 2012, the newly elected state representatives agreed on the 
incumbent-friendly map – in time for the 2012 election. Since then, a panel of federal 
                                                 
148 Richard E. Cohen. "Va. House Delegation Protects Itself." Politico, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51212.html. 
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judges has ruled the maps unconstitutional, so they must be redrawn before the 2015 
elections. 
Incumbents ran for reelection and won all eleven districts. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (11/11). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (8/8). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (3/3). The total 
reelection rate was 100% (11/11). 
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4.4 States with one-party control, redistricting by 
legislature 
4.4.1 Alabama  
In 2010, Democrats lost their grip on Alabama redistricting when Republicans 
gained control of both chambers in the state legislature for the first time since the 
Reconstruction, 136 years earlier. While the map drawn in 2001 by Democrats was branded 
“fairly partisan,” the GOP-drawn map in 2011 effectively secured Republican 
representation in six of seven districts by packing Democrats into the 7th District, which 
covers Montgomery and parts of Birmingham.
149
 Alabama’s whites are 69% of the state 
population, while the blacks are 27%. In the 7th District, the numbers are almost reversed: 
34% vs. 64%. 
 State Representative Craig Ford (D) proposed handing the redistricting process over 
to a neutral body, a nine-member citizens panel appointed by both parties in the Alabama 
State Legislature. An editorial in The Huntsville Times drily commented: “It was a sound 
idea. So why didn’t Democrats promote this when their party controlled the redistricting 
process?”150 
After the 2011 reapportionment Alabama kept all seven seats in the U. S. House of 
Representatives in the 113th Congress. Alabama redistricts strictly through a legislative 
process. The Alabama Constitution obligates the legislature to preserve county boundaries 
where possible and to draw compact districts. The redistricting plans are subject to veto by 
the governor. Alabama was in 2012 still subject to pre-clearance under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
The redistricting process was controlled by one party, and the incumbency 
reelection rate was 100% (7/7). Majority (R) reelection rate was 100% (6/6). Minority 
reelection rate was 100% (1/1). The total reelection rate was 100% (9/9).  
4.4.2 Arkansas 
Arkansas kept her four sets in the U. S. House of Representatives, following the 
2011 apportionment. Democrats lost control of State House and State Senate in the election 
                                                 
149 The Almanac of American Politics 2013. Location 1106. 
150 John Peck. "Alabama Redistricting Efforts Stirs Concerns of Political Gerrymandering." The Huntsville 
Times, May 12 2011. 
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following the redistricting process, but Democrats were in control of both - and the 
governorship - during the redistricting process. Nevertheless, they lost their one remaining 
seat in 2012, and in November 2014, Republicans won the gubernatorial election, too. 
Incumbents ran for reelection in three of four districts, winning all races. In the 
Fourth District the Democrat incumbent dropped out late in the primaries, unsuccessfully 
seeking the position of governor rather than reelection. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (3/3). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (3/3). The 
minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 0% (0). The total reelection rate was 75% 
(3/4). 
4.4.3 Connecticut 
Connecticut has a legislative process, but it uses a bipartisan commission to run the 
redistricting process. The Governor of Connecticut has no veto rights over redistricting 
plans, and the redistricting plans require a two thirds majority to pass legislation. Two 
majority and minority representatives are appointed from both chambers of the Connecticut 
State Congress. Those eight select a ninth commissioner to act as a tiebreaker. This worked 
fine in 2001, but in 2011 they failed to agree on a map, and the state court system took over 
and appointed Professor Nathan Persily — who also drew New York’s districts — as a 
“special redistricting master.”151 
Incumbents ran for reelection in four of five districts, winning all four. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The 
total reelection rate was 80% (4/5). 
4.4.4 Florida 
The tensions that created the Bushmanders of the 1990s  – described in chapter 3.5 
– were very much apparent in The Sunshine State’s 2012 election, and they still are. 
Florida is controlled by Republicans, who have House and Senate majority and the 
governorship. The Governor of Florida has no veto rights in this matter, though. Its 
redistricting was subject to pre-clearance by the U. S. Justice Department under Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. To complicate matters further, the Florida State 
                                                 
151 Barone et al. 1609/90879. 
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Constitution was amended November 2010 by a ballot initiative – Fair Districts – which 
demanded that legislators draw compact districts using city, county and geographical 
boundaries and look away from political statistics and incumbents’ residences.152 
 Despite broad popular support (63%), the amendment faced resistance, not only 
from the Governor and from state legislators reluctant to cede power, but also from some 
blacks and Hispanics in U. 
S. Congress, arguing that the 
amendment was 
irreconcilable with Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.  
There are minority-
majority districts in Florida, 
some sinisterly shaped, but 
drawn with the blessings of 
the U. S. Justice Department 
in order to secure 
representation for significant majorities. A week after the Fair Districts initiative won the 
election, the two U. S. House Representatives Corrinne Brown and Mario Diaz-Balart, filed 
suit in a U. S. District court to have the amendment declared unconstitutional. They 
worried that it would effectively reduce the number of blacks and Hispanics in Congress.  
Brown’s district, Florida Third Congressional District, was in 2010 said to be 
“scrupulously drawn to be 51 percent African-American.” 153 In a joint statement, the two 
argued that “certainly, minority communities do not live in compact, cookie-cutter like 
neighborhoods, and so district “compactness” would defeat the ability of the state 
Legislature to draw access and majority-minority seats, since minority communities would 
become fragmented across the state.” 154 
                                                 
152 Ballotpedia. 
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Congressional_District_Boundaries,_Amendment_6_%282010%29.  
153 Brent Batten. "Fight over Amendments 5, 6 Heads to Court." Naples Daily News, November 8 2010. 
154 Ben Smith. "Florida Districting Fight Heads to Court, as Expected." Politico, 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1110/Florida_districting_fight_heads_to_court_as_expected.html?sh
owall. 
Figure 11 - Florida's Fifth District. Source: The Washington Post. 
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Brown was in an unusual alliance of Republicans and black Democrats, as she had 
been since the 1990s, when her district was drawn. 
155
 Florida Republicans agreed in 1991 
to draw a black majority to secure African-American representation. This did not go well 
with other Florida Democrats, since securing Brown her district meant depleting the 
neighbor districts of predominantly Democrat-leaning blacks – thus securing Republican 
wins. It was a blatant gerrymander, but done according to the spirit of The Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, and therefore it survived strict scrutiny. In three elections – 2004, 2006 and 
2008 – Brown ran unopposed. 
Despite the amended Florida Constitution, three oddly shaped districts survived the 
Republican-controlled redistricting. The Florida Third District was left largely unchanged, 
but renumbered as the Fifth District for the 2012 election. The existing map is, however, 
still subject to court actions. In 2014, a Florida judge declared the Fifth District 
unconstitutional and ordered it and the neighboring Tenth District redrawn.
156
 The case is 
expected to appear before the Florida Supreme Court and quite possibly the U. S. Supreme 
Court before the district borders are finalized – and then the next redistricting round will 
probably draw close.  
Incumbents ran for reelection in twenty-two of twenty-seven districts, winning all 
but two. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 91% (20/22). The majority (R) party’s 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 88% (14/16). The minority party incumbents’ reelection 
rate was 100% (6/6). The total reelection rate was 74% (20/27). 
4.4.5 Georgia 
The Peach State has a rich history of partisan redistricting by the state legislature. 
The 2001 round was controlled by Democrats, who drew some bizarrely twisted districts, 
but to no avail. In 2012 Republicans controlled State House, State Senate and the 
governorship. They kept some of the minority majority districts and made sure they won 
the newly apportioned seat in the U. S. House of Representatives. They drew the maps 
aiming to win the Twelfth District by drawing Democrat voters out. This failed in 2012, but 
succeeded it in 2014.  
                                                 
155 Alex Leary. "Democrat U. S. Rep. Corrine Brown Again Aligns with Gop in Florida Redistricting Battle." 
Tampa Bay Times, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/national/democrat-us-rep-corrine-brown-again-
aligns-with-gop-in-florida/1169453. 
156 Frank James. "Florida Ruling Is a Primer on Redistricting Chicanery." National Public Radio, 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/07/11/330771339/florida-ruling-is-a-primer-on-redistricting-
chicanery. 
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Incumbents ran for reelection in thirteen of fourteen districts, winning all. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (13/13). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (8/8). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% 
(5/5). The total reelection rate was 93% (13/14). 
4.4.6 Illinois 
In Illinois, 
redistricting is a lottery – 
quite literally. If the 
General Assembly does not 
come up with a plan, a 
bipartisan commission is 
appointed. If this 
commission fails, the 
Illinois Secretary of State 
will randomly select one of 
two candidates, one from 
each party, to act as a 
tiebreaker.
157
 Illinois lost 
one U. S. House seat after the 2010 census. Incumbents ran for reelection in sixteen of 
eighteen districts and won thirteen. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 81% (13/16). The 
majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (8/8). The minority party 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 63% (5/8). The total reelection rate was 72% (13/18). 
4.4.7 Kansas 
In 2010, Democrats lost their last U. S. House representative in Kansas. 
Republicans won control of redistricting in 2000, but did not use that power for partisan 
gain. In 2012, a coalition of Democrats and moderate Republicans in the Kansas State 
Senate agreed upon a map. A more conservative majority of Republicans in the Kansas 
State House of Representatives agreed on another. A final map was approved by a three-
judge federal court in June 2012. Incumbents ran for reelection and won in all four districts. 
                                                 
157 "Illinois Redistricting." Illinois House Democrats, http://www.ilhousedems.com/redistricting/?page_id=2. 
Figure 12 - Illinois Fourth District, "the Earmuff."  
Source: Washington Post 
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The incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (4/4). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The 
total reelection rate was 100% (4/4). 
4.4.8 Maine 
In 2012, The Pine Tree State had a Republican governor and Republican majority in 
both congressional chambers. Still, they reelected two Democrats. Maine has a legislative 
redistricting process with a fifteen-member bipartisan advisory commission.  
Incumbents ran successfully for reelection in both districts. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. 
The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The total reelection rate 
was 100% (2/2). Process: Legislative with advisory commission. 
4.4.9 Maryland 
The Old Line State gerrymanderers won the dubious honor of having outlined the 
least compact districts of U. S. states in the 2012 congressional election – and the 2002 
election as well.
158
  Democrats 
use redistricting power openly 
for maximum partisan 
advantage. In 2011 they moved 
some Republican-leaning 
counties from the formerly 
Republican Sixth District to 
the already Republican First 
District and moved just enough 
Democrats from the Eighth 
District to ensure Democrat 
majority in both the Sixth and 
the Eight.  
                                                 
158 Megan Poinski. "Study: Maryland Has Nation’s Least Compact Congressional Districts." The Washington 
Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/24/maryland-has-nations-least-compact-
congressional-d/. 
 
Figure 13 - Maryland's Third District. Source: The Washington Post. 
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Incumbents ran for reelection in all eight districts and won seven. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 88% (7/8). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (6/6). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 50% (1/2). The total 
reelection rate was 88% (7/8). 
4.4.10 Massachusetts 
The Democrats had a solid grip on the legislature in the original gerrymander state 
in 2010, and when they lost their tenth seat in the U. S. House of Representatives they had 
total control, permitting only one close race and electing a new Kennedy – Robert F. 
Kennedy’s grandson, Joseph III. Two incumbents ended up in the same district, but 
William Keating moved from the new Eighth District to his other home in the Ninth 
District. Incumbents ran for reelection in eight of nine districts and won them all. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (8/8). The majority (D) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (8/8). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The 
total reelection rate was 89% (8/9). 
4.4.11 Michigan 
Republicans won only forty-six percent of the votes cast in the 2012 U. S. House 
election in The Wolverine State. Nevertheless, they won nine seats out of fourteen seats – 
sixty-four percent. Michigan legislators are experienced gerrymanderers. Michigan is the 
only state to lose population, and it has lost U. S. House seats and been forced to extensive 
redrawing of congressional district-maps after all the last four decennial apportionments. 
The city of Detroit alone used to hold five seats in the U. S. House of Representatives. 
Now, Detroit barely has one. Republicans control the Michigan House of Representatives, 
State Senate and the State Supreme Court – and they have the governor.159 During the 
redistricting process they made sure that the seat lost to reapportioning would be a 
Democrat seat, by pitting two Democrat incumbents against each other in the packed and 
twisted minority-majority Fourteenth District, causing one of them to drop out in the 
primary election and the other to win the general election with eighty-two percent of the 
votes. 
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Incumbents ran for reelection in twelve of fourteen districts and won all twelve. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (12/12). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (9/9). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% 
(3/3). The total reelection rate was 86% (12/14). 
4.4.12 Nebraska 
The Cornhusker State is the only with a unicameral state legislature. It is solid 
Republican, but one district was won just narrowly in 2010. Also, districts for elections to 
the U. S. House of Representatives are used for presidential elections too, and Nebraska 
does not practice winner-takes-all in presidential races, so redistricting is more combative 
than the Republican dominance should indicate. Unlike in all other states (Maine 
excepted), securing a third of the votes in Nebraska will win you a vote in the Electoral 
College, as President Obama did in 2008.   
In the 2012 election to the U. S. House of Representatives incumbents ran for 
reelection and won in all three districts. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (3/3). 
The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (3/3). The minority party 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The total reelection rate was 100% (3/3). 
 
4.4.13 North Carolina 
Fearing a Republican Governor, the ruling Democrats changed the North Carolina 
Constitution in 1996, removing 
the gubernatorial right to veto a 
redistricting plan. This came back 
to haunt them during the 2011 
redistricting, as the Democrat 
Governor was rendered powerless 
when the Republicans were as 
cynical and effective as 
Democrats had been for decades 
earlier. They made sure to keep 
the minority-majority districts 
Figure 14 - North Carolina's Twelfth District 2012, "The Lower 
Intestines." Source: The Washingon Post 
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and pack even more Democrats into them.  
Incumbents ran for reelection in ten of thirteen districts and won nine. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 90% (9/10). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (5/5). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 80% 
(4/5). One could argue that the minority reelection rate was only 57% (4/7), but that would 
require counting incumbents dropped out after redistricting as running – which one in this 
thesis has chosen not to do. The total reelection rate was 69% (9/13). 
4.4.14 Ohio 
With a majority in both chambers and the governorship, Ohio Republicans could 
make sure that the two seats lost in the U. S. House of Representatives were Democrat 
seats. Democrat incumbents were paired in two districts and as The Almanac of American 
Politics 2014 phrased it: “the creation of a Columbus Democratic vote sink would produce 
a beneficial ripple effect, allowing Republicans to shore up other freshmen and keep a 12-4 
advantage.” 160 
Incumbents ran for reelection in thirteen of sixteen districts and won all. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (13/13). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (11/11). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 67% 
(2/3). The total reelection rate was 100% (13/13). Note that the 67% are due to two 
incumbents running in the Sixteenth District. 
4.4.15 Oklahoma 
After only minimal border adjustments, the new maps were decided, and Oklahoma 
Democrats lost their only seat when Dan Boren (37) chose to retire from the Second 
District. Incumbents ran for reelection in three of five districts and won all three. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (3/3). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (3/3). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 0. The 
total reelection rate was 60% (3/5). 
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4.4.16 Pennsylvania 
In the Keystone State, there were about one million more registered Democrats than 
Republicans. Yet, Republicans 
controlled House, Senate and the 
Governor’s office and could decide 
which of the nineteen seats should 
be removed following the 
decennial apportionment.
161
  
Incumbents ran for reelection in 
sixteen of eighteen districts and 
lost only one. The incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 94% (15/16). 
The majority (R) party’s 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (11/11). The minority party incumbents’ reelection 
rate was 80% (4/5). The total reelection rate was 83% (15/18).  
4.4.17 Rhode Island 
The Democrat bastion of Rhode Island came very close to losing one of its two 
seats in the U.S House of Representatives. The First District was in 2011 USA’s least 
populated, estimated at 524,097 people. Incumbents ran for reelection and won both 
districts. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The majority (D) party’s 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate 
was 0. The total reelection rate was 100% (2/2). 
4.4.18 South Carolina 
”I would opt for the devil I know rather than the devil I don’t know,” was the 
explanation offered by Republican Senator Tom Davis when the South Carolina State 
Senate and House agreed on a set of electoral maps rather than leave the matter to the 
courts.
162
 The plan, which secured that the new seat would become a safe GOP seat, then 
                                                 
161 Alex Rose. "Pa. Democrats Facing Loss of Congressional District." Daily Times News, 
http://www.delcotimes.com/general-news/20110110/pa-democrats-facing-loss-of-congressional-district. 
162Associated Press. "Officials Ok S.C. Redistricting Plan." The Augusta Chronicle, 
http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2011-07-26/officials-ok-sc-redistricting-plan. 
Figure 15 - Pennsylvania's Seventh District. Source: The 
Washington Post. 
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passed the Governor and won pre-clearance by the Department of Justice. Incumbents ran 
for reelection in six of seven districts and won all. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 
100% (6/6). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (5/5). The 
minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (1/1). The total reelection rate was 
86% (6/7). 
4.4.19 Tennessee 
Rather than going aggressively for the two remaining Democrat seats, the 
Republicans, who controlled the Tennessee State House, Senate and Governor’s office used 
the 2011 redistricting to mainly secure their own seven seats for the future five elections. 
Incumbents ran for reelection and won all nine districts. The incumbents’ reelection rate 
was 100% (9/9). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (7/7). The 
minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The total reelection rate was 
100% (7/7). 
4.4.20 Texas 
“What's really shocking is we got four new congressional districts, and there's no 
addition of Latino opportunity districts.” Nina Perales, a lead attorney for the Mexican-
American Legal Defense and 
Education Fund complained 
in June 2011, when 
Governor Rick Perry gave 
birth to a new creature, the 
“Perry-mander.” 163 The 
Governor pushed a blatantly 
partisan map through the 
Texas State House of 
Representative and State 
Senate before giving it his 
stamp of approval. Texas 
                                                 
163 David Wasserman. "'Perrymander': Redistricting Map That Rick Perry Signed Has Texas Hispanics up in 
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Figure 16 - Texas' 35th District, "The Upside-Down Elephant." Source: The 
Washington Post. 
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was subject to pre-clearance by the U. S. Department of Justice under the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. Democrats and Hispanics took the maps to court, and while a federal court in 
San Antonio redrew the maps following the lawsuit, the DOJ returned the maps without 
any pre-clearance due to discriminatory intent. When the San Antonio court came up with 
new maps, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that the San Antonio Court had not paid 
sufficient respect to the maps presented by the Texas legislature – which the DOJ had 
denied pre-clearance. The San Antonio court then came up with a set of preliminary maps. 
While waiting for the final verdict on the maps, the 2012 election went by – and the 
Supreme Court rendered the Voting Rights Act of 1965 largely moot, effectively ending 
the pre-clearance demands.  
Incumbents ran for reelection in thirty of thirty-six districts and won twenty-eight. 
The incumbents’ reelection rate was 93% (28/30). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 91% (2|/23). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% 
(7/7). The total reelection rate was 78% (28/36). 
4.4.21 Utah 
Utah won its fourth seat in the U. S. House of Representatives in the 2011 
reapportionment. The Republicans had a firm grip on the Utah State House, State Senate 
and governorship, and made sure the new seat was safe for them. They also chipped away 
on the Fourth District to erode Democrat Jim Matheson’s electoral base, and they came 
very close to succeeding. Matheson won reelection with 119,803 votes – 768 more than his 
Republican opponent. Incumbents ran for reelection in three of four districts and won all. 
The incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The majority (R) party’s incumbents’ 
reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% 
(1/1). The total reelection rate was 75% (3/4). 
4.4.22 West Virginia 
The West Virginia Legislature made only minor adjustments to the existing maps 
for congressional districts. Incumbents ran for reelection and won in all three districts. The 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (3/3). The majority party – Democrats control the 
West Virginia House of Delegates, State Senate and governorship – incumbents’ reelection 
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rate was 100% (1/1). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (2/2). The 
total reelection rate was 100% (3/3). 
4.4.23 Wisconsin 
Republicans controlled both the Wisconsin State Assembly and State Senate, and 
Governor Scott Walker (R) signed into law a redistricting plan that helped maintain the 
status quo – five Republican and three Democrat seats – after the election in which the 
GOP won only 49% of the votes.  Incumbents ran for reelection in seven of eight districts 
and won all. The incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (7/7). The majority (R) party’s 
incumbents’ reelection rate was 100% (5/5). The minority party incumbents’ reelection rate 
was 100% (2/2). The total reelection rate was 88% (7/8). 
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4.5 States with only one congressional district 
4.5.1 Alaska 
In 2012 Don Young (R) was reelected to his 20th consecutive term. 
4.5.2 Delaware 
Delaware is a Democrat stronghold which gave John Carney a second term. 
4.5.3 Montana 
In The Treasure State the incumbent ran for senate, clearing the seat for fellow Republican 
Steve Daines. When Montana had more than one U. S. House representative, it used an 
independent commission for redistricting, and if it regains its second seat, it will do so 
again. 
4.5.4 North Dakota 
GOP incumbent Rick Berg ran for U. S. Senate, clearing the seat for fellow Republican 
Kevin Cramer. 
4.5.5 South Dakota 
The GOP incumbent Kristi Noem was reelected. 
4.5.6 Vermont 
Democrat incumbent Peter Welch was reelected.  
4.5.7 Wyoming 
Republican incumbent Cynthia Lummis was reelected. 
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4.6 Analyzing the numbers 
Do the numbers show any correlation between redistricting method and the 
incumbents’ reelection rate? At first glance the difference between legislative and 
commission states comes down to almost nothing – just two percent. A closer look does, 
however, reveal a deeper divide — which we examine more closely later in this chapter. In 
states using independent commissions for the redistricting following the 2010 census, 
ninety-three percent of the incumbents were reelected on Election Day 2012. In states 
having redistricted by legislature, incumbents had a reelection rate of ninety-five percent.  
Those numbers appear when we use weighted numbers, which means counting 
district by district, so that New Jersey’s twelve reelections count six times as much as 
Idaho’s two. If we count by state, letting New Jerseys perfect one hundred percent 
reelection rate be counted as equal to Idaho’s equally perfect hundred, the results differ, but 
still not much. Unweighted, commission-states had a ninety-eight percent reelection rate 
while legislature-states had ninety-four.  
In this thesis, we will place most emphasis on the weighted numbers, but there is a 
case to be made for using unweighted numbers, too. Unweighted numbers reduce the effect 
of single, large states in the equation. California’s thirty-nine reelections influence the end 
result proportionally much more than its eighty-eight percent reelection rate, and in a thesis 
where we are looking for the effects of two systems, California’s system is one, just as 
Idaho’s is one. When we end up emphasizing the weighted numbers, it is because of the 
system of single-member districts. The redistricting systems chosen affect every single 
single-member district directly, not just as proportion of a whole.  
The deeper — and more significant — divide appears when we separate those states 
where one party had total control of the redistricting process from the rest. There we find 
that the majority party has a staggering level of control — a ninety-seven percent 
incumbent reelection rate. The minority party’s incumbents, on the other hand, have a 
reelection rate of eighty-seven percent — a full ten percent difference. In legislative states 
without one-party control, majority parties actually had a lower rate of reelection than 
minorities — ninety-two versus ninety-seven percent. In commission-states the 
corresponding numbers are ninety-six and ninety — a six percent difference. 
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4.6.1 A testable hypothesis 
 “Can U. S. House elections results to a significant degree be predicted by the 
states’ redistricting methods” is simply a question, not a testable hypothesis. In order to test 
the research question statistically, we need to state it  as an assertion. If we base our 
hypothesis on the theories presented in chapter 2.1.3, a positive answer would rest on this 
assertion, which is testable: “In states where redistricting is done through the legislature 
and one party is in control of the process, we will see a higher reelection rate than in other 
states.”  
Our null hypothesis, H0, says that the assertion it true and that we will find a higher 
reelection rate in the above-named districts.  
Our alternative hypothesis, HA, says that the assertion is false and we will not find a 
higher reelection rate. 
We have two options. The first is to reject HA and conclude that H0 is supported by 
our data. The other is to fail to reject HA and conclude that H0 is not supported by our data. 
After inspecting and grouping the election data we are left with the reelection rates 
below.
164
 The abbreviations are provided only for making the following arguments more 
legible. 
  
                                                 
164 The numbers behind the reelection rates are found in the Appendix – Reelection rates. 
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Abbr. Rate Category 
RC1 0.94 Overall reelection rate in states redistricting by independent commission. 
RC2 0.96 Majority reelection rate in states redistricting by independent commission. 
RC3 0.90 Minority reelection rate in states redistricting by independent commission. 
RL1 0.95 Overall reelection rate in states redistricting by legislative process. 
RL2 0.96 Majority reelection rate in states redistricting by legislative process. 
RL3 0.91 Minority reelection rate in states redistricting by legislative process. 
RL1M 0.95 Overall reelection rate in states with one-party control and redistricting by legislative 
process. 
RL2M 0.97 Majority reelection rate in states with one-party control and redistricting by legislative 
process. 
RL3M 0.87 Minority reelection rate in states with one-party control and redistricting by legislative 
process. 
RL1N 0.95 Overall reelection rate in states without one-party control but redistricting by legislative 
process. 
RL2N 0.92 Majority reelection rate in states without one-party control but redistricting by legislative 
process. 
RL3N 0.97 Minority reelection rate in states without one-party control but redistricting by legislative 
process. 
   
If these numbers support our null hypothesis H0, the following should be true:  
RL2M should be the highest number. This is true. Majority parties controlling the 
redistricting did have the highest reelection rate in 2012. The fact that RL3N is equal to 
RL2M is also in line with Issacharoff’s theory. Bipartisan agreements apparently did not 
foster competition, but rather promoted tit-for-tat protection of electoral districts in 2012. 
RL3M should be the lowest number. This is true. Minority parties lost reelection 
battles more often when the opposition drew the electoral districts. 
RC1 should be lower than RL1N. This is true. Commission-states had lower 
reelection rates than legislation-states. 
RL2M should be higher than RL3M. This is true. It is also the highest difference 
recorded, but also the most obvious. Those who controlled the redistricting won reelection 
more often than those who did not. 
No findings support HA. 
All four findings support H0, that “In states where redistricting is done through the 
legislature and one party is in control of the process, we can expect to see a higher 
reelection rate for the majority party than in other states.” 
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4.6.2 The significance 
The null hypothesis is not rejected by the findings in this thesis, but at what level of 
significance, or rather — at what confidence level is it supported? How consistently do 
majority parties with full legislative control (RL2M) have a higher reelection rate than 
majority parties in states redistricting by commission (RC2)?  
Normally, statisticians require a p-value of 0.05 or less — 95% or more of the data 
within the expected range — to be statistically significant. This can almost be dismissed 
even before looking at the reelection rates in question. We have only twenty-three data 
points. One single fluke result could move the numbers off the scale.  
The average majority reelection rate in states without one-party control of 
redistricting is 94, as demonstrated in the appendix. We are testing for values below this. 
All values above 94 are on target according to the hypothesis. 
We start by calculating the mean µ of the observed data by dividing the sum of data 
by the number of data, n, which is 23.  
µ = (100 + 100 + 100 + 88 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 0 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 
100 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 91 + 100 + 100 + 100) / 23 = 94.73 
We then calculate the standard deviation s by subtracting µ from the observations 
that are lower than 94. Then we square the results, add them together, divide the sum by 22 
(n-1) and draw the square root of that value. That gives us a standard deviation of 20.27. 
Then we convert this to a Z score, a standard normal value, by subtracting 94 from 
µ and divide this by s.  
Z = (94 – 94.73) / 20.27 = -0.36.  
It must be noted that Z-values are of little use for small datasets. 
Checking this against a statistics reference table returns a p-value of 0.3594. This is 
— as expected — nowhere near the 0.05 required for statistical significance. 
This does not lend support our null hypothesis H0. However, with such a small 
dataset, we would be wise not to attribute too much value to those numbers, even if they 
should happen to show strong support. 
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5 Conclusion 
Can U. S. House election results to a significant degree be predicted by the states’ 
choice of redistricting method? Yes, they can. Anyone with only the slightest knowledge 
about redistricting may place a bet on any incumbent winning and still stand a ninety-three 
percent chance of winning the bet.  
If a student spends weeks and months analyzing every single district in the 2012 
election for the U. S. House of Representatives, he can add to his knowledge that betting on 
majority-party-incumbents being reelected in one-party-controlled states would have been 
almost a sure thing, or at least ninety-seven percent sure — which in other parts of life is 
considered a safe bet. He will also know that the minority-party-incumbents in those states 
were those least likely to win of all incumbents, and even those had a reelection rate of 
eighty-seven percent. The numbers fail, however, the test for statistical significance.  
In other words, there is indeed a difference between outcomes from different 
methods of redistricting. It is, however, a rather small one. Is it significant? Yes, it is 
significant in the sense that it is detectable and measureable, but it is not in the sense that a 
change of redistricting method is any kind of game-changer. It is demonstrably not. Neither 
is it significant in a statistical sense. Scholars have published numerous studies proving that 
moving towards commission-based redistricting increases competition, but while they have 
shown that the effect is observable, they have failed to show that redistricting reforms are 
what it takes to bring back competition to American elections. 
One aspect of American politics became clearer while this thesis was written: The 
many electoral procedures applied by the respective states defy being cast into one single 
form or shape. It also defies quantification. USA is — really — fifty different states, and 
even if there are similarities between their respective redistricting processes, there are 
constant changes and revisions being made, and to build an argument over time on numbers 
alone, requires an extensive set of ifs, buts, howevers and conditions that in sum would 
render any confident predictions and conclusions very vulnerable to attack and of little 
value.  
In the 2012 election, California was, despite an overly complicated process, a 
poster-child for election reform. Admittedly, its procedures were not ideal, but the 
competitive level and the election results were to a high degree exactly what the reformers 
had hoped for. The reforms in California released a long overdue massive redistricting, 
which created a landslide that made commission-states appear more competitive. However, 
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a change of majority in any state legislature — which is known to happen repeatedly over 
time — has the same effect, and that is why proponents of legislative redistricting point to 
the “it-evens-out-over-time”-argument. 
The numerous public efforts to reform the American electoral systems are often – 
and should be – based on normative arguments, because it is simply wrong that politicians 
get to choose their voters. It is not just corrupting. It is corrupt. It is also hard to change 
such a system from within, since politicians most often lack motivation to voluntarily cede 
power to their opponents. That would be placing a set of high ideals above a set of 
achievable political goals, which may be why redistricting reforms are usually initiatives 
from minority parties and grassroots movements, both whose political goals are less 
achievable. 
There is no perfect one-method-suits-all for redistricting. Surely, Iowa stands out in 
the field as the one doing the right thing — for Iowans. Formally and legally, Iowa has the 
same redistricting method as Texas and Illinois, but the Iowa legislators have chosen a 
culture of giving clear guidelines and then leaving the redistricting process to professionals. 
Even when this has worked to their disadvantage, they have remained loyal to the 
principles they once agreed on. It is a hands-off approach saving Iowa’s taxpayers millions 
of dollars — literally — on legal fees every decade. The Iowa state legislature is at liberty 
to change this any time it wishes, without consulting the voters. The practice in Iowa is not 
constitutionally founded. Arizona’s independent redistricting commission is founded in an 
amendment to the Arizona constitution. Still, the state’s legislators have repeatedly dragged 
the commission from court to court, and now all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court, 
fighting to regain control. Texan politicians have the same options as Iowans. Yet they 
repeatedly choose to push redistricting through the existing legal system. 
Iowa is also a unique example of a state legislature pushing through reforms. In 
other states, redistricting reforms have come through grassroots movements and direct 
democracy. Representative democracy as such has failed repeatedly in such cases, 
demonstrating the corrupting effects of power on elected representatives seeking reelection. 
This thesis will have to end without any clear conclusion or recommendation, only 
with an observation: The redistricting reform movement is right now at a crossroads. The 
course from here is in the hands of the United States Supreme Court justices, who must 
weigh two systems of democracy against each other. Direct democracy has helped the 
people of Arizona and California push through election reforms, but direct democracy is 
also what the mob-rule-fearing Founding Fathers warned against. Representative 
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democracy has demonstrably failed in securing fair representation, but it also is what the 
Framers of the United States Constitution expressly prescribed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court justices have until now been very reluctant to issue straight 
and easy guidelines for redistricting. If they break with that tradition, the outcome of 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015) may 
drastically change or even reverse the course of redistricting reforms. Predicting that 
outcome is — luckily — beyond the scope of this thesis.  
All bets are off. 
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Appendix 
These tables are found in the appendix: 
State overview: A listing of states and their processes for congressional redistricting 
State detail: Balance of power in the state legislatures at the time of redistricting 
Electoral district details: Election results from every district and information on 
incumbency and redistricting. 
Reelection rates: Four tables showing reelection rates overall and for majority and 
minority parties. 
States redistricting by commission. 
States redistricting by legislature, 
States redistricting by legislature with one-party control. 
States redistricting by legislature without one-party control. 
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State overview 
This table lists the states and their respective processes for congressional redistricting. The 
column “One party control” is derived from the numbers presented in the table “State 
detail” following this table. If a single political party has acquired the clout to force a 
congressional map through legislature, this column is marked “Yes.” This requires that the 
party has a majority in both chambers of the state legislature.
165
 It also requires that it has 
the governor — if indeed the governor has veto power in such matters.  
 
State Process One party 
control 
Process info 
Alabama Legislative Yes Governor has veto 
Alaska None Yes Has only one congressional district. 
Arizona Commission No Independent Commission 
• 5 members: commission on appellate court 
appointments nominates 25 people (10 from each 
major party, 5 from neither major party); legislative 
majority and minority leaders each select 1 
commissioner; those 4 commissioners select 1 
tiebreaker not registered with the party of any of the 
4 commissioners. 
• No more than 2 commissioners may be from the 
same party 
• No more than 2 of the first 4 commissioners may 
be from the same county 
• Commissioners must not have held public office 
within 3 years prior to appointment 
• Commissioners must not have switched party 
within 3 years prior to appointment 
 
Arkansas Legislative Yes Governor has veto 
California Commission No Independent Commission 
• 14 members: 5 from each major party and 4 from 
neither major party, chosen by state auditor panel 
with input from legislative 
majority and minority leaders 
• Commissioners must not have switched parties 
within 5 years prior to appointment 
• Commission must be geographically, racially and 
ethnically diverse 
• Commissioners must have voted in 2 of the 3 state 
elections prior to appointment 
• Commissioners must not have been officials or 
candidates of a political party, employees or 
consultants of a political campaign, or donors of 
more than $2,000 to a political campaign within 10 
years prior to appointment 
• Commissioners must not be staff, consultants or 
contractors for state or federal government 
Colorado Legislative No Governor has veto 
Connecticut Legislative Yes If the General Assembly fails to agree on a plan, the 
Governor appoints a commission. 
 
                                                 
165 Nebraska’s state legislature is unicameral. 
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Delaware None Yes Has only one congressional district. 
Florida Legislative Yes Governor has veto. State laws restrict 
gerrymandering. 
 
Georgia Legislative Yes Governor has veto. State laws restrict 
gerrymandering. 
 
Hawaii Commission Yes Independent, but appointed by leaders in State 
Senate President, State House Speaker and State 
House majority and minority leaders. 
 
Idaho Commission Yes Independent, but appointed by political leadership. 
Illinois Legislative Yes If General Assembly fails (which it usually does), 
leaders in State House and Senate appoint backup 
commission. If deadlock, Illinois Supreme Court 
appoints tie-breaker by lottery. 
 
Indiana Legislative Yes If legislature cannot agree, a five-person bipartisan 
commission is appointed. The fifth tie-breacking 
chair is appointed by the Governor. 
 
Iowa Legislative No Legislative Service Agency draw maps. General 
Assembly and Governor approve. 
 
Kansas Legislative Yes Legislature failed to agree on a map in spring of 
2012. Three-judge federal court approved map. 
 
Kentucky Legislative No Governor has veto. 
Louisiana Legislative No Governor has veto. 
Maine Legislative Yes Has also an advisory commission. Governor has 
veto. 
 
Maryland Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Massachusetts Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Michigan Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Minnesota Legislative No Governor has veto. 
Mississippi Legislative No Legislature gave up without trying and handed the 
process to three federal judges. 
 
Missouri Legislative No Governor has veto. 
Montana Commission No Has at present only one congressional district. 
Nebraska Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Nevada Legislative No Governor has veto. 
New Hampshire Legislative No Governor has veto. 
New Jersey Commission No Independent 10 person commission, but appointed 
by political leadership. If commission fails, New 
Jersey Supreme Court appoint an eleventh member, 
 
New Mexico Legislative No Governor has veto. 
New York Legislative No Governor has veto. 
North Carolina Legislative Yes No gubernatorial veto. 
North Dakota None Yes Has only one congressional district. 
Ohio Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Oklahoma Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Oregon Legislative No Governor has veto. 
Pennsylvania Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
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Rhode Island Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
South Carolina Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
South Dakota None Yes Has only one congressional district. 
Tennessee Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Texas Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Utah Legislative Yes Governor has veto. 
Vermont None Yes Has only one congressional district. 
Virginia Legislative No Governor has veto. Federal or state court acts as a 
backup. 
Washington Commission No Legislative leaders appoint four persons, who then 
appoint a fifth non-voting member. 
West Virginia Legislative Yes Governor has veto 
Wisconsin Legislative Yes Governor has veto 
Wyoming None Yes Has only one congressional district. 
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State details 
Columns explained: 
112. and 113. Number of seats held by the state in the House of Representatives in the 
United States 112
th
 and 113
th
 Congress, respectively. 
113. D. and 113. R. Democrats and Republicans, respectively, from the state in the House 
of Representatives in the United States 113
th
 Congress. 
2012 S. H. D., 2012 S. H. R. and 2012 S. H. I. Democrats, Republicans and Independents, 
respectively, in the lower chamber of the state legislature during redistricting, which in 
most cases was 2012. If otherwise, this is noted in “Additional info.” 
2012 S. S. D., 2012 S. S. R. and 2012 S. S. I. Democrats, Republicans and Independents, 
respectively, in the upper chamber of the state legislature during redistricting, which in 
most cases was 2012. If otherwise, this is noted in “Additional info.” 
2012 Gov. Party controlling the governorship at the time when the Governor could have 
vetoed redistricting plans. For most, this was in 2012. If else, it is noted in “Additional 
info.” 
 
 
 
  112.  113. 113. 
D. 
113. 
R. 
2012 
S. H. 
D. 
2012 
S. H. 
R. 
2012 
S. H. 
I. 
2012 
S. S. 
D. 
2012 
S. S. 
R. 
2012 
S. S. 
I. 
2012 
Gov. 
Additional info 
AL 7 7 1 6 39 66 0 12 22 1 R Alabama’s State House 
representatives serve four 
year terms with no term 
limits. 
AK 1 1 0 1 16 24 0 10 10 0 R   
AZ 8 9 5 4 20 40 0 9 29 0 R   
AR 4 4 0 4 55 45 0 20 15 0 D   
CA 53 53 38 15 52 28 0 24 14 0 D Independent commission 
redistricting from 2010. 
CO 7 7 3 4 32 33 0 20 15 0 D   
CT 5 5 5 0 97 54 0 23 13 0 D Four of five incumbents 
reelected. The fifth left to run 
for governor. 
DE 1 1 1 0 26 15 0 14 7 0 D   
FL 25 27 10 17 39 81 0 12 28 0 R   
GA 13 14 5 9 66 113 1 20 36 0 R   
HI 2 2 2 0 43 8 0 24 1 0 D   
ID 2 2 0 2 13 57 0 7 28 0 R   
IL 19 18 12 8 64 54 0 35 23 0 D   
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  112.  113. 113. 
D. 
113. 
R. 
2012 
S. H. 
D. 
2012 
S. H. 
R. 
2012 
S. H. 
I. 
2012 
S. S. 
D. 
2012 
S. S. 
R. 
2012 
S. S. 
I. 
2012 
Gov. 
Additional info 
             
IN 9 9 2 7 40 60 0 14 36 0 R   
IA 4 5 2 2 42 58 0 27 23 0 R All five incumbents ran in 
four districts. 
KS 4 4 0 4 33 92 0 8 32 0 R No State Senate Elections in 
Kansas 2008. 
KY 6 6 1 5 58 42 0 15 22 0 D   
LA 7 6 1 5 53 50 2 23 16 0 R Louisiana State House 
representatives are elected 
every four years, November 
2007 and 2011. Redistricting 
plans were submitted to 
DOJ April 21, 20111, before 
2011 election. State 
Parliament numbers are 
from following 2007 election 
for both chambers Senator 
Robert Adley switched form 
Democrat to Republican 
after the election, shifting 
the balance to 23/16. 
 
ME 2 2 2 0 72 78 1 14 20 1 R   
MD 8 8 7 1 98 43 0 35 12 0 D Lower chamber is called 
Maryland House of 
Delegates. 
 
MA 10 9 9 0 128 32 0 36 4 0 D Lost one seat after 2010 
census. 
 
MI 15 14 5 9 47 63 0 12 26 0 R Only state to lose 
population, lost one seat, 
lost five after last four 
censuses. Republicans 
control Michigan State 
Supreme Court, too, which 
adds to control of 
redistricting. 
 
MN 8 8 5 3 62 72 0 30 37 0 D   
MS 4 5 1 3 68 54 0 24 27 0 R The State legislature 
numbers are from 2007. The 
legislature agreed on 2011 
to leave redistricting to 
judges. Mississippi elects 
State House and State 
Senate every four years, in 
2007 and 2011. 1 Vacancy 
in State Senate 2007 
 
MO 9 8 2 6 58 105 0 7 27 0 D   
MT 1 1 0 1 33 67 0 22 28 0 D   
NE 3 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 R Nebraska is unicameral. 
State Senate primaries are 
run non-partisan, and the 
State Senate does not list 
senators according to party 
affiliation. It is, however, 
Republican. 
NV 3 4 2 2 26 16 0 11 10 0 R   
NH 2 2 2 0 101 298 0 5 19 0 D   
NJ 13 12 6 6 49 31 0 23 17 0 R NJ State legislature 
elections were in 2009 and 
2011, and the commission 
was appointed in June, 
2011. The State General 
Assembly and Senate 
numbers are therefore from 
2009 and 2007, 
respectively. 
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  112.  113. 113. 
D. 
113. 
R. 
2012 
S. H. 
D. 
2012 
S. H. 
R. 
2012 
S. H. 
I. 
2012 
S. S. 
D. 
2012 
S. S. 
R. 
2012 
S. S. 
I. 
2012 
Gov. 
Additional info 
NM 3 3 2 1 37 33 0 27 15 0 R   
NY 29 27 21 6 99 50 1 30 32 0 D Maps drawn by Nathan 
Persily. Lower chamber is 
called the State Assembly 
 
NC 13 13 4 9 52 67 1 19 31 0 D Massive redistricting since 
GOP took over. 
 
ND 1 1 0 1 25 69 0 12 35 0 R   
OH 19 16 4 12 40 59 0 10 23 0 R   
OK 5 5 0 5 31 70 0 16 32 0 R   
OR 5 5 4 1 30 30 0 16 34 0 D Only Pacific state w/o 
commission 
 
PA 19 18 5 13 91 112 0 20 30 0 R   
RI 2 2 2 0 65 10 0 29 8 1 D   
SC 6 7 1 6 48 75 1 19 27 0 R   
SD 1 1 0 1 19 50 1 5 30 0 R   
TN 9 9 2 7 34 69 1 13 20 0 R   
TX 32 36 12 24 51 98 1(V) 12 19 31 R   
UT 3 4 1 3 16 59 0 7 22 0 R   
VT 1 1 1 0 94 58 8 22 8 0 D The 8 State House 
independents are 5 from 
Vermont Progressive Party 
+ 3 Independents 
 
 
VA 11 11 3 8 32 67 1 20 20 0 R The Virginia legislature did 
not agree on congressional 
electoral maps until January 
13, 2012. The listed 
numbers for State House 
and Senate are therefore 
from the November 2011 
election. 
WA 9 10 6 4 57 41 0 27 22 0 D   
WV 3 3 1 2 65 35 0 27 7 0 D   
WI 8 8 3 5 38 60 1 14 19 0 R   
WY 1 1 0 1 9 51 0 4 26 0 R   
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Electoral district details 
Where not accredited to other sources, the data in these tables originate from the 
2014 and 2012 editions of The Almanac of American Politics and the Ballotpedia election 
databases.  
 
Columns explained: 
Inc.ran: An x indicates that an incumbent ran. Because many district borders had changed, 
incumbents from any district within the same state are counted as incumbents. Their 
financial advantage and name-recognition-advantage is still present. Candidates who had 
served previously and returned in 2012 are not seen as incumbents. Candidates who have 
been elected in special elections to fill vacant seats anytime before Election Day 2012 and 
have served, are seen as incumbents. 
Inc. won: An ‘x’ indicates that the incumbent — or one of the incumbents — won the seat. 
Party kept seat: An ‘x’ indicates that a representative from the same party as the previous 
representative was elected. This may be misleading, since redistricting caused many 
districts to be renumbered and without any incumbent running. In such cases the district is 
marked ‘x’ if the district with the same number in 2010 were won by same party in 2012. 
Party: Republicans are labeled ‘R’. Democrats are labeled ‘D’. There were no winners 
running for any other political parties. In Minnesota ‘D’ indicates that the winner 
represented the Minnesota Democratic–Farmer–Labor Party, which is affiliated with the 
United States Democratic Party. 
Winner 2012: Name of the person elected November 6, 2012 to represent the district in the 
113
th
 Congress. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Alabama 1st x x x 6 R Josiah Bonner Ran unopposed, replaced in special election Dec 
17, 2013 when he resigned to take a job with the 
University of Alabama.166 
Alabama 2nd x x x 2 R Martha Roby   
Alabama 3rd x x x 6 R Mike Rogers   
Alabama 4th x x x 9 R Robert Aderholt   
Alabama 5th x x x 2 R Mo Brooks   
Alabama 6th x x x 11 R Spencer Bachus   
Alabama 7th x x x 2 D Terri Sewell   
Alaska at-
large 
x x x 20 R Don Young   
Arizona 1st - - - 2 D Ann Kirkpatrick Redistricted as Democrat-friendly. Republican 
incumbent Ron Gosar moved to newly formed 4th 
district. Kirkpatrick served 1st term from 2008-
2010 
Arizona 2nd - - x 1 D Ron Barber Representative Gabrielle Giffords resigned after 
being shot. Barber, who was her staffer, was 
wounded during the same incident. Competitive 
seat 2014 
Arizona 3rd x x x 6 D Raúl Grijalva   
Arizona 4th x x x 2 R Paul Gosar Redrawn, GOP-friendly district. Incumbent Gosar 
moved from 1st district 
Arizona 5th - - x 5 R Matt Salmon Returned to House after years as lobbyist and state 
party chairman 
Arizona 6th x x x 2 R David Schweikert   
Arizona 7th x x x 11 D Ed Pastor   
Arizona 8th x x x 6 R Trent Franks Represented 2nd, redistricted to 8th. 
Arizona 9th - - - 1 D Kirsten Sinema New district 
Arkansas 1st x x x 2 R Rick Crawford   
Arkansas 
2nd 
x x x 2 R Tim Griffin   
Arkansas 3rd x x x 2 R Steve Womack   
Arkansas 4th - - - 1 R Tom Cotton Incumbent Democrat Mike Ross retired to run for 
governor. 
  
                                                 
166 Theresa Seiger. "Live: Rep. Jo Bonner Talks About His Resignation from Congress; New Job at Ua." 
Al.com, http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/05/live_rep_jo_bonner_talks_about.html#incart_river. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
California 1st - - - 1 R Doug LaMalfa Incumbent Mike 
Thompson displaced to and 
elected in 5th 
California 2nd - - x 1 D Jared Huffman Incumbent Lynn Woolsey 
retired and supported 
Huffman 
California 3rd x x x 2 D John Garamendi Garamendi served for the 
10th before redistricting. 
California 4th x x x 3 R Tom McClintock   
California 5th x x x 8 D Mike Thompson Thompson served for 1st 
District before the 2011 
redistricting. 
California 6th x x x 4 D Doris Matsui Matsui served for 5th 
District before redistricting. 
California 7th x - - 1 D Ami Bera Losing incumbent Dan 
Lungren (R) served for 3rd 
District. Bera lost to 
Lungren in 3rd in 2010. 
California 8th - - x 1 R Paul Cook Jerry Lewis (R) retired. 
California 9th x x x 4 D Jerry McNerney Displaced from 11th. 
California 10th x x x 2 R Jeff Dunham Displaced from 19th. 
California 11th x x x 20 D George Miller Miller displaced from 7th. 
California 12th x x x 13 D Nancy Pelosi Displaced from 8th. 
Speaker of the House 
2007-2011. 
California 13th x x x 8 D Barbara Lee She was displaced from 9 
California 14th x x x 3 D Jackie Speier Displaced from 12th 
California 15th x - x 1 D Eric Swalwell Defeated longtime 
incumbent Pete Stark, who 
was displaced from 13th 
California 16th x x x 5 D Jim Costa Displaced from 20th 
California 17th x x x 7 D Mike Honda Displaced from 15th 
California 18th x x x 11 D Anna Eshoo Displaced from 14th 
California 19th x x x 10 D Zoe Lofgren Displaced from 16th 
California 20th x x x 10 D Sam Farr Displaced from 17th 
California 21st - - x 1 R David Valadao Predecessor Devin Nunes 
displaced to 22 
California 22nd x x x 6 R Devin Nunes Nunes displaced from 21 
California 23rd x x x 4 R Kevin McCarthy Displaced from 22nd. 
California 24th x x x 8 D Lois Capps Displaced from 23rd. 
California 25th x x x 11 R Buck McKeon   
California 26th - - - 1 D Julia Bromley Incumbent Elton Gallegly 
(R) retired. 
California 27th x x x 2 D Judy Chu Displaced from 32nd 
California 28th x x x 7 D Adam Schiff Displaced from 29th 
California 29th - - x 1 D Tony Cardenas   
California 30th x x x 9 D Brad Sherman Displaced from 27, beat 
fellow Democrat 
incumbent Howard Berman 
(brother of professional 
gerrymanderer Michael 
Berman) in primaries167 
  
                                                 
167 Shane Goldmacher. "The Waxman-Berman Machine Finally Shuts Down." National Journal, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-waxman-berman-machine-finally-shuts-down-20130124. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
California 31st x x x 8 R Gary Miller Winner Miller displaced from 
42nd. 
California 32nd x x x 8 D Graciela Napolitano Winner displaced from 38th 
California 33rd x x x 20 D Henry Waxman Displaced from 30th 
California 34th x x x 11 D Xavier Becerra Displaced from 31st. 
California 35th x - - 1 D Gloria Negrete 
McLeod 
Incumbent Joe Baca(R) from 
former 43rd lost here 
California 36th x - x 1 D Raul Ruiz Losing six term incumbent 
Mary Bono Mack displaced 
from 45th 
California 37th x x x 2 D Karen Bass Displaced from 33rd 
California 38th x x x 6 D Linda Sanchez Displaced from 39th. 
Predecessor Edward Royce 
displaced to and won 39th 
California 39th x x x 11 R Edward Royce Displaced from 40th. 
Incumbent Gary Miller chose 
to run for and win 31st. 
California 40th x x x 11 D Lucille Roybal-Allard Displaced from 34th. 
California 41st - - - 1 D Mark Takano Hard to define if district was 
Democratic. The present 
geographical area is Democrat 
leaning. The former 41st 
District elected a Republican. 
California 42nd x x x 11 R Ken Calvert Displaced from 44th. 
Incumbent Gary Miller 
displaced to and won 31st. 
California 43rd x x x 12 D Maxine Waters Displaced from 35th 
California 44th x x x 1 D Janice Hahn Incumbent Hahn won special 
election in 2011 in 36th, ousted 
incumbent Laura Richardson 
(D) displaced from 37th in 
2012. 
California 45th x x x 4 R John Campbell Displaced from 48th. 
California 46th x x x 9 D Loretta Sanchez Displaced from 47th 
California 47th - - x 1 D Alan Lowenthal Predecessor displaced to 46th 
California 48th x x x 13 R Dana Rohrbacher Opponent Ron Varasteh(D) 
was displaced from 
incumbency in 46 
California 49th x x x 7 R Darrell Issa   
California 50th x x x 3 R Duncan Hunter His father held the same seat 
for 28 years. 
California 51st - - x 1 D Juan Vargas Incumbent Bob FiIlner (D) 
retired to run for San Diego 
Mayor. 
California 52nd x -   1 D Scott Peters Very close race. Beat 
incumbent Brian Bilbray (R) 
who was displaced from 50th. 
California 53rd x x x 7 D Susan Davis   
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Colorado 1st x x x 9 D Diana DeGette   
Colorado 2nd x x x 3 D Jared Polis   
Colorado 3rd x x x 2 R Scott Tipton   
Colorado 4th x x x 2 R Cory Gardner   
Colorado 5th x x x 4 R Doug Lamborn   
Colorado 6th x x x 3 R Mike Coffman   
Colorado 7th x x x 4 R Ed Perlmutter   
Connecticut 1st x x x 8 D John Larson   
Connecticut 2nd x x x 4 D Joe Courtney   
Connecticut 3rd x x x 12 D Rosa DeLauro   
Connecticut 4th x x x 3 D Jim Himes   
Connecticut 5th - - x 1 D Elizabeth Esty Incumbent Chris Murphy 
(D) ran for U. S.Senate. 
Delaware At-large x x x 2 D John Carney   
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Florida 1st x x x 6 R Jeff Miller   
Florida 2nd x x x 2 R Steve Southerland   
Florida 3rd - - x 1 R Ted Yoho 12 term incumbent Cliff 
Stearns (R) beaten in 
primary. District 
renumbered from Sixth. 
Florida 4th x x x 7 R Ander Crenshaw   
Florida 5th x x x 11 D Corinne Brown District renumbered from 
Third. 
Florida 6th - - - 1 R Ron DeSantis Newly drawn district. 
Florida 7th x x x 11 R John Mica Ran against former 
Twenty-fourth District 
incumbent Sandy Adams in 
the primaries. 
Florida 8th x x x 3 R Bill Posey   
Florida 9th - - - 2 D Alan Grayson Returned after 1 term off. 
Redrawn district. 
Florida 10th x x x 2 R Daniel Webster   
Florida 11th x x x 2 R Richard Nugent   
Florida 12th x x x 4 R Gus Bilirakis Succeeded his twelve term 
serving father, Michael, in 
2006. 
Florida 13th x x x 22 R Bill Young   
Florida 14th x x x 4 D Kathy Castor   
Florida 15th x x x 2 R Dennis Ross Ran unopposed 
Florida 16th x x x 4 R Vern Buchanan   
Florida 17th x x x 3 R Tom Rooney New district, Rooney 
served for the Sixteenth in 
2010. 
Florida 18th x - - 1 D Patrick Murphy At 29, youngest member of 
the 113th Congress. Beat 
Tea Party favorite, 
incumbent Allen West. 
Florida 19th - - x 1 R Trey Radel Incumbent Connie Mack 
ran for Senate. 
Florida 20th x x x 11 D Alcee Hastings   
Florida 21st x x x 2 D Ted Deutch After redistricting, Deutch 
kept three quarters of his 
old constituents in the old 
Nineteenth District. 
Florida 22nd - - - 1 D Lois Frankel Newly redrawn district. 
Incumbent Allen West ran 
unsuccessfully in the 
Eighteenth District. 
Florida 23rd x x x 5 D Debbie Wasserman 
Schultz 
Chairwoman of the 
Democratic National 
Committee. 
Florida 24th x x x 2 D Frederica Wilson Ran unopposed in the 
general election. 
Florida 25th x x x 6 R Mario Diaz-Balart Diaz-Balart joined Corinne 
Brown in opposing the Fair 
Districts reforms. 
Florida 26th x - - 1 D Joe Garcia Beat incumbent David 
Rivera (R) 
Florida 27th x x x 12 R Ileana Ros-Lehtinen   
  
 111 
 
District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Georgia 1st x x x 11 R Jack Kingston   
Georgia 2nd x x x 11 D Sanford Bishop   
Georgia 3rd x x x 5 R Lynn Westmoreland Ran unopposed 
Georgia 4th x x x 4 D Hank Johnson   
Georgia 5th x x x 14 D John Lewis   
Georgia 6th x x x 5 R Tom Price   
Georgia 7th x x x 2 R Rob Woodall   
Georgia 8th x x x 2 R Austin Scott Ran unopposed, both in 
primary and general 
election 
Georgia 9th - - - 1 R Doug Collins Newly drawn district. 
Georgia 10th x x x 3 R Paul Broun Ran unopposed. 
Georgia 11th x x x 6 R Phil Gingrey   
Georgia 12th x x x 5 D John Barrow Singled out as main target 
for the gerrymanderers, but 
won. Lost in 2014, though. 
Georgia 13th x x x 6 D David Scott   
Georgia 14th x x x 2 R Tom Graves   
Hawaii 1st x x x 2 D Colleenn Hanabusa  
Hawaii 2nd - - x 1 D Tulsi Gabbard Incumbent Mazie Hirono 
ran for U. S. Senate. 
Gabbard was the first 
Hindu in U. S. House. 
Idaho 1st x x x 2 R Raúl Labrador   
Idaho 2nd x x x 8 R Mike Simpson   
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Illinois 1st x x x 11 D Bobby Rush The only politician to beat 
Barack Obama in an 
election168 
Illinois 2nd x x x 9 D Jesse Jackson, Jr. Jackson resigned shortly 
after, pleading guilty to 
wire and mail fraud, having 
spent $750,000 of 
campaign money for 
personal expenses.169 
Illinois 3rd x x x 5 D Daniel Lipinski In 2004, Lipinski replaced 
his father, Bill Lipinski 
who served for 22 years. 
Illinois 4th x x x 11 D Luis Gutierrez   
Illinois 5th x x x 2 D Mike Quigley Succeeded Rahm Emanuel 
(Obama chief of 
staff/Chicago mayor) in 
2009. 
Illinois 6th x x x 6 R Peter Roskam District packed with 
Republicans to ease two 
neighboring Democratic 
seats. 
Illinois 7th x x x 7 D Danny Davis   
Illinois 8th x - - 1 D Tammy Duckworth Favorably redrawn district. 
Illinois 9th x x x 8 D Jan Schakowsky   
Illinois 10th x - - 1 D Brad Schneider   
Illinois 11th x x x 2 D Bill Foster Newly carved Democratic-
friendly district 
Illinois 12th - - x 1 D Bill Enyart Jerry Costello (D) retired 
Illinois 13th - - x 1 R Rodney Davis Tim Johnson (R) retired. 
Davis won 46.5% to 
46.2%. 
Illinois 14th x x x 2 R Randy Hultgren   
Illinois 15th x x x 9 R John Shimkus First time elected, he said 
he would serve no more 
than six terms. Changed his 
mind. 
Illinois 16th x x x 2 R Adam Kinzinger Before redistricting, 
Kinzinger served for 
Illiinois Eleventh. Beat ten-
term incumbent Don 
Manzullo (R) in the GOP 
primary election. 
Illinois 17th x - - 1 D Cheri Bustos Unseated Bobby Schilling 
(R) 
Illinois 18th x x x 3 R Aaron Schock   
  
                                                 
168 Lois Beckett. "Obama’s Gerrymander." ProPublica, http://www.propublica.org/article/obamas-
gerrymander. 
169 Michael S. Schmidt. "Jesse Jackson Jr. Pleads Guilty: ‘I Lived Off My Campaign’." The New York Times, 
February 20 2013. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Indiana 1st x x x 15 D Peter Visclosky   
Indiana 2nd - - - 1 R Jackie Walorski Newly redrawn with 
weakened Democrat 
electoral base. Incumbent 
Joe Donnelly (D) ran for 
Senate and won. 
Indiana 3rd x x x 2 R Marlin Stutzman   
Indiana 4th x x x 2 R Todd Rokita Redistricting placed 
Rokita's home in the 
Seventh District. Most of 
his voters remained in the 
Fourh. 
Indiana 5th - - x 1 R Susan Brooks Beat U. S.House veteran 
David McIntosh (R) in the 
GOP primary. Incumbent 
Dan Burton (R) retired. 
Indiana 6th - - x 1 R Luke Messer Incumbent Mike Pence (R) 
ran for governor. 
Indiana 7th x x x 3 D André Carson   
Indiana 8th x x x 2 R Larry Bucshon   
Indiana 9th x x x 2 R Todd Young   
Iowa 1st x x x 4 D Bruce Braley After redistricting, more 
than half of the voters were 
new to Braley. 
Iowa 2nd x x x 4 D Dave Loebsack After redistricting, more 
than half of the voters were 
new to Loebsack. 
Iowa 3rd x x x 10 R Tom Latham After redistricting, Latham 
was pit against Democrat 
incumbent Leonard 
Boswell. 
Iowa 4th x x x 6 R Steve King King's Fifth District 
disappeared after 
reapportionment, and King 
won in a previously very 
Democratic-friendly 
district. 
Kansas 1st x x x 2 R Tim Huelskamp   
Kansas 2nd x x x 3 R Lynn Jenkins   
Kansas 3rd x x x 2 R Kevin Yoder   
Kansas 4th x x x 2 R Mike Pompeo   
Kentucky 1st x x x 10 R Ed Whitfield   
Kentucky 2nd x x x 3 R Brett Guthrie   
Kentucky 3rd x x x 4 D John Yarmouth   
Kentucky 4th - - x 1 R Thomas Massie Incumbent Geoff Davis (R) 
retired 
Kentucky 5th x x x 17 R Harold Rogers   
Kentucky 6th x - - 1 R Andy Barr Beat incumbent Ben 
Chandler (D) even if 
redrawn district was 
expected to be more 
Democrat-friendly. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Louisiana 1st x x x 3 R Steve Scalise   
Louisiana 2nd x x x 2 D Cedric Richmond Redrawn, but still a 
minority-majority district 
Louisiana 3rd x x x 5 R Charles Boustany Democrat freshman Jeff 
Landry lost his district 
through redistricting and 
ran unsuccessfully here 
against another incumbent.. 
Louisiana 4th x x x 3 R John Fleming   
Louisiana 5th x x x 6 R Rodney Alexander Alexander switched parties 
in 2004. 
Louisiana 6th x x x 3 R Bill Cassidy Future senator? Campaigns 
outside own district. 
Maine 1st x x x 3 D Chellie Pingree   
Maine 2nd x x x 6 D Michael Michaud   
Maryland 1st x x x 2 R Andy Harris Received a gift of surplus 
Republicans from the 
Sixth. 
Maryland 2nd x x x 6 D Dutch Ruppersberger   
Maryland 3rd x x x 4 D John Sarbanes   
Maryland 4th x x x 3 D Donna Edwards   
Maryland 5th x x x 16 D Steny Hoyer   
Maryland 6th x - - 1 D John Delaney Beat incumbent Roscoe 
Bartlett. Republican voters 
redistricted to First District. 
Dem voters redistricted 
from Eighth. 
Maryland 7th x x x 9 D Elijah Cummings   
Maryland 8th x x x 6 D Chris Van Hollen   
Massachusetts 1st x x x 13 D Richard Neal Ran unopposed 
Massachusetts 2nd x x x 9 D Jim McGovern Ran unopposed in five of 
six last elections 
Massachusetts 3rd x x x 3 D Niki Tsongas   
Massachusetts 4th - - x 1 D Joseph Kennedy III RFK's grandson. 
Incumbent Barney Frank 
(D) retired after 
redistricting made district 
more conservative. 
Massachusetts 5th x x x 19 D Edward Markey   
Massachusetts 6th x x x 9 D John Tierney Won close race, 48% vs 
Richard Tisei (R) 47% 
Massachusetts 7th x x x 8 D Michael Capuano   
Massachusetts 8th x x x 6 D Stephen Lynch   
Massachusetts 9th x x x 2 D Wiliam Keating Moved from Eighth to his 
other home to avoid 
competing w/Lynch. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Michigan 1st x x x 2 R Dan Benishek   
Michigan 2nd x x x 2 R Bill Huizenga   
Michigan 3rd x x x 2 R Justin Amash   
Michigan 4th x x x 12 R Dave Camp   
Michigan 5th - - x 1 D Dan Kildee Replaced his uncle, Dale 
Kildee, who retired after 36 
years in Congress. 
Michigan 6th x x x 14 R Fred Upton   
Michigan 7th x x x 3 R Tim Walberg   
Michigan 8th x x x 7 R Mike Rogers Chair of House Intelligence 
Committe. Former FBI 
agent. 
Michigan 9th x x x 16 D Sander Levin Faced another incumbent, 
Gary Peters (D) after 
redistricting. Peters chose 
to move and run in the 
Fourteenth. 
Michigan 10th x x x 6 R Candice Miller   
Michigan 11th - - x 1 R Kerry Bentivolio Incumbent Thaddeus 
McCotter (R) tried to run 
for president, then failed to 
run for House. 
Michigan 12th x x x 29 D John Dingell Longest serving House 
representative, ever. 
Michigan 13th x x x 25 D John Conyers   
Michigan 14th x x x 3 D Gary Peters Moved from Ninth. 
Minority-majority district. 
Beat another incumbent, 
Hanson Clarke (D) in the 
primary election. 
Minnesota 1st x x x 4 D Tim Walz D, in Minnesota, is DFL, 
Democratic Farmer Labor 
Party 
Minnesota 2nd x x x 6 R John Kline   
Minnesota 3rd x x x 3 R Erik Paulsen   
Minnesota 4th x x x 7 D Betty McCollum Michele Bachmann's home 
is in this district. 
Minnesota 5th x x x 4 D Keith Ellison First Muslim in Congress, 
first black from Minnesota 
Minnesota 6th x x x 4 R Michele Bachmann Also presidential candidate 
until January, 2012. Slim 
victory, attributed in part to 
judicial committee 
adjustments and leftover 
presidential campaign 
funds. Ran in Sixth to 
avoid facing incumbent 
Betty McCollum in Fourth. 
Minnesota 7th x x x 12 D Collin Peterson   
Minnesota 8th x - - 4(!) D Rick Nolan Beat freshman incumbent 
Chip Cravaack (R). Nolan 
was a U. S. House rep 
some 30 years ago. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Mississippi 1st x x x 2 R Alan Nunnelee   
Mississippi 2nd x x x 10 D Bennie Thompson   
Mississippi 3rd x x x 3 R Gregg Harper   
Mississippi 4th x x x 2 R Steve Palazzo   
Missouri 1st x x x 7 D William Lacy Clay Beat fellow (redistricted) 
incumbent Russ Carnahan 
in primary election. 
Missouri 2nd - - x 1 R Ann Wagner Incumbent Todd Akin(R) 
ran for Senator. Incumbent 
Russ Carnahan (D) of 
former Third District, 
backed off. 
Missouri 3rd x x x 3 R Blaine Luetkemeyer   
Missouri 4th x x x 2 R Vicky Hartzler   
Missouri 5th x x x 5 D Emanuel Cleaver Leader of Black Caucus in 
112th Congress. Worked 
for Republican redistricting 
plan that favored him. 
Missouri 6th x x x 7 R Sam Graves Chairman of Small 
Business Committe. 
Missouri 7th x x x 2 R Billy Long   
Missouri 8th x x x 9 R Jo Ann Emerson Resigned in 2013 
Montana at-large - - x 1 R Steve Daines Incumbent Denny Rehberg 
(R) ran for Senate. 
Nebraska 1st x x x 5 R Jeff Fortenberry   
Nebraska 2nd x x x 8 R Lee Terry   
Nebraska 3rd x x x 4 R Adrian Smith   
Nevada 1st - - x 2 D Dina Titus Titus lost reelection in 
Third, 2010 
Nevada 2nd x x x 1 R Mark Amodei Won special election 
September 2011. Reelected 
November 2012 
Nevada 3rd x x x 2 R Joe Heck Beat Dina Titus in 2010. 
Nevada 4th - -   1 D Steven Horsford New district. No 
incumbent. No previous 
party. 
New Hampshire 
1st 
x - - 3 D Carol Shea Porter Incumbent Porter lost to 
Frank Guinta (R) in 2010, 
but beat him in the 2012 
rematch 
New Hampshire 
2nd 
x - - 1 D Ann McLane Kuster Lost w/only 3500 votes to 
Charlie Bass (R) in 2010. 
Beat him 50-45% this year. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
New Jersey 1st x x x 12 D Robert Andrews   
New Jersey 2nd x x x 10 R Frank LoBiondo   
New Jersey 3rd x x x 2 R Jon Runyan Offensive linesman for 
Tennessee Titans and 
Philadelphia Eagles. Voted 
2nd dirtiest player in NFL 
2006.170 
New Jersey 4th x x x 17 R Chris Smith   
New Jersey 5th x x x 6 R Scott Garrett Fellow incumbent retired 
after redistricting 
New Jersey 6th x x x 13 D Frank Pallone   
New Jersey 7th x x x 3 R Leonard Lance   
New Jersey 8th x x x 4 D Albio Sires   
New Jersey 9th x x x 9 D Bill Pascrell   
New Jersey 10th x x x 1 D Donald Payne Jr. First elected March 2012, 
when his father died in 
office. 
New Jersey 11th x x x 10 R Rodney Frelinghuysen   
New Jersey 12th x x x 8 D Rush Holt   
New Mexico 1st - - x 1 D Michelle Lijan Grisham Incumbent Martin 
Heinreich (D) ran for the 
U. S. Senate 
New Mexico 2nd x x x 5 R Steve Pearce   
New Mexico 3rd x x x 3 D Ben Ray Luján   
  
                                                 
170 "Pats' Harrison Can't Wash Hands of Dirtiest Player Label." ESPN, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2631666. 
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District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
New York 1st x x x 6 D Tim Bishop   
New York 2nd x x x 11 R Peter King   
New York 3rd x x x 7 D Steve Israel   
New York 4th x x x 9 D Carolyn McCarthy   
New York 5th x x x 8 D Gregory Meeks   
New York 6th - - x 1 D Grace Meng First Asian-American 
woman from NY in 
Congress. Democrat 
incumbent Gary Ackerman 
retired. 
New York 7th x x x 11 D Nydia Velázquez   
New York 8th - - x 1 D Hakeem Jeffries Incumbent Edolphus 
Towns (D) retired after 20 
years. 
New York 9th x x x 4 D Yvette Clarke   
New York 10th x x x 11 D Jerrold Nadler   
New York 11th x x x 2 R Michael Grimm   
New York 12th x x x 11 D Carolyn Maloney   
New York 13th x x x 22 D Charle Rangel Close to expulsion from 
Senate in 2010. Threatened 
by growing Hispanic 
population in his Harlem 
district. 
New York 14th x x x 8 D Joseph Crowley   
New York 15th x x x 12 D José Serrano   
New York 16th x x x 13 D Eliot Engel   
New York 17th x x x 13 D Nita Lowey Won w/ 64% of the votes 
in redrawn district w/more 
than 50% new voters. 
New York 18th - - x 1 D Sean Patrick Maloney Incumbent Nita Lowey ran 
in redrawn 17th. Former 
Bill Clinton staffer. 
New York 19th x x x 2 R Chris Gibson More than half of 
constituents new, due to 
redistricting. 
New York 20th x x x 3 D Paul Tonko   
New York 21st x x x 2 D Bill Owens   
New York 22nd x x x 2 R Richard Hanna   
New York 23rd x x x 2 R Tom Reed   
New York 24th x - - 2 D Dan Maffei Maffei also served 2009-
2011. Beat incumbent Ann 
Marie Burkle (R) 
New York 25th x x x 14 D Louise Slaughter   
New York 26th x x x 5 D Brian Higgins   
New York 27th x - - 1 R Chris Collins Self-made multimillionaire 
who beat incumbent Kathy 
Hochul (D) in a close race. 
  
 119 
 
District Inc. 
ran 
Inc. 
won 
Party 
kept 
seat 
Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
North Carolina 1st x x x 5 D G.K. Butterfield   
North Carolina 2nd x x x 2 R Renee Ellmers   
North Carolina 3rd x x x 10 R Walter Jones   
North Carolina 4th x x x 13 D David Price   
North Carolina 5th x x x 5 R Virginia Foxx   
North Carolina 6th x x x 15 R Howard Coble   
North Carolina 7th x x x 9 D Mike McIntyre 336,000 votes cast. Won by 
654. 
North Carolina 8th x - - 1 R Richard Hudson Beat incumbent Larry 
Kissell (D) 
North Carolina 9th - - x 1 R Robert Pittenger Incumbent Sue Myrick (R) 
retired 
North Carolina 
10th 
x x x 5 R Patrick McHenry   
North Carolina 
11th 
- - - 1 R Mark Meadows Incumbent Heath Shuler 
(D) retired after 
redistricting eroded his 
electoral base. 
North Carolina 
12th 
x x x 12 D Melvin Watt The legendary 
gerrymandered "lower 
intestines"-district 
North Carolina 
13th 
- - - 1 R George Holding Incumbent Brad Miller (D) 
retired after redistricting 
had placed his house in the 
Fourth District. 
North Dakota at-
large 
- - x 1 R Kevin Cramer Incumbent Rick Berg ran 
for Senate. 
Ohio 1st x x x 9 R Steve Chabot   
Ohio 2nd - - x 1 R Brad Wenstrup Beat incumbent Jean 
Schmidt (R) in the primary 
election. 
Ohio 3rd - - - 1 D Joyce Beatty Newly drawn district 
Ohio 4th x x x 4 R Jim Jordan   
Ohio 5th x x x 3 R Bob Latta   
Ohio 6th x x x 2 R Bill Johnson   
Ohio 7th x x x 2 R Bob Gibbs Served for Ohio 18th in 
then 112th Congress 
Ohio 8th x x x 12 R John Boehner Speaker of the House 
Ohio 9th x x x 16 D Marcy Kaptur Beat fellow Democrat 
incumbent Dennis 
Kucinich in the primary 
election. 
Ohio 10th x x x 6 R Mike Turner   
Ohio 11th x x x 3 R Marcia Fudge Ran unopposed in the 
general election. 
Ohio 12th x x x 7 R Pat Tiberi   
Ohio 13th x x x 6 D Tim Ryan   
Ohio 14th - - x 1 R David Joyce Incumbent Steve 
LaTourette (R) retired 
Ohio 15th x x x 2 R Steve Stivers   
Ohio 16th x x x 2 R Jim Renacci Beat another incumbent, 
Betty Sutton(D) 
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Inc. 
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Party 
kept 
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Inc. 
Term 
no. 
Party Winner 2012 Note 
Oklahoma 1st - - x 1 R Jim Bridenstine Beat incumbent fellow 
Republican John Sullivan 
in the primary 
Oklahoma 2nd - - - 1 R Markwaune Mullin Incumbent Dan Boren (D) 
retired. 
Oklahoma 3rd x x x 10 R Frank Lucas   
Oklahoma 4th x x x 6 R Tom Cole   
Oklahoma 5th x x x 2 R James Lankford   
Oregon 1st x x x 1 D Suzanne Bonamici Won special election 
January, 2012 to replace 
David Wu (R). Reelected 
in November. 
Oregon 2nd x x x 8 R Greg Walden   
Oregon 3rd x x x 9 D Earl Blumenauer   
Oregon 4th x x x 14 D Peter DeFazio   
Oregon 5th x x x 3 D Kurt Schrader   
Pennsylvania 1st x x x 8 D Robert Brady   
Pennsylvania 2nd x x x 10 D Chaka Fattah   
Pennsylvania 3rd x x x 2 R Mike Kelly   
Pennsylvania 4th - - x 1 R Scott Perry Incumbent Todd Platts (R) 
retired. 
Pennsylvania 5th x x x 5 R Glenn Thompson   
Pennsylvania 6th x x x 6 R Jim Gerlach   
Pennsylvania 7th x x x 2 R Pat Meehan   
Pennsylvania 8th x x x 3 R Mike Fizpatrick   
Pennsylvania 9th x x x 6 R Bill Shuster   
Pennsylvania 10th x x x 2 R Tom Marino   
Pennsylvania 11th x x x 2 R Lou Barletta   
Pennsylvania 12th x - - 1 R Keith Rothfus Beat incumbent Mark Critz 
(D) in GOP-favorably 
redrawn district. 
Pennsylvania 13th x x x 5 D Allyson Schwartz   
Pennsylvania 14th x x x 10 D Mike Doyle   
Pennsylvania 15th x x x 5 R Charlie Dent   
Pennsylvania 16th x x x 9 R Joe Pitts   
Pennsylvania 17th - - x 1 D Matt Cartwright Beat incumbent Tim 
Holden (D) in Democratic 
primary. 
Pennsylvania 18th x x x 6 R Tim Murphy   
Rhode Island 1st x x x 2 D David Cicilline   
Rhode Island 2nd x x x 7 D Jim Langevine   
South Carolina 1st x x x 2 R Tim Scott Appointed to U. S. Senate 
shortly after being elected 
in 2012. Mark Sanford won 
seat in 2013 election. 
South Carolina 2nd x x x 6 R Joe Wilson Ran unopposed in the 
general election. 
South Carolina 3rd x x x 2 R Jeff Duncan   
South Carolina 4th x x x 2 R Trey Gowdy   
South Carolina 5th x x x 2 R Mick Mulvaney   
South Carolina 6th x x x 11 D James Clyburn   
South Carolina 7th - - - 1 R Tom Rice New district 
South Dakota at-
large 
x x x 2 R Kristi Noem   
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Tennessee 1st x x x 3 R Phil Roe   
Tennessee 2nd x x x 13 R John Duncan   
Tennessee 3rd x x x 2 R Charles Fleischmann   
Tennessee 4th x x x 2 R Scott DesJarlais   
Tennessee 5th x x x 12 D Jim Cooper   
Tennessee 6th x x x 2 R Diana Black   
Tennessee 7th x x x 6 R Marsha Blackburn   
Tennessee 8th x x x 2 R Stephen Fincher   
Tennessee 9th x x x 4 D Steve Cohen   
  
 122 
 
District Inc. 
ran 
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Term 
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Party Winner 2012 Note 
Texas 1st x x x 5 R Louie Gohmert   
Texas 2nd x x x 5 R Ted Poe   
Texas 3rd x x x 11 R Sam Johnson Ran unopposed in the 
general election 
Texas 4th x x x 17 R Ralph Hall Ran as a GOP-friendly 
Democrat 1980-2004. 
Texas 5th x x x 5 R Jeb Hensarling   
Texas 6th x x x 15 R Joe Barton   
Texas 7th x x x 7 R John Culberson   
Texas 8th x x x 9 R Kevin Brady   
Texas 9th x x x 5 D Al Green   
Texas 10th x x x 5 R Michael McCaul   
Texas 11th x x x 5 R Mike Conaway   
Texas 12th x x x 9 R Kay Granger Only Texan woman in 
Congress. 
Texas 13th x x x 10 R Mac Thornberry   
Texas 14th - - - 1 R Randy Weber Incumbent Ron Paul (Lib) 
retired 
Texas 15th x x x 9 D Rubén Hinojosa   
Texas 16th x - - 1 D Beto O' Rourke Beat incumbent Silvestre 
Reyes (R). 
Texas 17th x x x 2 R Bill Flores   
Texas 18th x x x 10 D Sheila Jackson Lee   
Texas 19th x x x 5 R Randy Neugebauer   
Texas 20th - - x 1 D Joaquin Castro Incumbent Charles 
Augustine Gonzalez (D) 
retired 
Texas 21st x x x 14 R Lamar Smith   
Texas 22nd x x x 3 R Pete Olson   
Texas 23rd x - - 1 D Pete Gallego Beat incumbent Francisco 
Canseco (R) 
Texas 24th x x x 5 R Kenny Marchant   
Texas 25th - - - 1 R Roger Williams Completely redrawn GOP-
friendly. Former 25th 
incumbent redistricted to 
the 35th. 
Texas 26th x x x 6 R Michael Burgess   
Texas 27th x x x 2 R Blake Farenthold   
Texas 28th x x x 5 D Henry Cuellar   
Texas 29th x x x 11 D Gene Green   
Texas 30th x x x 11 D Eddie Bernice Johnson   
Texas 31st x x x 6 R John Carter   
Texas 32nd x x x 9 R Pete Sessions   
Texas 33rd - - - 1 D Marc Veasey Newly created district 
Texas 34th - - - 1 D Filemon Vela Newly created district 
Texas 35th x x x 10 D Lloyd Doggett Redistricted from 25th 
Texas 36th - - - 2 R Steve Stockman Newly created district. 
Stockman served for Texas 
9th 1995-1997 
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Party Winner 2012 Note 
Utah 1st x x x 6 R Rob Bishop   
Utah 2nd - - - 1 R Chris Stewart New district 2012 
Utah 3rd x x x 3 R Jason Chaffetz   
Utah 4th x x x 7 D Jim Matheson 768 votes ahead of Mia 
Love (R). 119,803 vs 
119,035 
Vermont At-large x x x 4 D Peter Welch   
Virginia 1st x x x 3 R Rob Wittman   
Virginia 2nd x x x 2 R Scott Rigell   
Virginia 3rd x x x 11 D Bobby Scott   
Virginia 4th x x x 6 R Randy Forbes   
Virginia 5th x x x 2 R Robert Hurt   
Virginia 6th x x x 11 R Bob Goodlatte   
Virginia 7th x x x 7 R Eric Cantor House majority leader. 
Virginia 8th x x x 12 D Jim Moran   
Virginia 9th x x x 2 R Morgan Griffith   
Virginia 10th x x x 17 R Frank Wolf   
Virginia 11th x x x 3 D Gerald Connolly   
Washington 1st - - x 1 D Suzan DelBene The was also a special 
election on Election Day, 
2012, to replace Governor-
to-be Jay Inslee(D) for the 
remainder of the term, 
which DelBene also won. 
In this thesis, however, she 
will not be counted as an 
incumbent, since it did not 
affect the election. 
Washington 2nd x x x 7 D Rick Larsen  
Washington 3rd x x x 2 R Jaime Herrera Beutler   
Washington 4th x x x 10 R Doc Hastings   
Washington 5th x x x 5 R Cathy McMorris Rodgers   
Washington 6th - - x 1 D Derek Kilmer Incumbent Norm Dicks (D) 
retired 
Washington 7th x x x 13 R Jim McDermott   
Washington 8th x x x 5 R Dave Reichert   
Washington 9th x x x 9 D Adam Smith   
Washington 10th - - - 1 D Denny Heck New district 2012 
West Virginia 1st x x x 2 R David McKenley   
West Virginia 2nd x x x 7 R Shelly Moore Capito   
West Virginia 3rd x x x 19 D Nick Rahall   
Wisconsin 1st x x x 8 R Paul Ryan Chair of the House Budget 
Committee, VP Nominee 
2012 
Wisconsin 2nd - - x 1 D Mark Pokan Incumbent Tammy 
Baldwin (D) ran for Senate. 
Wisconsin 3rd x x x 9 D Ron Kind   
Wisconsin 4th x x x 5 D Gwen Moore   
Wisconsin 5th x x x 18 R Jim Sensenbrenner   
Wisconsin 6th x x x 17 R Tom Petri   
Wisconsin 7th x x x 2 R Sean Duffy   
Wisconsin 8th x x x 2 R Reid Ribble   
Wyoming at-large x x x 3 R Cynthia Lummis   
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Reelection rates 
The following four tables show incumbent reelection rates in states redistricting by 
commission and states redistricting by legislature. The first table of states redistricting by 
legislature is divided into two separate tables. The first table of those two shows states in 
which one party controlled both chambers of the legislature and — if necessary — the 
governorship at the time of redistricting. 
 
Explanation of terms and column headings: 
Majority is the largest party in state legislature at time of redistricting.  
Minority is the smallest party in state legislature at time of redistricting.  
Weighted is a percentage. It is the number of incumbents within a given category who 
won, divided by the number of districts in which incumbents ran, multiplied by one 
hundred and rounded to the nearest integer. 
Unweighted is the average of the state reelection percentages within a given category, 
regardless of the states’ respective sizes.  
Won is the number of incumbents who won reelection on Election Day 2012. 
Ran is the number of districts in which incumbents ran on Election Day 2012. 
% is the number of incumbents who ran divided by the number of districts in which 
incumbents ran for reelection, multiplied by one hundred. 
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States redistricting by commission 
Overall       
 
Majority   
 
Minority   
Weighted 
  
93 
   
95 
   
89 
Unweighted 
  
98 
   
99 
   
63 
State Won Ran %   Won Ran %  Won Ran % 
Arizona 5 5 100   3 3 100 
 
2 2 100 
California 39 44 89   27 29 93 
 
12 15 80 
Hawaii 1 1 100   1 1 100 
 
0 0 0 
Idaho 2 2 100   2 2 100 
 
0 0 0 
New Jersey 12 12 100   6 6 100 
 
6 6 100 
Washington 7 7 100 
 
2 2 100 
 
5 5 100 
Sum 66 71     45 47     27 30 
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States redistricting by legislature 
Overall       
 
Majority   
 
Minority   
Weighted 
  
95 
   
96 
   
91 
Unweighted 
  
94 
   
87 
   
73 
State Won Ran %   Won Ran %  Won Ran % 
Alabama 7 7 100 
 
6 6 100 
 
1 1 100 
Arkansas 3 3 100 
 
3 3 100 
 
0 0 0 
Colorado 7 7 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
3 3 100 
Connecticut 4 4 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
0 0 0 
Florida 20 22 91 
 
14 16 88 
 
6 6 100 
Georgia 13 13 100 
 
8 8 100 
 
5 5 100 
Illinois 13 16 81 
 
8 8 100 
 
5 8 63 
Indiana 6 6 100  4 4 100  2 2 1000 
Iowa 4 4 100 
 
2 2 100 
 
2 2 100 
Kansas 4 4 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
0 0 0 
Kentucky 4 5 80 
 
1 2 50 
 
3 3 100 
Louisiana 6 6 100 
 
1 2 50 
 
5 5 100 
Maine 2 2 100 
 
0 0 0 
 
2 2 100 
Maryland 7 8 88 
 
6 6 100 
 
1 2 50 
Massachusetts 8 8 100 
 
8 8 100 
 
0 0 0 
Michigan 12 12 100 
 
9 9 100 
 
3 3 100 
Minnesota 7 8 88 
 
3 4 75 
 
4 4 100 
Mississippi 4 4 100 
 
3 3 100 
 
1 1 100 
Missouri 7 7 100 
 
5 5 100 
 
2 2 100 
Nebraska 3 3 100 
 
3 3 100 
 
0 0 0 
Nevada 2 2 100 
 
0 0 0 
 
2 2 100 
New Hampshire 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
New Mexico 2 2 100 
 
1 1 100 
 
1 1 100 
New York 22 24 92 
 
17 18 94 
 
5 6 83 
North Carolina 9 10 90 
 
5 5 100 
 
4 5 80 
Ohio 13 13 100 
 
11 11 100 
 
2 3 66 
Oklahoma 3 3 100 
 
3 3 100 
 
0 0 0 
Oregon 5 5 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
1 1 100 
Pennsylvania 15 16 94 
 
11 11 100 
 
4 5 80 
Rhode Island 2 2 100 
 
2 2 100 
 
0 0 0 
South Carolina 6 6 100 
 
5 5 100 
 
1 1 100 
Tennessee 9 9 100 
 
7 7 100 
 
2 2 100 
Texas 28 30 93 
 
21 23 91 
 
7 7 100 
Utah 3 3 100 
 
2 2 100 
 
1 1 100 
Virginia 11 11 100 
 
8 8 100 
 
3 3 100 
West Virginia 3 3 100 
 
1 1 100 
 
2 2 100 
Wisconsin 7 7 100 
 
5 5 100 
 
2 2 100 
Sum 275 289     195 203     80 88   
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States redistricting by legislature with one-
party control of the process 
In these states one party had a controlling majority in the one or both chambers of the 
legislature and of the Governor’s office where needed. 
Overall       
 
Majority   
 
Minority   
Weighted 
  
95 
   
97 
   
87 
Unweighted 
  
97 
   
95 
   
63 
State Won Ran %   Won Ran %  Won Ran % 
Alabama 7 7 100 
 
6 6 100 
 
1 1 100 
Arkansas 3 3 100 
 
3 3 100 
 
0 0 0 
Connecticut 4 4 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
0 0 0 
Florida 20 22 90 
 
14 16 88 
 
6 6 100 
Georgia 13 13 100 
 
8 8 100 
 
5 5 100 
Illinois 13 16 81 
 
8 8 100 
 
5 8 63 
Kansas 4 4 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
0 0 0 
Maine 2 2 100 
 
0 0 0 
 
2 2 100 
Maryland 7 8 88 
 
6 6 100 
 
1 2 50 
Massachusetts 8 8 100 
 
8 8 100 
 
0 0 0 
Michigan 12 12 100 
 
9 9 100 
 
3 3 100 
Nebraska 3 3 100 
 
3 3 100 
 
0 0 0 
North Carolina 9 10 90 
 
5 5 100 
 
4 5 80 
Ohio 13 13 100 
 
11 11 100 
 
2 3 67 
Oklahoma 3 3 100 
 
3 3 100 
 
0 0 0 
Pennsylvania 15 16 94 
 
11 11 100 
 
4 5 80 
Rhode Island 2 2 100 
 
2 2 100 
 
0 0 0 
South Carolina 6 6 100 
 
5 5 100 
 
1 1 100 
Tennessee 9 9 100 
 
7 7 100 
 
2 2 100 
Texas 28 30 93 
 
21 23 91 
 
7 7 100 
Utah 3 3 100 
 
2 2 100 
 
1 1 100 
West Virginia 3 3 100 
 
1 1 100 
 
2 2 100 
Wisconsin 7 7 100 
 
5 5 100 
 
2 2 100 
Sum 194 204     146 150     48 55 
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States redistricting by legislature without 
one-party control of the process 
In these states neither party could control the redistricting process alone. 
Overall       
 
Majority   
 
Minority   
Weighted 
  
96 
   
93 
   
97 
Unweighted 
  
90 
   
76 
   
91 
State Won Ran %   Won Ran %  Won Ran % 
Colorado 7 7 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
3 3 100 
Indiana 6 6 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
2 2 100 
Iowa 4 4 100 
 
2 2 100 
 
2 2 100 
Kentucky 4 5 80 
 
1 2 50 
 
3 3 100 
Louisiana 6 6 100 
 
1 2 50 
 
5 5 100 
Minnesota 7 8 88 
 
3 4 75 
 
4 4 100 
Mississippi 4 4 100 
 
3 3 100 
 
1 1 100 
Missouri 7 7 100 
 
5 5 100 
 
2 2 100 
Nevada 2 2 100 
 
0 0 0 
 
2 2 100 
New Hampshire 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 
New Mexico 2 2 100 
 
1 1 100 
 
1 1 100 
New York 22 24 92 
 
17 18 94 
 
5 6 83 
Oregon 5 5 100 
 
4 4 100 
 
1 1 100 
Virginia 11 11 100 
 
8 8 100 
 
3 3 100 
Sum 87 91 
  
53 57 
  
34 35  
 
